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The Canadian Senate is often the target of criticism and there have been countless calls to 
reform Canada’s upper chamber since its creation in 1867. While much has been written 
about the Senate’s lacklustre performance in the modern period, there remains limited 
discussion on the operation of the Senate during its early years. Addressing this lacuna is 
important, in order to consider whether the Senate ever performed as those who designed the 
institution had intended.   
 
This thesis analyzes the original intentions for the Canadian Senate, developed by the 
Fathers of Confederation and specified in the British North America Act (1867), showing 
how the architects of the Senate regarded it as a chamber for sober second thought. The 
thesis then considers the extent to which senators followed the founders’ intentions when 
legislating over three government bills that were blocked in the Senate during the first sixty 
years of its existence. Drawing on Hansard, newspaper articles and archival documents, the 
thesis examines the operation of the Senate with regard to debating and then blocking the 
Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill (1875), the Naval Aid Bill (1912) and the Old Age 
Pension Bill (1926). These blocked bills provide a representative sample of the diverse bills 
considered by the Senate in its first sixty years. When considered together they also 
encompass the different federal political party contexts which occurred in the Canadian 
Parliament within the first sixty years of Confederation.  
 
The thesis demonstrates that although the senators pr vided a well informed, critical second 
thought when debating these bills, the issue of partisan block voting that had concerned the 
Fathers of Confederation and remains a significant aspect of contemporary debates about 
Senate reform, affected the independence of the Senate a d the legislative outcomes in each 
case.   
 
The thesis suggests that although the Senate can provide a sober second thought on 
legislation, the ideal Senate, as envisaged by its creators, is always likely to be affected by 
the dynamics of partisan politics. Those involved in the creation of second chambers, or 
proposing Senate reform in the contemporary period, may benefit from the broader historical 
perspective that this thesis provides. In making a broader contribution to debates about the 
design of second chambers, this thesis highlights how t e objectives of those involved in the 
initial design of second chambers may not be easily achieved in practice, even after 
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There is an ever growing reform movement in Canada. It is not new, for it 
can be traced back over one hundred years, it is almost as old as Canada itself. 
Certain years it is dormant, but other years it is high on the agenda. There have been 
countless attempts for reform, numerous reform models proposed, lessons learnt and 
after years of failure there might be some success on the horizon in reforming one of 
Canada’s most historic political institutions. The institution in reference is the Senate 
of Canada. 
 The Canadian Parliament consists of the House of Commons, the Senate and 
the Sovereign. The House of Commons is the lower chamber and its members are 
popularly elected while the Senate is the upper chamber which has one hundred and 
five senators who are appointed by the governor general of Canada on the advice of 
the prime minister. All proposed legislation must be passed by both chambers before 
it receives Royal Assent and becomes law. The Canadi  upper chamber has 
undergone little reform since Canada’s creation in 1867, as the last substantial reform 
on the Senate was in 1965 when the retirement age changed from a life appointment 
to mandatory retirement at the age of seventy-five.  
There is the potential for some success in Senate reform with the current 
Canadian Government under Prime Minister Stephen Harper. As the Prime Minister 
has majority support in both chambers of Parliament, there is the probability of 
reform legislation passing through the Canadian Parliament with little resistance. 
However, if the best predictor of the future is that of the past, Prime Minister Harper 
has a very steep hill to climb because Senate reform is incredibly difficult to achieve 
in Canada as the provinces undoubtedly will get involved. Calls for change and 
reform are not new, and in the twenty-first century Canadians are uneasy about non-
elected parliamentarians acting against the elected and accountable members of 
parliament. 
 
The Background and Context of the Canadian Senate 
 Ever since the Senate was created in 1867 it has been subjected to numerous 
reform proposals. In the most recent Canadian Speech from the Throne delivered in 
Parliament on 3 June 2011, Governor General David Johnston said, “Reform of the 
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Senate remains a priority for our Government. Our Government will reintroduce 
legislation to limit term lengths and to encourage provinces and territories to hold 
elections for Senate nominees.”1 The debate is alive and well in the contemporary 
period as it has been throughout most of Canadian history. However there are many 
questions that develop within the larger debate surrounding Senate reform. With the 
constant barrage of criticism forwarded at the Canadian Senate concerning its 
function and performance, which resulted in the subsequent calls for reform, an 
interesting and important question developed. Through t the history of the 
Canadian Senate, did it ever function and perform as it was intended by its creators? 
If it did function and perform as it was intended, what changed from then to now, or 
if it did not, why not? Was there ever a period when the Senate performed as it was 
intended during its history?  
There were many time periods on which an in-depth analysis could be 
performed, but this thesis focuses on the Senate immediately following the act of 
Confederation. An examination of the Senate in the early years after Confederation is 
interesting because one could look at Confederation as an event on reform in that a 
new Senate was created. It is relevant in the modern p iod today because people 
want to create a new reformed Senate and along with that comes their intentions and 
expectations. Back in Canadian history during the Confederation Conferences, the 
Fathers of Confederation discussed and created the new Canadian Senate and they 
had certain intentions for it on how it would function. By examining how closely the 
intentions and expectations of the Fathers of Confederation were for their new Senate 
can be relevant in the modern discussion because what one wants and creates, may or 
may not be what one forms and actually develops into. This thesis surrounds and 
appreciates the wider discussion on Canadian Senate reform, but focuses on the 
Senate’s early years immediately after Confederation in 1867.  
The Fathers of Confederation had a vision for the Senate, and they tried to 
realize it through subsequent sections of the British North America Act (1867). The 
Canadian Senate along with the House of Commons make up the two chambers of 
Parliament, with the Sovereign comprises the Parliament of Canada. The Parliament 
of Canada was established on 1 July 1867 with the enactment of the British North 
                                                
1 Canada. Speech from the Throne. H re for all Canadians: Stability, Prosperity, Security. (Ottawa, 3 
June 2011), 15. 
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America Act.  Although the House of Commons and the Senate were created to 
complement each other, disagreements between the two chambers were inevitable, 
and the Senate occasionally blocks important governm nt legislation passed by the 
House of Commons. The primary function of the Senat is to legislate. An 
examination of how the Senate legislated over a number of bills, particularly those 
that were blocked by the Senate will allow the development of a conclusion whether 
or not the Senate performed to the intentions of the Fathers of Confederation. The 
senators’ justification into its blockages provided a valuable insight into the Senate’s 
functioning and whether they adhered to the intentions set out for it.  
 
The Core Questions and Objective of the Thesis 
This thesis evaluates and explores the legislative actions that the Canadian 
Senate took during the first sixty years of Confederation. The objective of this thesis 
includes the analysis of three important government bills that the Senate blocked, 
which were the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill (1875), the Naval Aid Bill 
(1912), and the Old Age Pension Bill (1926), to understand if the Senate adhered to 
the intentions of the Fathers of Confederation. Didthe Senate perform as it was 
intended after a period of reform following Confederation in 1867? Did the Senate 
follow the original intentions that the Fathers of Confederation had for the upper 
chamber when it exercised its legislative power? Did the Senate provide a well 
informed, critical sober second thought when debating and then blocking these three 
important provincial, national and internationally focused government bills? If the 
Senate did not, what were the prevailing problems surrounding the chamber which 
prevented it from so doing?  Finally some conclusion  are produced about the 
Senate’s blockages in its early years within the larger context on reforming the 
Canadian Senate, and there are some cautionary remarks that can be applied and 
paralleled to the contemporary period of Canadian Se ate reform.   
 
The Existing Scholarship 
In reviewing the literature on the Canadian Senate, I found the public debate 
on the Senate focused on the present not the past as there was little discussion 
surrounding the performance of the Senate during the first sixty years of the Senate’s 
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history with the exception of the sporadic book or newspaper article. On the other 
hand, in the last forty years there has been an explosion in literature regarding 
criticism towards the Senate and calls for reform. 
 
The Primary Role of Upper Chambers 
The Canadian Senate is a rather particular institution and has generated much 
criticism. The Canadian Senate “…has been ridiculed, vilified, abused and criticized 
to such an extent that it probably today has one of the worst images of any public 
body in Canada.”2 Scholars, journalists, politicians and everyday individuals all have 
something to say about Canada’s upper chamber. Before the criticisms of the Senate 
are discussed, it is important to appreciate a greate  understanding of upper 
chambers.  
The primary role of upper chambers is to enact and review proposed 
legislation that has been introduced in that parliament or national assembly. If ideal 
lower legislative chambers existed in the world, there would not necessarily be a 
need for upper chambers of review. However there is no ideal lower chamber that 
works perfectly and whenever a second body looks afresh at proposed legislation, it 
is as F.A. Kunz argued, “…extremely useful, if not quite necessary.”3 I would agree 
with Kunz that is it extremely useful but I would not agree that it is completely 
necessary in every case. As an example each Canadian province has a unicameral 
legislature which legislates effectively. However, I would agree with Kunz in that it 
is quite necessary for a second chamber in Canada at the national level.  Having a 
second chamber is beneficial beyond revision and improvements to legislation 
because the upper chamber might uncover difficulties not noticed by the lower 
chamber, which make it clear that a second opinion should be sought and valued.4 
The second review and opinion often decelerates the progress of proposed 
legislation. This might be viewed as redundant and disadvantageous, but having a 
second review is one of the greatest attributes of second chambers. The improvement 
                                                
2 Library and Archives Canada, Florence Bird Fonds, MG31-D63, Volume 16, Senate of Canada (1), 
"Talk to Alberta Legislative Interns," 3 February 1982, page 2. 
3 F. A. Kunz, The Modern Senate of Canada, 1925-1963 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1926), 5. 
4 See Meg Russell, Reforming the House of Lords: Lessons from Overseas (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 21. 
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upon the legislation and a further public discussion are two factors that are a positive 
result of this reoccurrence and duplication of the legislative process. People are only 
human, mistakes and errors will occur. As Robert A. MacKay argued, “This opinion 
is not necessarily founded on distrust of the peopl’s ability to govern themselves or 
on any denial that their will must prevail, but it recognizes certain defects in popular 
assemblies.”5 Canada has over thirty-three million people and the legislation passed 
by the Canadian Parliament will have an effect on them all, as David Smith noted 
“…two decisions are better than one.”6 Where there are bicameral systems in place 
there is an advantageous reoccurrence and duplication of the legislative process 
where those nations gets the privilege of examining the merits of the proposed 
legislation twice. 
 
The Secondary Role of Upper Chambers 
In federations, upper chambers also usually perform a second role that of 
representation of regions, provinces, states and/or territories within the national 
federal legislature. Countries like Canada, Australia, the United States and Germany 
have upper chambers in their respective form which a t and provide a greater 
national forum for regions, provinces, states and territories within the federation to 
voice their concerns within the national parliament or assembly. This is seen in 




The legislative powers of upper chambers differ throughout the world, and 
they can typically be divided into three groups. The groups are as follows:7 
(a) Those upper chambers that have legislative power equal to those of the 
lower chamber;  
(b) Those upper chambers that have legislative power equal or almost equal 
to the lower chamber, but in practice exercise less;  
                                                
5 Robert A. MacKay, The Unreformed Senate of Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967), 
162.  
6 David E. Smith, The Canadian Senate in Bicameral Perspective (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2003), 176.  
7 MacKay, The Unreformed Senate of Canada (1967), 160. 
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(c) Those upper chambers that have legislative power less than the lower 
chamber. 
The Canadian Senate would be associated with those upp r chambers where its 
powers are almost equal to the powers of the House f Commons, but in practice 
exercise less.8 The Senate is almost equal to the powers of the House f Commons 
with the exception that the Senate cannot initiate ny bill that would either 
appropriate public funds or generate revenue from a new tax measure; this is found 
under Section 53 of the British North America Act. Any new measure that would 
increase taxation or spend public funds must originate from the House of Commons, 
specifically the Cabinet.  
 
The Canadian Senate 
The chief function of the Senate is to legislate, rview and examine 
legislation that is in Parliament. Every bill must be approved and passed in 
Parliament by the House of Commons and the Senate before receiving Royal Assent. 
As David E. Smith, R. MacGregor Dawson and W. F. Dawson, have all shown, the 
Senate’s chief function is to consider and complement the House of Commons.9  
More specifically it “…amplifies, clarifies, and scrutinizes legislation….”10 The 
Canadian Senate has virtually identical legislative powers to the House of Commons, 
the lower chamber, yet the Senate is reluctant to block bills, as senators cannot be 
seen to be acting against the lower elected House of Commons given that senators 
are appointed rather than democratically elected. The Senate is only limited in its 
legislative abilities as it cannot initiate ‘money bills’, however the Senate still 
possesses the legislative power of an absolute veto on proposed legislation.11 The 
Senate has the power to block and reject legislation if the majority of the senators 
feel it should not pass. However, as Paul Fox noted th re is one exception to the veto, 
“In 1982 Canada’s new constitution assigned the Senate only a suspensive veto of 
180 days over future constitutional amendments.”12 The Senate and House of 
                                                
8 Ibid., 162. 
9 Smith, The Canadian Senate in Bicameral Perspective, 160; R. MacGregor Dawson and W. F. 
Dawson, Democratic Government in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), 67. 
10 Smith, The Canadian Senate in Bicameral Perspective, 167. 
11 Ibid., 160. 
12 Paul W. Fox, Politics: Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1982), 527. 
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Commons are there to work together in Parliament, no  be rivals, and beyond 
constitutional amendments, the veto is present to ac  as a safeguard from the lower 
house in moments where the upper house considers it necessary to block legislation. 
With respect to Senate membership, there are certain equirements. They 
include: one must be a Canadian citizen, at least thirty years of age, and a resident in 
the province or territory that they represent. Within the province they represent they 
must also own at least four thousand dollars worth f property. This requirement is 
found under Section 23 of the British North America Act. Four thousand dollars is 
not a vast amount of money by today’s standards but in 1867 it was an enormous 
amount and only a small proportion of the people in Canada could afford it.13 The 
appointment of senators is the most controversial apect of the Canadian Senate. To 
become a senator, an individual is appointed in the Sovereign’s name by the 
governor general on the advice of the prime minister. The Senate is an appointed 
body, unlike the House of Commons which its members are elected in a first-past-
the-post electoral system. Initially senators were appointed for life, however in 1965 
an amendment to the British North America Act changed the life-time appointment 
and senators must retire at the age of seventy-five.14  
As Canada is a federation of ten provinces and three territories, the second 
function of the Canadian Senate is representational. The Senate is based on equality 
of four formal Canadian regions: Ontario, Quebec, Maritime Canada and Western 
Canada. Newfoundland and Labrador, Northwest Territories, Yukon, and Nunavut 
do not fall within one of the four specific regions of Canada as outlined in Section 22 
of the British North America Act. One area where the Senate has received a barrage 
of criticism and demands for reform usually encompass the deficiency of the Senate 






                                                
13 See Patrick Malcolmson and Richard Myers, The Canadian Regime (Peterborough ON: Broadview 
Press, 2005), 132.  
14 Fox, Politics: Canada, 527. 
 9 
Table 1.1: Current Allocation of Canadian Senate Seats 
 
Region Province Senate Seats - 
Provincial Total 




of Canada  
 
Ontario  Ontario  24 24 1867 
Quebec  Quebec  24 24 1867 
Maritime Canada New Brunswick  10 1867 
  Nova Scotia  10 1867 
  Prince Edward Island  4 
24 
1873 
Western Canada  Manitoba  6 1870 
  British Columbia  6 1871 
  Alberta  6 1905 
  Saskatchewan  6 
24 
1905 
Other Newfoundland and Labrador 6   1949 
  Northwest Territories  1 9 1870 
  Yukon  1   1898 
  Nunavut  1   1999 
 SENATE TOTAL  105 105  
 
 
Major Criticisms to the Senate 
The Canadian Senate is “…a national disgrace.”15 The Canadian Senate is a 
“…legislative hall of shame.”16 “No political subject provokes more dissatisfied 
public comment in Canada than its Senate. Rare is the year that passes when 
someone of note in this country has not been on his feet voicing criticism and 
seeking the reform or outright abolition of the upper house.”17 These are just some 
quotes from the academic literature. As with any subject matter there are major 
publications surrounding the subject, in regards to the Canadian Senate and 
surrounding reform most authors have quoted at least one of the following 
publications: The Senate of Canada: Its Constitution, Powers and Duties Historically 
Considered (1914) by George Ross, The Unreformed Senate of Canada (1926, 1963) 
by Robert A. MacKay, The Modern Senate of Canada 1926-1963 (1965) by F.A. 
Kunz, The Canadian Senate in Bicameral Perspective (2003) by David E. Smith, and 
Protecting Canadian Democracy (2003) edited by Senator Serge Joyal, finally the 
most recent is The Democratic Dilemma (2009) edited by Jennifer Smith. The 
                                                
15 Randall White, Is Canada Trapped in a Time Warp? (Toronto: Venture Press, 2001), 53.  
16 Meg Russell, and Mark Sandford, “Why are Second Chambers so Difficult to Reform?” The 
Journal of Legislative Studies Vol. 8, No. 3 (Autumn 2002): 81. 
17 John Turner, “The Senate of Canada – Political Conundrum,” in Canadian Issues: Essays in 
Honour of Henry F. Angus, ed. Robert M. Clark (Toronto: University of Toront  Press, 1961), 57. 
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subject matter and topics that are contained within these books encompass events and 
issues surrounding the Senate around the time they were published. The books by 
Ross, The Senate of Canada: Its Constitution, Powers and Duties Historically 
Considered and MacKay, The Unreformed Senate of Canada speaks about the early 
Senate and the legislative and representative actions it took. F.A. Kunz’s book, The 
Modern Senate of Canada 1926-1963 discussed the Senate in a larger context within 
the Canadian Parliament and its sometimes antagonistic exchanges with the House of 
Commons and Cabinet. Finally the books, The Canadian Senate in Bicameral 
Perspective, Protecting Canadian Democracy, and The Democratic Dilemma speak 
about the modern debate on the complexities of reforming the Senate and the failures 
of reform. The conclusion found in the literature is that there are two major 
reoccurring criticisms aimed at the current Senate, nd they are the appointment of 
senators, and provincial representation.  
 
First Major Criticism: The Appointment of Senators  
An appointed Senate was acceptable in 1867 but now is unacceptable; the 
undemocratic nature of having senators appointed to their position without election is 
the main argument for reform.18 The duty of senatorial appointments falls to the 
prime minister and the selections are usually partis n appointments. By having one 
individual decide who becomes a senator, who is undemocratically appointed to their 
position until the age of 75, and who does not fearlosing their seat, are the most 
important factors in undermining the legitimacy of the Senate.19 In addition, David E. 
Smith and David Docherty both have concluded that since the Senate is unelected, it 
cannot publicly be viewed as a fully legitimate chamber in Canada.20 The fact that 
the Senate is free from elections hurts its public image in Canada. The failure to 
acquire public legitimacy is a serious problem because the Senate is the upper 
                                                
18 Although having an appointed system is viewed negatively, it has allowed for greater representation 
of minorities and particularly women in Parliament, to alleviate partial deficiencies as a result of 
general elections. The prime minister can appoint more women and minorities to the Senate to create a 
more diverse and representative group of parliamentarians, thus better reflecting the true 
representation of Canada. 
19 See Campbell Sharman, “Political Legitimacy for an Appointed Senate,” IRPP Choices Vol. 14, 
No. 11 (September 2008): 19. 
20 Smith, The Canadian Senate in Bicameral Perspective, 58; David Docherty, “The Canadian Senate: 
Chamber of Sober Reflection or Loony Cousin Best Not Talked About,” The Journal of Legislative 
Studies Vol. 8, No. 3 (Autumn 2002): 29. 
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chamber – the chamber that reviews, checks, and occasionally blocks legislation of 
the lower elected chamber.  
 
Second Major Criticism: Provincial Representation 
The appointment of senators by the prime minister and not by the provinces 
or territories they represent leads to the second major criticism towards the Senate. 
The senators represent the provinces and territories however Campbell Sharman has 
suggested that the Senate is failing to do so.21 In addition, R. MacGregor Dawson 
and W.F. Dawson have stated, “The Senate, it was hoped, would protect provincial 
interests….”22 John Turner argued, “The plain truth of the matter seems to be that the 
Senate today has very little to do with the provinces.”23 He continued, “…it is 
doubtful whether today any provincial government would look towards the Senate as 
its spokesman or champion.”24 There is no direct connection to the people or 
province the senators represent, it is not the province or the people of the province 
who placed them in the Senate. The lack of control of who gets to represent the 
provinces results in an institution that as David Docherty suggested, “…struggles for 
public acceptance and support.”25 As an appointed body in Parliament, the Senate 
cannot be viewed “…as a legitimate voice of the regions.”26 The lack accountable 
provincial and territorial representation by unelected senators naturally results in the 
demand for reform. However, as Wilfried Swenden has shown in his work on second 
chambers in Federalism and Second Chambers, senators can vote as provincial or 
regional group members, if “…one region, or possibly a group of regions, share a 
common view on a specific issue, irrespective of their party affiliation. In contrast, in 
the absence of regional block voting, party adherence dominates.”27 This party 
adherence is a consistent problem that will be seenin this study.  
 
 
                                                
21 Russell, and Sandford, “Why are Second Chambers so Difficult to Reform?” 81. 
22 Dawson, and Dawson, Democratic Government in Canada, 64. 
23 Turner, “The Senate of Canada – Political Conundrum,” 60. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Docherty, “The Canadian Senate: Chamber of Sober Reflection or Loony Cousin Best Not Talked 
About,” 45. 
26 Ibid., 29. 
27 Wilfried Swenden, Federalism and Second Chambers (Brussels: Presses Interuniversitairies 
Européennes, 2004), 65. 
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Demand for Senate Reform 
With major criticisms aimed at the Senate it is to no surprise that individuals 
have called and been calling for reform for a great number of years. Henri Bourassa 
has once said that Canadian Senate reform “…comes periodically like other forms of 
epidemics and current fevers.”28 The first proposal for Senate reform occurred in 
1874 and since then has become “…one of the enduring features of Canadian 
political life.”29 The second major call for reform was in 1927, where the matter was 
discussed at the Dominion – Provincial Conference held in Ottawa.30 E. Russell 
Hopkins explained that reform did not follow from these proposals as “…there was 
little or no chance of agreement on any specific reform or set of reforms.”31 The lack 
of agreement on what should be done to the Senate is also an enduring feature of 
Canadian political life.  
There has been an explosion of Senate reform literature in the recent decades 
as the result of “…incessant intergovernmental conflict and, more positively, as a 
response to the need for more effective intergovernm ntal coordination.”32 One of 
the principal intergovernmental conflicts surrounded the federal government’s 
National Energy Program in 1980. The National Energy Program was a program 
which created new federal taxes and obtained a larger share on petroleum revenues 
for the federal government.33 Petroleum is a natural resource that is in the jurisdiction 
of the provinces. Western Canada, specifically Alberta, was furious as this is where 
the majority of the petroleum in Canada is located. This was seen as a major 
infringement on provincial rights. This was connected o Senate reform because the 
Senate had been set up to protect the regions and provinces, but Western Canada was 
unable to do much in the Senate because it is greatly outnumbered versus central and 
                                                
28 Library and Archives Canada, Florence Bird Fonds, MG31-D63, Volume 16, Senate of Canada (1), 
“Notes on Bill C-640, An act to provide for the structural reform of the Senate of Canada.” No Date, 
page 1.  
29 See Jack Stilborn, Senate Reform: Issues and Recent Developments. Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 
21 January 2008. http://epe.lac-
bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/library_parliament/backgrounder/2008/senate_reform-e/prb0742-e.pdf, 3. 
30 E. Russell Hopkins, “What’s Right About The Senate,” McGill Law Journal Vol.8, No. 3 (1962): 
168. 
31 Ibid.  
32 Roger Gibbins, Conflict and Unity: An Introduction to Canadian Political Life (Scarborough ON: 
Nelson Canada, 1994), 85. 
33 See Rand Dyck, Canadian Politics: Critical Approaches (Scarborough ON: Thomson Nelson, 
2004), 60.  
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Maritime senators. This led political pressure and the academic literature to the 
famous “Triple-E Senate” reform proposal, which came out of Western Canadian 
aggravation and formed the framework for Senate reform during the Charlottetown 
Accord constitutional reform proposal that came out in 1992.  
There have been numerous models proposed for reform in the past and the 
most prevalent is the Triple-E model. The Triple-E model, originated from Alberta, 
called for a Senate that is elected, effective and equal. Elected where the provinces or 
the people of Canada decide who receives a seat. Effective in the sense that senators 
would use their legislative power more frequently to delay or block legislation that 
they feel is unwarranted by the provinces they represent. Finally, equal in that every 
province would have the same number of senators. The riple-E model never 
succeeded nor has there been any success on the other twenty-eight initiatives in the 
last thirty years.34 Twenty-eight initiatives in the last thirty years is a large number 
and each had their own differences however there are some fundamental similarities 
surrounding them all. There are three primary areas th t the reform proposals 
surround, they are: the selection of senators, the distribution of Senate seats, and the 
powers of a reformed Senate.35 Of the more than twenty-eight more recent proposals 
or initiatives, these three are the most frequent re-occurring areas that reforms 
addresses.  
 
The Failure of Senate Reform 
The ultimate failures of the previous reform models have been attributed to 
the obstacles that are in place which restrict people from reforming the Senate. First 
the Supreme Court of Canada has ruled that Parliament cannot unilaterally reform 
the Senate and the provinces must be involved.36 Second, the Constitution Act 
(1982), states that any changes to the Senate’s powers, senatorial selection and 
                                                
34 Docherty, “The Canadian Senate: Chamber of Sober Reflection or Loony Cousin Best Not Talked 
About,” 38. 
35 Stilborn. “Senate Reform: Issues and Recent Developments.” 4. 
36 Supreme Court of Canada, Re: Authority of Parliament in Relation to the Upper House [1980], 1 
S.C.R. 54. In the matter of a Reference by the Governor in Council concerning the legislative 
authority of the Parliament of Canada in relation t the Upper House, as set out in Order in Council 
P.C. 1978-3581, dated the 23rd day of November, 1978. http://scc.lexum.org/en/1979/1980scr1-




number of senators per province must be approved under the general amending 
formula.37 Third, as Docherty explained, “…most attempts at Senate reform have 
failed because they have been linked to larger constitutional reform packages. The 
best hope for change to the structure of the Senate lies in smaller, incremental moves 
….”38 This is the current method that Prime Minister Harper is trying with Bill C-7, 
An Act respecting the selection of senators and amending the Constitution Act, 1867 
in respect of Senate term limits.39  
The second conclusion why Senate reform is rather difficult to achieve is that 
no collective agreement has been reached on what the Senate should be. The barrier 
of reform is disagreement among the involved parties. As Docherty and George Ross 
have both argued, what one individual wants the Senate to be often differs greatly 
from another.40 Indeed, as Smith notes, if that cannot be determined, “…there will be 
no agreement on its modification.”41 Should it provide oversight, protection, 
innovation or representation?42 How can the Senate be reformed if people cannot 
agree on what the Senate should be? Senate reform is incredibly difficult because of 
the formal constitutional restrictions, and that the key stakeholders cannot 
collectively agree on what to do. As Docherty argued, the subsequent failed attempts 
have resulted in the Canadian Senate remaining “…one of the last unreformed 
chambers in Westminster-based parliamentary democracies.”43 The Canadian 
Parliament and more specifically the Senate, exists today in a very similar form to 
the way that the Fathers of Confederation created it in 1867. It is beneficial and 
healthy in democratic nations such as Canada to have debates about reforming parts 
of the Canadian Parliament.  
 
                                                
37 Stilborn. “Senate Reform: Issues and Recent Developments.” 9. 
38 Docherty, “The Canadian Senate: Chamber of Sober Reflection or Loony Cousin Best Not Talked 
About,” 28. 
39 Parliament of Canada. “Bill C-7 - An Act respecting the selection of senators and amending the 
Constitution Act, 1867 in respect of Senate term limits.” 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Docid=5101177&file=4 
(Date created unknown, date last accessed on 31 August 2011). 
40 See David Docherty, Legislatures (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005), 177; 
and George Ross, The Senate of Canada: Its Constitution, Powers, and Duties Historically 
Considered (Toronto: The Copp, Clark Company Limited, 1914), 96.
41 Smith, The Canadian Senate in Bicameral Perspective, 157. 
42 Ibid., 154. 
43 Docherty, “The Canadian Senate: Chamber of Sober Reflection or Loony Cousin Best Not Talked 
About,” 27. 
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Why are Second Chambers so Difficult to Reform? 
Meg Russell and Mark Sandford, detailed five barriers associated with 
reform, which can easily be applied to Canada. The barriers to reform consist of: 
constitutional rigidity, wider constitutional disputes, vested interests in the status 
quo, the attitude of the government and finally public opinion.44 This is true for 
Canada as the Canadian Constitution is fairly rigid concerning Senate reform. It is 
easy for other topics to be brought to the table whn a discussion starts on the topic 
of Senate reform. The prime minister currently enjoys a great deal of power and 
influence with the status quo and reform might upset and diminish that. Some 
political parties and governments simply do not consider Senate reform to be a 
significant issue when there are more prominent issue  in their agendas. Finally it is 
difficult to fully convince the opinion of the nation that Senate reform ought to occur 
when there are so many other vital issues which could be seen as more important that 
ought to be addressed before reforming Canada’s upper chamber. In part, all of this 
encapsulates why there has been limited reform to the Senate since 1867.   
 
Framework of the Study  
The existing academic literature surrounding the Canadian Senate provides 
significant criticism aimed at the modern Senate with its lacklustre performance and 
need of reform. However, there appears to be a gap in the literature surrounding the 
performance of the Senate in its early years of exist nce, there is value in looking at 
the past and addressing this lacuna is important in order to consider whether the 
Senate ever performed as those who designed the institution had intended. The 
question that comes to mind: What about the Senate’s p rformance following its 
creation immediately after Confederation in 1867? This thesis analyzes the original 
intentions for the Canadian Senate, developed by the Fathers of Confederation and 
shows how the architects of the Senate regarded it as a chamber for sober second 
thought. The thesis then considers the extend to which the senators followed the 
founders’ intentions when legislating over three government bills that were blocked 
in the Senate during the first sixty years of its existence. There is not much focus on 
the early years and early actions of the Senate in the context of the major reoccurring 
                                                
44 See Russell, and Sandford, “Why are Second Chambers so Difficult to Reform?” 83-87. 
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themes and criticism towards the Senate. It is easyfor one to state the modern Senate 
needs reform as the current Senate is an easy target which has had little formal 
reform to it, but this thesis analyzes the Senate in a period immediately following its 
creation and examined if it performed as intended.  
An analysis of the original intentions of the Fathers of Confederation is 
critical because it is those intentions which act as a baseline to scrutinize the Senate 
in a post-Confederation era. There were two primary intentions established for the 
Senate during the Confederation Conferences in the years immediately prior to 1867. 
The first surrounded independent deliberation and representation. It was established 
that the Senate’s membership would be by appointment, not popular election. By 
having an appointed Senate, it would be more independent.45 The goal, as MacKay 
noted, “…was to render the upper house a thoroughly independent body – one that 
would be in the best position to canvass dispassionately the measures of (the lower 
house).”46 Since the senators would not face recurrent elections, it was hoped that 
they would evaluate legislation on what would be right for Canada. The Fathers of 
Confederation concluded that by having an appointed S nate, it would lead to a 
greater independent upper chamber to evaluate legislation. The Senate, as John A. 
Macdonald famously conveyed was to provide a “…sober s cond thought in 
legislation.”47 An independent sober second thought was to be imparted on the 
legislation passed by the House of Commons.  
The second intention established for the Senate was that it be a protector of 
rights. The Senate is based on provincial representatio  and senators come from each 
province and territory. However, the Fathers of Confederation did not have the 
intention that the Senate would be the great protect r of provincial rights. The Senate 
was intended to be the last means of defence and never the chief line of protection.48 
The Senate was intended to legislate at a distance from the strong gusts of public 
passion, not to be swayed but to independently evaluate legislation for its true merits 
for the benefit of Canada, even if it went against the wishes of certain regions, 
provinces, governments or foreign nations. The Senate w s also provided with strong 
                                                
45 See MacKay, The Unreformed Senate of Canada (1967), 40. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Citation from P.B. Waite, The Confederation Debates in the Province of Canada – 1865 (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart, 1969), 49. 
48 See MacKay, The Unreformed Senate of Canada (1967), 44. 
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legislative powers, to be exercised when it thought proper to block legislation from 
passing.  
 
Methodology, Research Methods and Data Collection  
In the academic literature surrounding the Senate and Senate reform, there is 
a tendency to list of bills that were passed, greatly mended, or blocked by the 
Senate. These bills tend to be the focus for subsequent models of reform. It was 
rather conclusive that if an in-depth analysis on the early Senate occurred, the 
examination of bills that were passed, amended or blocked by the Senate would be 
needed. The focus in this study is on three bills which were blocked. Why examine 
blocked bills? The blockage of a bill that has been approved by the lower chamber is 
the most significant action the upper chamber could perform. Blockage means the 
Senate actively and knowingly stopped it from furthe  passage to Royal Assent. For 
breadth in case selection, I selected a number of bills that were blocked in a variety 
of manners, as blockage takes many forms in the Canadi  Parliament. This thesis 
focused on government bills that passed through the House of Commons but were 
blocked by the Senate. There were many government bills which were blocked by 
the Senate during the first sixty years of Confederation. The three specific bills 
analyzed in this thesis are the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill, the Naval Aid 
Bill, and the Old Age Pension Bill.   
 
The Selection of the Specific Blocked Bills 
Selecting specific early bills provided the largest contribution to knowledge 
as there was a gap in the literature on early governm nt bills in the Canadian 
Parliament immediately following Confederation. An important facet to selecting 
cases is the question of generalizability. Although these three bills are distinct in 
their significance, nevertheless I would argue thatey are not distinct in a manner of 
being deficient of any generalizability. They have applicability because there have 
been and there will be in the future, bills that will either involve provincial concerns, 
national concerns or international concerns that will have very similar characteristics 
as one of the three above that entered Parliament.  In later studies these three bills 
could be compared and contrasted between more modern bills that were blocked. 
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Timeframe  
The initial step in the selection of government bills was to set out some 
criteria, primarily the time frame to study within. The first sixty years of the Senate 
was a period in which little had changed within theSenate since Confederation, and 
not enough time had lapsed yet in Canadian political history for the Senate to have 
evolved away from its creation and there remained a large degree of preservation 
from its origins in 1867. Because of the degree of preservation that the Senate 
withstood during the first sixty years, the intentio s of the Fathers of Confederation 
were allowed to be more rigorously applied.  
The first sixty years was chosen for a number of other related factors. First it 
allowed for successive governments to form under a number of different prime 
ministers which allowed the introduction of government legislation introduced from 
Conservative and Liberal governments. The time period additionally allowed for the 
analysis of government bills blocked in the Senate originating from a minority 
government in the House of Commons. Second, senators sat for life in the Senate 
which resulted in a slower turnover of new senators entering the Senate, the sixty 
year time frame allowed for new senators to enter the chamber and evaluate 
legislation. Finally, this timeframe allowed for the delay in alternation of political 
party control of the Senate between both major politica  parties to have formed the 
government.   
In this thesis the focus was on new major government bills that were 
purposely blocked by the Senate that encompassed provincially, nationally and 
internationally related bills. It was concluded that during the first sixty years of 
Confederation, twenty-three bills were blocked from passage in the Senate.49 This 
equates to approximately 0.923% of government bills introduced in the House of 
Commons were blocked by the Senate during the firstsix y years of post-
Confederation history. These twenty-three bills dealt with railways, financial 
assistance, representation in the House of Commons, appointment of federal judges, 
and naval battleships. Focusing and performing an in-depth analysis on twenty-three 
                                                
49 Author’s methodological elimination process from list provided at: Parliament of Canada, “Bills 
Sent to the Other House that did not Receive Royal Assent.” Legislation, 
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Parlinfo/compilations/houseofcommons/legislation/billsbyresults.aspx (Date 
created unknown, date last accessed on 31 August 2011). 
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blocked bills would have been far too great of a number to examine. A further 
elimination took place which narrowed the list to three bills that ultimately equated 
to a representative sample of the government bills locked by the Senate. The 
detailed justification for selection and the core el ments of the three selected blocked 
bills are found below.  
 
The Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill 
The Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill (1875) marked the “…first major 
legislative confrontation between the Senate and House of Commons….”50 The first 
of anything is always an important unit to study as many things could be learnt from 
this exceptional case which would advance and provide an increased level of 
understanding as to why the Senate took the action that it did. The bill called for the 
construction of a railway between the towns of Esquimalt and Nanaimo, which are 
on Vancouver Island in the Western Canadian province of British Columbia. The 
blockage outraged the provincial government of British Columbia and the Dominion 
Government incurred the charge of perfidy.51 The House of Commons was 
controlled by a Liberal majority government under Alexander Mackenzie, and his 
Government introduced the bill. The Senate was controlled in majority by the 
opposing Conservative Party. The Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill was a 
considerable piece of legislation on the provincial level. Its introduction was also in 
part dictated by the British Government.  
This study is in part trying to understand the reasoning behind the Senate’s 
actions of blockage towards a variety of bills and breadth was one of the goals trying 
to be achieved in the selection of specific bills for this study. There were ten other 
railway bills that were blocked by the Senate on the list and breadth would not have 
been achieved if the study focused primarily or solely on railway bills. Additionally, 
removal of further bills took place because they, like the Esquimalt and Nanaimo 
Railway Bill were bills blocked by the same Senate nd under Prime Minister 
Alexander Mackenzie. The research design for this study aims for an analysis on the 
                                                
50 Senate of Canada, “A Legislative and Historical Overview of the Senate of Canada.” Committees 
and Private Legislation Directorate, http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-E/pub-
E/legislative-e.htm (Date created unknown, date revised May 2001, date las  accessed on 31 August 
2011). 
51 See MacKay, The Unreformed Senate of Canada (1967), 97. 
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Senate’s legislative actions over a sixty year period and not specifically during one 
prime minister; hence the additional removal of theother blocked bills during the 
Liberal premiership of Alexander Mackenzie and the Conservative controlled Senate. 
The Senate legislates over a variety of different bills, some are provincially, 
nationally, or internationally related, while others deal with economic and social 
issues. One of the primary objectives of this thesis i  to examine a diversified 
selection of blocked legislation. With respect to the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway 
Bill, this bill fell within the category of provincially related legislation blocked by 
the Senate. The removal of the remaining provincially related bills then occurred.  
 
The Naval Aid Bill 
On the list of remaining blocked bills, the Naval Aid Bill (1912) was the most 
prominent. If passed this bill would have provided the British Government with 
thirty-five million dollars which would have been directly put forth for the 
construction of three Dreadnought battleships for the Royal Navy. Prime Minister 
Robert Borden’s Government introduced the bill into the Conservative-controlled 
House of Commons. The debate in the House of Commons ge erated enormous 
interest throughout Canada, and the debate was one of the most turbulent and 
prolonged in Canadian history.52 The debate lasted months, it was truly historical in 
proportion, it broke parliamentary records and engulfed the attention of the public. 
Throughout the months of debate, opinions solidifie and, for the first time in 
Canada, the bill only passed through the House of Commons with the adoption of 
rules for closure.53  However Borden’s predecessor, the leader of the opposition, was 
Liberal Wilfrid Laurier, who had appointed many Liberals to the Senate while he 
was prime minister and the Liberals were in firm contr l of the Senate. The bill was 
an internationally significant piece of legislation surrounding Canadian national 
development. Its introduction into the Canadian Parliament was also at the request of 
the British Government.  
The decision to include the Naval Aid Bill was again based on strategic and 
calculated case selection. When the Naval Aid Bill was introduced in 1912, there was 
a Conservative government and the Liberals were no lo ger in control of the House 
                                                
52 Ibid., 99. 
53 Ibid. 
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of Commons. However, Liberals not Conservatives had control in the Senate. This 
was an important fact with the decision to include th  Naval Aid Bill with respect to 
the research question because the Senate as an institution needs to adhere to its 
founding principles over a number of decades. Certain areas of criteria and breadth 
had been filled with the inclusion of the Esquimalt nd Nanaimo Railway Bill and 
the Naval Aid Bill. There was still a gap for a wider representation of legislation 
under different scenarios of Liberal and Conservative dominance in the lower and 
upper chambers. The focus was then on selecting one final bill that was blocked in 
the Senate during the Liberal minority-government of Prime Minister William Lyon 
Mackenzie King.   
 
The Old Age Pension Bill 
The Old Age Pension Bill (1926) was of national significance surrounding 
the social welfare of old aged Canadians. The bill would have provided eligible 
Canadians with a monthly pension, where the federal and provincial governments 
would halve the cost equally. The parliamentary dynamics were of great interest as 
well. An election had just ended which saw the Liberals form a minority government, 
much to the displeasure of the Conservatives becaus it was the Conservatives who 
obtained the most seats in the House of Commons. The Conservatives did not obtain 
enough to have a majority, so the Liberal party worked with the Progressive and the 
Labour parties to form a razor-thin minority government. The Labour members 
demanded social welfare legislation in the form of old age pensions, in return for 
their critically needed support. The introduction of the bill in Parliament was argued 
as a surprise as it was not in any election manifesto nor mentioned in the Speech 
from the Throne.  
With the inclusion of the final case study I had purposely and strategically 
selected three important legislative bills that were blocked by the Senate during the 
first sixty years of its existence. These three bills were strategically selected because 
of their similarities to other blocked legislation by the Senate during this time as they 
represented legislation related to either a provincial, national or international issue.  
Together these three bills are a representative sample of legislation because they 
occurred throughout different political compositions commonly found in Canada, 
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being either Conservative or Liberal controlled House of Commons and 
Conservative or Liberal controlled Senate – with even the inclusion of a minority 
government.  
 
Data Collection and Triangulation 
The framework for the collection of primary source data on these historical 
cases was in accordance with the triangulation strategy which involved information 
gathered from three specific, yet dynamically different sources. Triangulation 
originated from navigation and military strategy that uses various reference points to 
establish an exact position and by the utilization of multiple viewpoints it allows for 
superior accuracy.54 The collection of primary source data provided information on 
each bill from a number of angles. The information gathered was from several 
different data classes, and this resulted in the production of a more complete picture 
of these three bills.55 Three main sources of primary data were gathered fom 
Hansard, newspaper articles, and finally archival documents.  
Hansard enabled an understanding of what the parliamentarians considered to 
be the main issues surrounding the three blocked bills. Within its record show how 
partial or impartial the parliamentarians were. If the Canadian Senate were setup to 
act as an independent sober second thought, how politically biased were the 
arguments in favour and against each bill in the Senate versus the arguments used in 
the House of Commons?  
Newspapers contain vital information such as public opinion that are 
obviously absent from the official debates in Parliament. The Globe (currently 
known as the Globe and Mail) acted as the primary national newspaper and anchor (a 
constant newspaper) from which information was gathered for the three blocked 
bills. The Globe has a long history and was in print before Confederation; it is 
considered a credible national newspaper in Canada. The other metropolitan 
newspaper is the Gazette (Montreal). Other newspapers, which represented provided 
small town and rural viewpoints outside the major cities that were included were the 
                                                
54 See Todd D. Jick, “Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: Triangulation in Action,” 
Administrative Science Quarterly Vol. 24, No. 4 (December 1979): 602.  
55 See Udo Kelle, “Sociological Explanations between Micro and Macro and the Integration of 
Qualitative and Quantitative Methods,” Forum: Qualitative Social Research Vol. 2. No. 1, Art. 5 
(February 2001): 3. 
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British Colonist (Victoria), the Morning Chronicle (Halifax), and the Manitoba Free 
Press (Winnipeg). They were included to act as complementary and contrasting 
agents, and to avoid a metropolitan bias. I imposed a number of questions on the 
newspaper material. What happened to be the general public consensus regarding the 
passage or blockage of the bills? Was the public opni n in the newspapers more 
favourable of the bills receiving Royal Assent or were they not? What can be 
concluded regarding the public’s perception in the newspapers surrounding the 
actions in the Senate?  
Further information was gathered from archival sources held at Library and 
Archives Canada. The archival documentation provided a wealth of information and 
an additional dimension, which is needed in the triangulation strategy. Some of the 
documents included: Justice Canada files regarding the legality of the Old Age 
Pension Bill, Privy Council documentation regarding the Esquimalt and Nanaimo 
Railway Bill, and so forth. Particular questions that were imposed during the analysis 
of the archival documents include: Can this document provide a further indicator into 
the Senate’s action as to why it blocked one of the thr e bills? Can any of the 
documents provide insight to the inner private workings of the Canadian Senate? 
Would anything indicate per se that the prime minister, government ministers or the 
leader of the opposition tried to influence the Senat ’s votes from going one way or 
the other? Was there anything written to specifically nd conclusively state that 
specific political parties should vote as a group against the bills (‘toe the party line’)?  
Gathering information from the three sources was exceptional as data was 
collected from official parliamentary records, public opinion on record, finally 
private and candid records, each providing an aspect to these three blocked bills in 
the Senate that the other source could not provide.  
 
Argument 
This thesis provides knowledge, perspectives and dimensions on the actions 
conducted by the Senate during the first sixty years fter Confederation. By 
evaluating the Senate’s legislative actions surrounding proposed legislation, this 
thesis generates an analysis that assists and benefits the larger topic of Canadian 
Senate behaviour regarding government bills and the topic surrounding Senate 
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reform. The evaluation of the Senate immediately after Confederation is interesting 
because one could look at Confederation as an event on reform in that a new Senate 
was created. It is relevant in the modern day because some want to create a new 
reformed Senate and with that comes their expectations of how a new Senate should 
perform. The thesis argues that the senators provided a well informed, critical sober 
second thought when it debated, and then blocked, three important government bills 
during the first sixty years of Confederation. However, the issue and dynamics of 
partisan voting, that had concerned the Fathers of C nfederation, affected the 


























































The Fathers of Confederation were the architects who created the Canadian 
Senate. The Fathers of Confederation generated a number of intentions for the 
multifaceted upper chamber in Canada’s new Parliament and the understanding of 
the intentions of these individuals for the Senate is critical as it establishes the 
baseline to evaluate the performance of the Senate immediately after Confederation. 
It is important for one to recognize what the original intentions were to scrutinize the 
institution accurately; it would be unfair to state th  Senate did not perform at a level 
which it was never originally intended. This chapter examines what the Fathers of 
Confederation specifically intended for the Canadian Senate. 
 
British North America Before 1867  
Before the examination of the discussions at the Confederation Conferences 
occur, which established the Senate, one needs to expl r  the political and driving 
forces which preceded and ultimately influenced the int ntions of the Fathers of 
Confederation. In 1867 the British North American colonies formally began uniting 
into a federation. However, the history of what is now known as Canada started 
many years prior. All of the British North American colonies had achieved some set 
of political institutions by 1791 that included repsentative government in an elected 
legislative assembly.1 By 1851, these colonies had established and operated on the 
basis that the cabinet resigned if it lost the confidence of the elected legislative 
assembly, responsible government had been established.2 Although responsible 
government had been established, the population of British North America was still 
rather small, in 1861 Canada West (Ontario) had 1.4 million people, Canada East 
(Quebec) had 1.1 million people, Nova Scotia had 330,000 people, New Brunswick 
had 252,000 and there were 80,000 people in Prince Edward Island.3 In essence, as 
Alexander Brady observed, the British North American territory consisted of, 
“…little more than scanty pockets of settlement subsisting on farms, fisheries, forest 
                                                
1 See Rand Dyck, Canadian Politics: Critical Approaches (Scarborough ON: Thomson Nelson, 
2004), 26.  
2 Ibid., 27. 
3 Provincial Parliament of Canada. Parliamentary Debates on the subject of the Confederation of the 
British North American Province, 3rd Session, 8th Parliament, (7 March 1865), p. 753 (Mr. Scatcherd, 
Member of Provincial Parliament). 
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industries, and localized manufactures.”4 Although they were small, there was 
consistent population growth during this time – particularly in Canada West where 
they experienced a rapid expansion from a constant stream of immigrants notably 
from the United Kingdom and they were filling up the vast farmlands and 
establishing prosperous commercial towns.5 The social expansion and economic 
growth for Canada West (Ontario) was extraordinary. However as a result of this 
growth, Canada West, under the leadership of George B own wanted more political 
strength in the united Province of Canada (Canada West and Canada East).  
 
Political Deadlock in the Province of Canada 
There was political instability and deadlock between the major political 
figures and political parties from Canada West and Canada East. There was a need 
for major reform to the bicameral political system in the Province of Canada as the 
system that had been established with the Act of Union uniting Canada West and 
East was not functioning well. To conduct successive legislative business was 
difficult, and it was rather challenging to get legislation passed. One politician, 
Étienne-Paschal Taché, stated during the parliamentary debates on Confederation in 
the Provincial Parliament of Canada, “Legislation in (the Province of Canada) for the 
last two years had come almost to a stand still, and if any one would refer to the 
Statute Book since 1862, he would find that the only public measures there inscribed 
had been passed simply by the permission of the Opposition.”6 The second difficulty 
was that any major decision in the united province had to be approved upon by the 
system as a whole, for instance a local issue in Canad  East had to get approval from 
the politicians from Canada West and vice versa.7 This required the approval of a 
‘double majority’ where a majority was required from both members of the 
legislature from Canada West and Canada East, in order to pass a measure.8 A simple 
majority at large in the legislature did not suffice. There were numerous problems 
                                                
4 Alexander Brady, Democracy in the Dominions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1947), 40. 
5 See Christopher Moore, 1867: How the Fathers Made a Deal (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 
Ltd., 1997), 4-5. 
6 Provincial Parliament of Canada. Parliamentary Debates on the subject of the Confederation of the 
British North American Provinces (3 February 1865), p. 9 (Mr. Taché, Premier of the Province of 
Canada). 
7 See Dyck, Canadian Politics: Critical Approaches, 27. 
8 Ibid.  
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with this convention. Canada West and Canada East were each equally represented in 
the provincial parliament. As D.G. Creighton argued, they each possessed the same 
political strength.9 Many political deadlocks developed as a result of the equality in 
representation in the united province. Francis Hincks, a representative from Canada 
West explained why political deadlock developed, “The truth was that the people 
occupying (Canada West) and (Canada East) were not homogeneous; but they 
differed in feelings, language, laws, religion and i stitutions and therefore the union 
must be considered as between two distinct peoples….”10 There were distinct 
peoples each wanting and striving for something different, yet they were politically 
equal and approval had to be granted by both sections t  proceed with measures 
initiated in the provincial parliament, naturally disagreements occurred. A new 
bicameral parliament with structurally different chambers was appealing to both 
Canadas.  
During this time Canada West was growing rapidly in population compared 
to Canada East and George Brown cried for change.  G orge Brown and other 
Reformers persistently argued for representation by population and they wanted 
reform. Reformers wanted freedom from a “…rigid and paralysing constitutional 
framework in which (Canada West) was imprisoned.”11 As Ged Martin noted, 
restructuring was needed and necessary because “...it was impossible to maintain the 
existing structure, with its artificial equality of representation between the two 
sections… [and] (Canada West’s) rapid population growth….”12 George Brown 
demanded a larger share of political power for Canad  West.13 The strength of 
George Brown’s argument for representation by population grew, particularly as 
difficulties in achieving legislation became more app rent and the need for reform 
increased. At the same time, the French-Canadian population in Canada East feared 
the inevitable of being swamped, and the need for avenues to protect French-
Canadian interests grew. Such interests could, in part, be protected in a Senate. 
                                                
9 D.G. Creighton, The Road to Confederation– The Emergence of Canada: 1863-1867 (Toronto: 
Macmillan of Canada, 1964), 44. 
10 Moore, 1867: How the Fathers Made a Deal, 15. 
11 Creighton, The Road to Confederation- The Emergence of Canada: 1863-1867, 43. 
12 Ged Martin, Britain and the Origins of Canadian Confederation, 1837-67 (London: Macmillan 
Press Ltd., 1995), 47. 
13 Ibid.  
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The upper chamber in the bicameral parliament of the Province of Canada, 
known as the Legislative Council, posed additional problems that required reform. 
These are important to understand, not least becaus the Legislative Council was the 
predecessor to the Canadian Senate and its councillors were elected by popular vote. 
Responsible government had been established with the government being responsible 
to the lower chamber with respect to financial and confidence matters. The elected 
upper chamber in the Province of Canada started to be antagonistic towards the 
fundamental establishment of responsible government in a Westminster style 
parliament where the upper chamber has a limited role with respect to financial 
legislation. The problem started when the councillors considered that they had a 
popular mandate to assume responsibility for the finances in the province.14 This 
created a number of clashes and challenges between th  upper and lower house in the 
provincial legislature and between the upper house and the ruling Government.15  
A final difficulty in the Province of Canada was ofpolitical instability. 
Between May 1862 and June 1864, the Province of Canada experienced five 
different governments.16 To make matters worse the political situation in the 
Province of Canada did not appear to be rectifying itself any time soon.  As P.B. 
Waite has noted, “The two sections of the province pulled against each other more 
and more; the years had made the knot tighter, harder, more impossible to undo. In 
fact it could not be undone. It demanded a heroic remedy, not a patient 
unravelling.”17 The remedy to solve the toxicity of the political scene in the Province 
of Canada was to start afresh by devising a new constitutional settlement and 
designing a new set of institutions to reflect those constitutional arrangements. While 
the political situation in the Province of Canada ws growing from bad to worse, 
other interesting developments were occurring in the province and also in the 
Maritime colonies, the eastern region of British North America.  
 
                                                
14 See Library and Archives Canada, Wishart Robertson Fonds, R9206 #3, "Miscellaneous Papers 
Regarding Senate Reform" series, 3-11, 1954. Norman Lambert, Reform of the Senate (Winnipeg Free 
Press Pamphlet No. 30, April 1950), page 5.  
15 Ibid.  
16 Provincial Parliament of Canada. Parliamentary Debates on the subject of the Confederation of the 
British North American Provinces (3 February 1865), p. 9 (Mr. Taché, Premier of the Province of 
Canada). 
17 P.B. Waite, The Life and Times of Confederation 1864-1867 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1962), 35. 
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Driving Forces Towards A Larger Union 
One idea that emerged during this time was a larger union of all the British 
North American colonies. The creation of local governments to handle distinctively 
local interests and a central government to handle large, common interests of the 
entire country – the primary essentials of a federation – was attractive to the Province 
of Canada and the Maritime Colonies. This was attractive as many politicians in 
British North America, particularly in Canada East, were uncomfortable with large 
central governments handling distinctly local issues, where local politicians should 
be the deciders and not politicians handling nationl issues.18 The desire for a large 
union among the British North American colonies was not established simply on the 
basis of political deadlock in the Province of Canada s there were other significant 
political, economic and security forces which came into play.  
Political Forces 
One of the primary motives towards a confederation by the Province of 
Canada was the desire for more effective government. As Ged Martin has argued, 
confederation would “…secure good government and political harmony to the 
country.”19 This was needed with respect to the constant political deadlock between 
the allied political parties in the Province of Canada’s legislature and the requirement 
of a double majority for the passage of legislation. There was a political toxicity 
within the Province of Canada and some change was needed. The move towards 
Confederation was designed to solve this, not least because it provided the 
opportunity for respected leaders from each colony t  meet together at three major 
conferences in Charlottetown, Quebec City and London, in order to create a new 
political system for a new united country.20 The leaders knew what worked and what 
did not, they viewed other country’s political arrangements and they created and 
adopted a system which they thought would best suit the united colonies of British 
North America.  
 
                                                
18 See Dyck, Canadian Politics: Critical Approaches, 27. 
19 Martin, Britain and the Origins of Canadian Confederation, 1837-67, 35. 
20 The Charlottetown Confederation Conference was held in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island 
between 1 – 9 September 1864; The Quebec Confederation Conference was held in Quebec City, 
Quebec between 10 – 27 October 1864; The London Confederation Conference was held in London, 
England between December 1866 until March 1867.  
 31 
Economic Forces 
Economic factors and incentives played an additional role in entertaining the 
idea of uniting the British North American colonies together. For example, many of 
the political leaders in the colonies who were considering union anticipated that a 
confederation would enhance trade between them.21  Commercial elites in the British 
North American colonies considered that confederation would expand trading 
empires in the colonies because increasing internal t ade would place the federal 
government in a better position to create an inter-colonial railway from the Province 
of Canada to the eastern colonies of British North America.22 The increased trade 
would naturally increase the demand for better infrastructure links to trade 
commerce. In addition, the new inter-colonial railwy was viewed favourably by 
many politicians in the Maritime colonies because of the prospective potential to 
generate new forms of local revenue and trade for thei home colonies to grow and 
prosper. This railway was a grand undertaking, something a small colony might have 
great difficulty achieving, as such an undertaking would need great amounts of 
capital and a large organization to create and manage it. A strong central government 
would have the resources to achieve such a scheme. It could also afford and finance 
such a large capital project. This could be done if the colonies united into one large 
union.       
Security Factors 
The national security of the British North America olonies was a growing 
concern. The United States of America was never a ralistic threat to the security of 
the colonies until 1861. Before 1861 the British armed forces in the colonies were 
stronger than the armed forces in the United States nd could resist any offensive 
manoeuvres on British North American soil.23 That all changed when civil war broke 
out in the United States in April 1861 and the United States developed a skilled and 
powerful army as it became increasingly militarized.24 This was a threat to the small 
un-united colonies north of the border that feared possible American annexation. The 
“…temptation to aggression…” was increased and then b came feared.25 If 
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confederation occurred the colonies could collaborate and strengthen the defences of 
the colonies to better protect against aggressive events from the United States.26  A 
united British North America would have collective r sources to better defend the 
country against an attack, and it would be more difficult to annex a large 
geographical country rather than a small colonial territory. The need for defence 
against the Americans was a strong incentive to unite.    
 
British Support 
Britain was pushing the British North American colonies towards greater 
independence.  As Martin noted, Britain considered that a union, together with the 
creation of some armed force in “Canada” would make th  colonies “…better 
prepared to stand alone in the world.”27 In addition, as Robert MacKay observed, the 
colonies themselves of British North America could not say, “…how far Great 
Britain would be able to aid them, or indeed, how far (Britain) would be willing to 
aid…” them in a crisis.28 In short, union among the colonies offered greater 
independent prospects of stronger defence.29 As time progressed, Britain lost 
incentive in supporting British North America and reduced financial support to the 
colonies.30 The colonies would have to find other means of supporting themselves – 
to be independent and self reliant. There was active encouragement by Britain for the 
colonies to unite into one large country. The message  supporting Confederation by 
Britain were so strong that, “By the mid-1860s, nota single significant voice was 
raised in opposition to Confederation, thus demonstrating that a consensus had 
developed among the political elite, a shared view of the future of British North 
America….”31 In essence, the British government was saying, ‘Wesupport you 
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Maritime Union Proposed 
A wide range of factors influenced the political lead rs from the colonies of 
British North America towards forming a confederation among them. In Maritime 
Canada, the colonies of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island 
started to discuss a Maritime Union concurrently while the Province of Canada was 
experiencing political difficulties. Internal and ext rnal pressures on the Maritime 
colonies led the political leaders of these three colonies to hold a conference to 
discuss the formation of a new Maritime Union. Resoluti ns were passed in all three 
colonial legislative chambers agreeing upon the principles of a union and to meet in 
Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island on 1 September 1864 to discuss union.32 Before 
it actually started, news of the conference spread to the Province of Canada, whose 
leaders considered that, in light of the difficulties being experienced in an era of 
deadlock, the discussions in Charlottetown provided a perfect opportunity for 
change. The Governor General of Canada wrote to his counterparts in the Maritimes 
and sent notice that the Canadian government wished to send a number of delegates 
of their own to the conference.33 The Canadians wished to attend and “…ascertain 
whether the proposed union may not be made to embrace the whole of British North 
American provinces.”34 The Maritimers agreed to the Canadian request but the 
original mandate to discuss Maritime union was first and foremost on the agenda.  
 
The Confederation Conferences 
The Charlottetown Conference – 1-9 September 1864 
Once the Conference began on 1 September 1864, the Canadians essentially 
took over and led the main discussions towards a larger British North American 
union. The idea of a small Maritime union was effectively marginalized.35 As Russell 
argued, “While the Maritimers had not accepted all the details of the Canadians’ 
scheme, they did agree to set aside the Maritime union project and to make a federal 
union of British North America their constitutional priority.”36 However not all the 
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colonial leaders agreed with the idea of a larger union.  From the outset, Prince 
Edward Island was not very enthusiastic about the proposal for a Maritime union, let 
alone an even larger union including the Province of Canada.37 Nonetheless, many 
other leaders were in general agreement that a union would be better than no union at 
all. Étienne-Paschal Taché from Canada East said, “…the object of the Conference 
was to do away with some of the internal hindrances to trade, and to unite the 
Provinces for mutual defence. Without unity of action and comity of sentiment a 
great Country could not expect to exist.”38 
The Charlottetown Conference was received as a succe s and, with their 
spirits raised by the general consensus of uniting the colonies, the delegates agreed to 
meet again in Quebec. They knew that the creation of a new constitution could be 
divisive and, as Moore notes, “…accepted that unanimity was not to be expected and 
disagreement had to be allowed for.”39 After all, these men were skilled politicians 
and provincial representatives.  As Melvin O. Hammond reflected, “These were the 
cream of the statesmen of their day. Both parties gave of their best. Each man was in 
his prime….”40 The Charlottetown Conference created the foundations for 
discussion, debate, and eventual agreement at the Quebec Conference, in October 
1864, concerning the union of key British North American colonies.  
 
The Quebec Conference – 10-27 October 1864  
Out of the discussions at Charlottetown, came the Qu bec Conference where 
the delegates came from the Province of Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and 
Prince Edward Island, and discussed the union of the British North American 
colonies in greater detail. Russell has observed how t e specifics of the union were 
considered, debated, argued and finally agreed uponwith the production of a striking 
document of seventy-two resolutions that these Fathers of Confederation and framers 
of the Constitution established. The seventy-two resolutions that were worked out, 
“…covered nearly all of what was to be contained in the British North America 
                                                
37 See Moore, 1867: How the Fathers Made a Deal, 46. 
38 Cited in Arthur George Doughty, “Notes on the Quebec Conference, 1864,” The Canadian 
Historical Review Vol. 1, No. 1. (March 1920), 27. 
39 Moore, 1867: How the Fathers Made a Deal, xii. 
40 Melvin O. Hammond, Confederation and its Leaders (Toronto: McClelland, Goodchild and 
Stewart, 1917), 6. 
 35 
Act.”41  The seventy-two resolutions created the framework of unity among the 
colonies. Federalism and bicameralism were two major spects of the seventy-two 
resolutions. 
 
Federalism Agreed Upon 
Federalism is a system based on a division of authority between the central 
government (federal government) and the local governm nts (provincial 
governments). George- Étienne Cartier, from Canada East stated, “We thought that a 
federation scheme was the best because these provinces are peopled by different 
nations and by peoples of different religions.”42  Within this federal union, there 
would be a federal government charged with matters hat are of common interest to 
the entire federation, and provincial governments to control local matters and to 
protect diversified interests within each province.43 Federalism with the division of 
powers was determined to be the only acceptable form of government that pleased 
the majority of delegates at Quebec because, as Leonard Tilley from New Brunswick 
commented, “What (the federal government) had acquired, were Imperial powers 
transferred from London, rather than local powers rmoved from the provinces.”44 
The explicit powers that would be controlled by the federal government were 
considered to be the main functions of a national government.45 Some items that 
were of common national interest to the entire federation included: national defence, 
currency, weights and measures, postal service, duties of customs on imports and 
exports, telegraphic communication, Indians and lands reserved for Indians, 
naturalization and immigration, and inter-colonial railways.46 The provinces would 
have control of items that were of local interest such as: direct taxation, education, 
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penitentiaries, hospitals, municipalities, social welfare, and other matters of a merely 
local or private nature.47 
 
Structure of the Bicameral National Parliament 
The progress of the Conference slowed when the discussion moved to the 
structure of the national parliament. The national p rliament would consist of a 
bicameral legislature – this resolution was easily agreed upon. John A. Macdonald 
said, “As regards to the constitution of our legislature…with the Queen as our 
Sovereign, we should have an upper and a lower house.”48 The delegates had some 
rather strong contrasting views on representation in the lower house. A number of 
Maritime delegates were uncomfortable with representation by population in the 
lower chamber because they would be overwhelmed by both the populations of 
Canada East and more so by Canada West.49 The Maritime delegates feared there 
would always be a focus on the Canadas, as Canada West and Canada East already 
had more population in the British North American colonies than the Maritimes. 
George Brown, a delegate from Canada West, who was a staunch supporter of 
representation by population, would not agree to enter a federal union without at 
least one chamber in the national parliament consisti g of representation by 
population.50 
 
The Structure of the Senate 
Delegates from Canada East were also not overly enthusiastic about 
representation by population. They needed some reassurances that they would not be 
inundated by representatives from Canada West in the national parliament. The 
proposal for an upper chamber, the new Senate, calmed the fears of the delegates 
from Canada East of not having a strong voice in the national parliament as there 
would be much greater individual equality among thenew provinces of Canada. 
George Brown believed that compromise was in order since he and the other 
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delegates from Canada West received what they wanted i  the lower house. Brown 
stated, “Our (Canada East) friends have agreed to give us representation by 
population in the Lower House, on the express condition that they shall have equality 
in the Upper House. On no other condition could we have advanced a step.”51 As J.L. 
Finlay and D.N. Sprague noted, the Senate would be bas d on set equality rather than 
population, this pacified both Canada East and the Maritimers, “…who feared 
representation by population because it seemed too populist or prejudicial to the 
small provinces.”52 The Senate based on regional equality would assure the smaller 
provinces of greater influence since no proposed bill in the House of Commons could 
receive Royal Assent, without the explicit confirmation of the Senate.53 The 
delegates had agreed representation by population in the lower house and equality in 
the upper house. The difficulties were in the details, while the representation by 
population was rather straight forward, the specifics about the Senate were not. 
 
Regional Equality and Seat Allocation in the Senate  
At the Quebec Conference, out of a total of fourteen days spent discussing 
Confederation, six days were spent discussing the details of the Senate.54 From the 
beginning the delegates were in constant disagreement surrounding the details of the 
upper house. The discussion of the Senate started when John A. Macdonald 
introduced the resolution that the Senate should be bas d on regional equality rather 
than provincial equality.55 The three regions that were to be equally represent d were 
Canada West, Canada East and the Maritimes. The Maritimers felt that the regional 
allocation was unfavourable to them as the two Canad s were being over represented 
in the Senate.  There were two competing arrangements for equality in the Senate, 
one was based on provincial equality, and the other was based on regional equality.  
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The Maritimers wanted and argued for more influence in the Senate, and 
were understandably opposed to regional equality.56 The Senate was the last area 
where the Maritimers could justifiably argue for more influence, because they had a 
weak argument in the lower house based on population. The resolution for regional 
equality was strenuously opposed by the Maritime Provinces, primarily Prince 
Edward Island.57 Why should Canada East (Quebec) and Canada West (Ontario) 
each be classified as their own region, while the Maritime colonies are attached 
together? Surely the differences of Canada East and Canada West were just as 
different as those of New Brunswick versus Nova Scotia. The only safeguard that 
Maritime Provinces would possess was in the Senate.58 The delegates from Prince 
Edward Island demanded provincial equality in the Senate. From the beginning of 
the Charlottetown Conference, the delegates from Prince Edward Island were rather 
indifferent to the idea of Maritime Union, let alone British North American union, 
now in the middle of the Quebec Conference they were growingly displeased and 
undesirable to the idea. Regarding the new Canadian Parliament, the delegates from 
Prince Edward Island were uncomfortable with representation by population in the 
lower house – although they accepted it, but they objected to and held opposition 
towards regional equality in the new upper house. They were opposed to regional 
equality because similar to the lower house, Prince Edward Island would have an 
insignificant voice in the upper chamber. As a result of the opposition towards 
regional equality, the delegates from Prince Edward Island introduced a proposal for 
provincial equality in the Senate during the Quebec Conference, which was not in 
fact entertained.59 The other delegates agreed with John A. Macdonald and felt that 
regional equality was better than provincial equality.  
  The proponents of regional equality argued that te “…general regional 
needs and interests rather than particular states’ rights should be represented in the 
British North American upper house.”60 One of the fears of provincial equality was 
that senators would then demand attention to very specific, local issues in the Senate 
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that were only related to their province as opposed to general regional and national 
needs. It would be best, that if specific local provincial issues arose, they be best 
handled by the provincial legislatures as it was a loc l issue. This was set out in the 
Seventy-Two Resolutions and more so in the British North America Act in Section 
92 (16) as the provincial legislatures are within the exclusive right to handle matters 
of a local nature of the province.61 It would infringe the rights of the provinces in the 
federation if the national parliament consistently handled local issues. If such local 
matters were brought into the national Parliament they should be introduced by the 
members of the lower house, chosen to represent local c nstituencies. The Canadian 
upper house was intended to represent, articulate and express larger regional 
concerns; this is why John A. Macdonald advocated regional equality rather than 
provincial equality in the Senate. Regional equality would assign each region twenty-
four senators. Twenty-four senators would each go to Canada West and Canada East, 
and the Maritime Provinces would also receive twenty-four senators where Nova 
Scotia and New Brunswick would each receive ten senators and Prince Edward 
Island would receive four.  
The delegates from Prince Edward Island alone disagreed with the 
arrangement of senators.62 They considered that four senators would be insufficient 
in the upper house to advocate Prince Edward Island’s views in the new national 
parliament, particularly when compared to the twenty-four senators allocated to 
Canada West. Although not unanimously agreed, the majority of the delegates voted 
in favour of subdividing the Senate on regional equality, rather than provincial 
equality, on the grounds that the Senate was not intended to be a chamber to 
represent specific provincial interests.   
 
Fixed Number Equals Greater Independence.  
Once the resolution had been passed on regional equity, the delegates then 
debated over the related issue of having a fixed number of seats in the Senate. The 
intention for the Senate, by having a fixed constitutionally rigid number of seats, 
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would be a heightened level of independence. George B own stated, “The desire was 
to render the Upper House a thoroughly independent body – one that would be in the 
best position to canvass dispassionately the measurs of this House, and stand up for 
the public interests in opposition to hasty or partis n legislation.”63 If the Senate did 
not have a rigid number of seats and the numbers wee rather fluid and could be 
increased, the government of the day could simply apoint new partisan senators that 
would vote favourably towards government measures, hence reducing the 
independence of the upper house. The Senate would n onger have a heightened 
level of being an independent chamber legislating objectively on proposed 
legislation; it would simply be a rubber stamp that agreed with the lower house. On 
having a rigid number of seats in the Senate, John A. Macdonald stated, “No 
Ministry, can in the future do what they have done i  Canada before – they cannot 
with the view of carrying any measure, or strengthening the party, attempt to 
overrule the independent opinion of the Upper House by filling it with a number of 
its partisans and political supporters….The fact of he government being prevented 
from exceeding a limited number will preserve the independence of the Upper 
House, and make it, in reality, a separate and distinct chamber, having a legitimate 
and controlling influence in the legislation of the country.”64 This protection for the 
upper chamber being an independent body was partially established when delegates 
approved the proposal for a fixed number of seats in he Senate.   
 
Appointment Equals Greater Independence 
There were two different and competing arguments for the selection of 
senators; the first being elected, and the second being appointed. A number of 
delegates believed democracy and accountability were vital in the new parliament, 
and argued in favour of electing senators, either by the people or by the provincial 
legislatures. After an analysis of the arguments put forward at the Quebec 
Conference, it was understandable why the delegates ev ntually agreed that senators 
should not be elected but rather appointed by the gov rnor general of Canada on the 
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advice of the prime minister. Not all the delegates were in favour of appointments, 
Christopher Dunking from Canada East ridiculed and called it, “…just the worst 
body that could be contrived – ridiculously the worst.”65 He joked that the only 
defence it had was that the appointees would be oldr men, where death, “…would 
provide a strange kind of constitutional check when nothing else did.”66 Some 
delegates wanted the senators to be selected directly by he provincial legislatures.67 
This idea was not greatly entertained at the Confere ce. 
The primary problem some delegates had with appointed senators was a lack 
of accountable representation. How could a senator selected by the governor general 
on the advice of the prime minister be a special representative and a staunch defender 
of the province they were from?68 Even George Brown, at one point argued, “I press 
on the Conference that each province should be allowed to take its own mode of 
selection.”69 There were a number of reasons why the delegates at the conference 
eventually voted in favour of the appointment process by the central government 
rather than by the provinces or the general electorate. The interest of the nation 
supersedes the interests of individual provinces in the Senate. One of the reasons 
why the delegates agreed to the appointive process by the central government was, 
“…that sentiments of particularism should not endanger the unity of the new 
nation…”70 The Fathers of Confederation and framers of the Constitution, “…called 
for representation of the regions in a legislative and deliberative institution where 
(senators) would bring their knowledge of the regions into debates on national 
issues…in the formal, deliberative, and lawmaking process of the nation.”71 The 
central government would make the appointment, rathe  an the local authorities 
because the Fathers and framers did not intend nor want extreme provincialists 
placed into the Senate, but rather they wanted natio l thinking regionalists sitting in 
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the Senate. This is one reason why the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill is 
selected as a case study as it concerned a very specific local railway between two 
towns in British Columbia. It does not have strong re ional or national significance, 
and this is a good case study to analyze the senators’ responses to a local provincial 
issue being dealt with in the national parliament. 
The Fathers of Confederation also considered that an ppointed Senate could 
also be more independent since there would be no elections. The senators could 
evaluate legislation on what would be right for Canada, which at times would not 
necessarily be the most popular outcome. Having an appointed Senate would lead to 
a more independent upper chamber that could act, in the way John A. Macdonald 
famously conveyed, as a “…sober second thought in legislation.”72 It was intended 
that since the future senators would not face re-election every few years, they could 
vote on potentially controversial measures in the Senate for the benefit of Canada as 
a whole as they would not fear making an unpopular decision nor fear losing their 
senate seat. This is one additional reason why the Old Age Pension Bill is selected as 
a case study. This was a bill that was almost universally approved of as providing 
pensions to the old age population, yet the majority f senators blocked the bill from 
passage. This begs the question of whether senators might have done so if they had 
been facing an election soon afterwards.  Moreover, given that they blocked the bill 
so surely, we need to consider whether the senators had a crucial issue with the 
proposed legislation, or whether there were also extenuating circumstances behind 
the blockage.  
 
The House of Commons is Supreme 
One explanation as to why the delegates agreed on an appointed Senate was 
that they felt a bicameral legislature should only have one powerful chamber, not two 
competing chambers. The delegates agreed that the gov rnment would be held 
responsible to the House of Commons. The delegates’ commitment and faith in 
responsible government explained why they settled on an appointed Senate.73 If the 
delegates created an elected Senate, it would have created a rival in parliament and 
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would have challenged the responsible government pri ci le established many years 
prior to the Confederation Conferences. The delegates viewed the lower house, the 
House of Commons, as the more powerful chamber. As MacKay notes, “The Senate 
was intended to hold a subordinate place to the House of Commons.”74 An elected 
Senate would challenge the House of Commons because ther  would be “…two 
Houses of exactly the same character which were both likely to consider themselves 
the interpreters of the popular will, and that such a condition would inevitably lead to 
conflicts between the Houses.”75 These conflicts and challenges were a problem the 
Province of Canada faced during pre-Confederation and was trying to overcome with 
the creation of a new parliament. By creating a Senate that was appointed, and a 
House of Commons that was elected, the latter would be supreme because the more 
representative chamber would have the popular mandate needed to govern in a 
democracy.76 This became evident in each case study as the Senate was criticized by 
newspapers and the public for blocking a bill that d been passed by a lower but 
publicly elected legislative chamber.  
John A. Macdonald was one of the delegates who adamntly opposed an 
elected Senate.  If there was an elected Senate and a deadlock between the two 
chambers happened, Macdonald feared the worst, becaus  the elected Senate could 
claim to have supremacy over the House of Commons. As John A Macdonald 
argued, in the case of deadlock the elected Senate could claim:   
“We as much represent the feelings of the people as you do, and even more 
so; we are not elected from small localities and for a short period; you as a 
body were elected at a particular time, when the public mind was running in 
a particular channel; you were returned to Parliament, not so much 
representing the general views of the country, on ge eral questions, as upon 
the particular subjects which happened to engage the minds of the people 
when they went to the polls. We have as much right, or a better right, than 
you to be considered as representing the deliberate will of the people on 
general questions, and therefore we will not give way.”77  
Alexander Mackenzie from Canada West, similarly echo d John A. Macdonald’s 
claim. Mackenzie said, “It is evident that two chambers which have originated in 
precisely the same way, will claim to exercise that same rights and privileges, and to 
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discharge the same function….”78 The proposals for the appointment of senators by 
the governor general on the advice of the prime minister was approved by the 
majority of delegates at the Quebec Conference. 
 
Appointment For Life 
After the delegates agreed that the senators should be appointed by the central 
government and not elected, the next detail to be sorted was the tenure of each 
senator. How long would they serve? With the exception of the delegates who 
wanted an elected Senate, it was agreed with littleresistance that the tenure of a 
senator should be for life. The appointment for life was intended to grant and 
encourage a more honest freedom of speech and legislative action.79 The idea was 
that the senators would not fear political party ramifications if they did not toe the 
party line in the Senate, since they were there for life, they could vote as they pleased 
on what would be best for Canada.  The problem withthis, as will be seen with each 
blocked bill, when a partisan individual gets appointed into the Senate, they usually 
remain a partisan individual in the Senate for lifewhich naturally created large 
partisan voting blocks of senators. Partisan block voting proved to be a significant 
issue with the Naval Aid Bill and the Old Age Pension Bill. 
 
Chief Function of the Senate 
After the delegates established that the Senate would be based on regional 
equality, with a fixed number of seats, and senators appointed by the Crown – for 
life, delegates at the Quebec Conference considered the chief functions of the Senate. 
They determined that, while the Senate’s primary function, as in most second 
chambers, was to legislate, its secondary function was to represent the regions. As 
Dawson and Dawson have argued, “The chief function of the Senate is legislation, 
that is, the consideration and passage of bills which it either originates or receives 
                                                
78 Provincial Parliament of Canada. Parliamentary Debates on the subject of the Confederation of the 
British North American Provinces (23 February 1865), p. 426 (Mr. Mackenzie, Member of Pr vincial 
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79 See Lieut.-Governor Arthur Hamilton Gordon of New Brunswick to Edward Cardwell, Colonial 
Secretary, 26 September 1864, in Documents on the Confederation of British North America, 46. 
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from the House of Commons.”80 The intended heightened level of independence that 
the delegates tried to establish for the Senate refl ct d how they viewed it as a 
legislative chamber that should be kept away from all the drama and cheap politics in 
the House of Commons in order that the Senate could review legislation placed 
before it. Canada’s upper chamber was to be “the worksh p” of Parliament and the 
House of Commons was to be “the theatre”, where the drama happened.81 The 
intention George Brown hoped for, “…was to render the upper house a thoroughly 
independent body – one that would be in the best poi ion to canvass dispassionately 
the measures of (the lower house), and stand up for the public interests in opposition 
to hasty or partisan legislation.”82 This is important as there are occasions when the 
government of the day introduces hasty legislation, as in the case of the Esquimalt 
and Nanaimo Railway Bill, the Naval Aid Bill, and the Old Age Pension Bill. A 
delegate from Canada East, Joseph Édouard Cauchon, seconded George Brown by 
stating, “…we ought to place in the Constitution a counterpoise to prevent…and to 
moderate the precipitancy of any government which might be disposed to move too 
fast and go too far, - I mean a legislative body able to protect the people against itself 
and against the encroachments of power.”83 In order to ensure that the Senate’s great 
responsibility as a chamber of sober second thought, tha  would stand up for the 
public interest and prevent any government moving too fast, or too far, made it 
necessary to ensure that the Senate would have the pow r of a legislative veto.  
The power of a legislative veto in the Senate was agreed and granted by the 
delegates at the Quebec Conference. Without the power f a veto many delegates 
feared the worst. George-Étienne Cartier stated, “…the weak point in democratic 
institutions is the leaving of all power in the hands of the popular element. The 
history of the past proves that this is an evil. In order that institutions may be stable 
and work harmoniously, there must be a power of resistance to oppose to [sic] the 
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democratic element.”84 The English political theorist, John Stuart Mill would had 
been pleased with the Fathers of Confederation and the framers of the Canadian 
Constitution as Mill wrote in his publication entitled, Considerations on 
Representative Government, “An assembly which does not rest on the basis of ome 
great power in the country, is ineffectual against one which does.”85 The Senate 
needed the power of resistance – the power of a veto – to act as a proficient second 
thought chamber. With the power of a legislative veto the new Senate would have the 
ability, “…to guard (Canadian) interests, protecting them against hasty and ill-
considered legislation, and preventing improper andextravagant appropriations of 
the public funds.”86 The intention that the Senate provide a protection against an 
extravagant appropriation of public finds was an additional reason why the Naval 
Aid Bill was selected, as it proposed to spend thirty-f ve million dollars in 1913 on 
three battleships for the British Royal Navy.  
 The Fathers of Confederation granted the Senate a veto. The intended role of 
the Senate was to use its power when it considered it necessary. If it did not, there 
would be no use of the Canadian Senate. John A. Macdonald, during the 
Confederation debates, summed up what he and others int nded and expected from 
the Senate. Macdonald said, “There would be no use of an Upper House if it did not 
exercise, when it thought proper, the right of opposing or amending or postponing 
the legislation of the Lower House. It would be no value whatever were it a mere 
chamber for registering the decrees of the Lower House. It must be an independent 
House, having a free action of its own, for it is only valuable as being a regulating 
body, calmly considering the legislation initiated by the popular branch, and 
preventing any hasty or ill-considered legislation which may come from that body.”87 
Alexander Campbell from Canada West echoed John A. Macdonald’s intentions for 
the Senate when he stated that the Canadian Senate should be “…conservative, calm, 
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considerate and watchful, to prevent the enactments of measures which, in its 
deliberate judgement, were not calculated to advance the common weal.”88 The 
intentions of the Fathers of Confederation for the Senate were that it legislate with 
independence, at a distance from outbursts of current excitement, not to be swayed 
but to evaluate proposed legislation for its true mrits, for the benefit of Canada, 
even if it went against what certain regions, provinces, governments or even what 
other countries wanted. This is an additional reason why the three specific case 
studies were selected. The Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill was a very 
provincial piece of legislation and there was strong opinion for its support within 
British Columbia. The Naval Aid Bill generated massive public interest and the 
British government wanted it passed. Finally, the Old Age Pension Bill was publicly 
supported, yet the Senate still blocked the bill.  
 
Protection of Rights 
The Senate is based on regional representation and se ators come from 
specific provinces or territories, but the Fathers of Confederation did not intend on 
having the Senate act as the primary protector of pr vincial rights. This resulted in 
uncertainly because although the Fathers of Confederation set up an upper chamber 
where each senator was to represent their home province, the Senate was divided 
also into equal regions where the senators are to adv c te and articulate interests of 
the regions they are from. Representation of the province, protection of the region, 
this is fine for Ontario and Quebec where they each are classified as a single region. 
With respect to the other regions such as the western region (British Columbia, 
Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba) – there is not the same loyalty present with a 
senator from either Saskatchewan or Manitoba handling a “regional” issue that 
would have a large or exclusive effect on British Columbia. This was seen with the 
Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill. The loyalty to stand up for and with British 
Columbia by a Manitoba senator would not be to the same degree as with senators 
dealing with “regional” issues from Ontario or Quebec.  
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This returns to the main question concerning the Senate in its first sixty years. 
The Senate in Parliament was created to articulate and express Canada’s regional and 
national concerns, and to scrutinize proposed legislation that came before it carefully 
and independently. The selection of the blocked Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway 
Bill, Naval Aid Bill, and the Old Age Pension Bill, all provided excellent case 
studies to analyze the Senate on its foundational setup by the Fathers of 
Confederation. Two of the bills had a strong inclinat on of the federal government 
infringing on the rights of the provinces. The senators did not allow for such 
infringement to pass through the national Parliament. The naval bill additionally 
dealt with nationally retrogressive legislation, which the senators blocked from 
passage after their evaluation. 
 
Seventy-Two Resolutions 
The delegates from the Province of Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, 
and Prince Edward Island at the Quebec Conference which took place between 10 
and 27 October 1864, produced seventy-two resolutions. The Seventy-Two 
Resolutions ultimately framed the structure of governance and union in the Canadian 
federation.89 They were the backbone of the British North America Act of 1867. As 
Moore argues, the document that the Fathers of Canadi  Confederation produced, 
“…was a strikingly utilitarian document. There was nop etry in the Quebec 
resolutions. The colonists had addressed the philosophical questions of government 
in the responsible-government struggles two decades earlier. They treated their 
constitution as a machine for running government mechanics.”90  
 
Problems 
Nothing is perfect and some problems developed with the Senate after 
Confederation which was not entirely accounted for n appreciated during the 
Confederation Conferences. The first problem, as we will see in the discussion of the 
three proposed bills, lay with the appointment process and partisan appointments as 
partisan appointments lead to partisan block voting. This was voting with one’s 
respective political party in the Senate, not necessarily having an independent 
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mindset nor voting on proposed legislation with for what was in the best interests of 
the nation. During the Confederation Conferences, political parties were still in their 
infancy stages in Canada and party discipline in the legislatures was still rather 
loose.91 The Fathers of Confederation intended that the Senate would be less partisan 
than the elected House of Commons with appointed lif  terms where no one would 
challenge them for their Senate seat. 
The second related problem that most of the Fathers of Confederation did not 
foresee was by having senators appointed for life, th re is no real check upon them 
after they get appointed. David Reesor from Canada East was not pleased with the 
appointment process and foresaw future difficulties. “But inasmuch as you appoint 
these members for life,” Reesor said, “you have no check over them, nor are they so 
likely to check legislation of an immature and ill-considered character. While the 
ministry of the day which appoints them remains in power, it will expect and receive 
a cordial support from them; but let it be defeated, and a ministry, formed out of the 
opposite party obtaining office, there will certainly be difficulty – there will be a 
tendency to dead-locks between the two braches of the legislature….”92 Reesor’s 
cautionary statement that foresaw the difficulties of partisan appointments, actually 
became reality with respect to all three blocked bills. There is no scheduled check 
upon them so the senators could vote as they wished and this often resulted to 
exclusively voting with one’s respective political party on a constant basis. A senator 
can say to themselves, “I owe no loyalty to my province or region I represent, the 
prime minister put me in here, my loyalty belongs to the leader and the party because 
it is not like the province can get rid of me if they do not appreciate how I legislate.”  
 
Approval of Union in the British North American colonies 
When the Quebec Conference ended on 27 October 1864, delegates from the 
colonies of the Province of Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince 
Edward Island, went back to their respected legislatures to receive approval of the 
formalized Seventy-Two Resolutions established at the Conference, and approve the 
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act of uniting with the other British North American colonies. The Province of 
Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick all approved the scheme, but Prince 
Edward Island did not approve. Prince Edward Island did not find the scheme 
advantageous and did not see the need to join the others.  
 
The London Conference – December 1866 – March 1867 
The London Conference was held in order to transform the Seventy-Two 
Resolutions into a formal legislative act that could be introduced as a bill into the 
British Parliament. There were no major transformations regarding the resolutions, 
the delegates urged the individuals at the Colonial Office that the delegates agreed 
upon the Seventy-Two Resolutions at Quebec, and their union was based on those. 
Any major alterations might have upset the union plan. There was only one change 
regarding the new Canadian upper chamber. The Colonial Office required some 
provision within the British North America Act to break deadlocks between the 
House of Commons and the Senate. The delegates in London included an 
amendment to provide for the appointment of extra senators that would be appointed 
in equal numbers from each of the regions thus maintaini g regional equality and to 
break any political deadlocks within the Canadian Prliament.93 There will always be 
a situation that arises where the lower house and the upper house are at odds with 
each other. This provision was included because the British recognized from their 
own experience and from what they witnessed in the Province of Canada, that 
disagreements naturally occur and it is not a matter of if – but of when.   After that 
was placed in the proposed Act, the Act passed through the British Parliament with 
no problems, it received Royal Assent from Queen Victor a, and on 1 July 1867 
came in force.  The specific sections that apply to the Senate in the British North 
America Act are sections twenty-one through thirty-six.  
 
The Intentions 
The Senate was intended to be a legislative chamber which considers 
legislation either introduced from the Senate itself or from the House of Commons. 
Secondly, the Senate is a legislative chamber based on regional representation. The 
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Senate was intended to represent, articulate and cou t larger regional and national 
issues, not specifically provincial issues for the members of parliament are to 
articulate those or the province handles them. There would be a fixed number of 
senators as to preserve regional equality and that no one specific region would 
dominate the Senate by having a greater number than everyone else.  
The Senate was created to have membership by appointment only. Since there 
would be no public elections, it was intended that e senators would have the ability 
to evaluate and legislate on proposed measures which would benefit Canada, which 
at times happens to go against popular opinion. The Fathers of Confederation and the 
framers of the Constitution did not want an elected Senate, as an elected Senate 
would have an elected mandate from the people and this might have caused a number 
of deadlock situations because an elected Senate could also claim to be the 
interpreters of popular will. The Fathers of Confederation wanted to get away from 
the political deadlocks they were experiencing before Confederation. By having an 
appointed chamber, it created an upper chamber that was subordinate to the House of 
Commons and less likely to challenge the lower chamber repeatedly.  
Although the Senate was subordinate to the House of Commons, from time to 
time the Senate might block legislation from the popular chamber. The Senate was 
granted legislative veto powers because the Fathers of Confederation did not want to 
create a powerless chamber. From time to time the Senate might be required to 
remind members of the House of Commons that they belong d to a bicameral 
parliament. When considered appropriate, and with justified reasoning, the senators 
were expected to stand up against the House of Commons and block legislation 
which they had evaluated and concluded was not in the best interests of Canada. This 
could be legislation that was either partisan, passed through the House of Commons 
too hastily – on which the government was trying to m ve too fast and go too far, or 
any legislation that was unjustifiably extravagant in appropriations of public funds.  
As John A. Macdonald said the Senate was intended to be a place of sober second 
thought. There would not be any point in having a second chamber if it did not 






































The principal task intended for the Senate by the Fathers of Confederation 
and the framers of the Constitution was the consideration and passage of proposed 
legislation. Confederation was less than ten years old and many of the Fathers of 
Confederation still sat in Parliament and the intentions for the Senate were still fresh 
in the minds of the parliamentarians. By 1875 there was a large Conservative 
majority in the Senate while there was a Liberal majority in the House of Commons, 
this was the first time in Canadian parliamentary history when opposing political 
parties held different majorities in the two national legislative chambers. The 
Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill was the first major confrontation between the 
House of Commons and the Senate, as it was the first time since 1867 that a 
considerably important government bill was blocked by the Senate from receiving 
Royal Assent. The Senate’s debate over this legislation provided a key opportunity to 
assess the extent to which this new parliamentary institution was functioning in its 
early years. After careful consideration the Senate blocked the Esquimalt and 
Nanaimo Railway Bill, as it was the result of British influence in Canadian affairs, 
extravagant and unjustifiable in the appropriations f public funds, and potentially 
unconstitutional. This chapter argues that the Senate’s blockage of the Esquimalt and 
Nanaimo Railway Bill was in accordance with the founding principles and intentions 
set out by the Fathers of Confederation, but it wasevident that some political partisan 
voting occurred in the vote outcome.  
 
The New Province of British Columbia 
After Confederation, Canada was expanding westward from the province of 
Ontario and after the inclusion of Manitoba in 1870, the British colony of British 
Columbia showed interest in joining Canada. Prime Minister John A. Macdonald 
welcomed Canadian westward expansion with the inclusion of the new province of 
British Columbia into the Canadian federation in 187 , after the two respective 
parties agreed upon important Terms of Union. Of the numerous Terms of Union, the 
most relevant is Clause 11 as it required the federal government to commence within 
two years (by 1873) the construction of a railway from the pacific coast to the 
existing railway system in central Canada, and to complete the railway within ten 
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years (by 1881).1 Not only was the trans-national railway a physical link across 
Canada, it was also a symbolic national bond from sea-to-sea. Work on the railway 
began in 1871 with the initiation of land surveys that the railway route would travel 
throughout Western Canada. However, Clause 11 proved rather ambitious in scope 
and detrimental to the relationship between the federal government and the new 
province.  
 
Map 3.1: Location of British Columbia within Canada in 18712  
 
 
Political Change in Ottawa 
During this time in Ottawa there was a power shift where Macdonald and his 
Conservative ministry resigned because it was found that they had accepted bribes 
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with contracts given out to build the trans-national r ilway.3 The Conservatives 
resigned in the autumn of 1873 and this event was known as the Pacific Scandal.4 
This resignation resulted in a power shift in Ottawa. The Liberals took control of the 
government under the leadership of Alexander Mackenzie on 7 November 1873.5 
The Senate also experienced a power shift. In 1867 the Senate had political equality 
with equal representation of the Liberals and Conservatives balancing each other out. 
However, by 1873 the Senate’s balance of power laidin the hands of the 
Conservatives as numerous Senate appointments had been made during the previous 
six years of Conservative rule. It is clear that within five years of Confederation the 
convention of political party nomination for the Senate was well established and, as a 
result, the political independence of the Senate was being destroyed.6  
The Senate was at capacity and therefore there wereno vacant seats for 
Liberals to fill in order to achieve a balance of power. The Liberals were in the 
minority in the Senate and Prime Minister Mackenzie was rather uncomfortable with 
the situation so he appealed to the Governor General of Canada. On 22 December 
1873, Alexander Mackenzie recommended that six additional senators be added to 
the Senate in accordance with Section 26 of the British North America Act which 
stipulates that additional senators may be appointed b yond that of the normal 
amount allocated to the regions.7 The governor general of Canada, Lord Dufferin, 
wrote to the colonial secretary, Lord Kimberley, onwhether such appointments 
should take place. Lord Kimberley wrote back to Lord Dufferin stating: 
“You will readily understand that Her Majesty could not be advised to take 
the responsibility of interfering with the Constituon of the Senate expect 
upon an occasion when it had been made apparent that a difference had 
arisen between the two Houses of so serious and permanent a character that 
the Government could not be carried on without Her intervention, and when 
it could be shown that the limited creation of Senators allowed by the Act 
would apply an adequate remedy. (…) It follows from what I have said that I 
                                                
3 See Barbara J. Messamore, “The Line Over Which He Must Not Pass: Defining the Office of the 
Governor General, 1878.” The Canadian Historical Review 86, 3 (2005): 465. 
4 Ibid., 466. 
5 See F. W. Howay, British Columbia: The Making of a Province (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1929),  
194-195. 
6 See Robert MacGregor Dawson. The Principle of Official Independence (Toronto: S.B. Gundy, 
1922), 243. 
7 Lord Kimberley acknowledges Prime Minister Alexander Mackenzie’s recommendation in his own 
despatch to Lord Dufferin. Library and Archives Canada, Alexander Mackenzie Fonds, R5744-1-8-E, 
Reel M-197 "Proposed Addition to the Senate," Letter from Lord Kimberley to the Governor General 
Lord Dufferin, 18 February 1874, pages 311-312. (Secret Despatch)  
 56 
am not prepared to advise Her Majesty to direct the proposed addition to the 
Senate.”8 
No deadlock had developed between the House of Commons and the Senate, yet 
Mackenzie tried to get more Liberal senators in the Senate potentially foreseeing 
challenges with the upper house in the future.  
 
 British Columbia was Still Waiting… 
Meanwhile in British Columbia, progress on the trans-national railway was 
not advancing as most would have liked. By 1873, the p ysical construction of the 
railway was nowhere in sight. The battle against Western Canadian topography had 
not yet been won.9 The surveying and construction caused massive delays. 
Politicians in British Columbia became angry and irritated by the construction delays 
particularly as the federal government had agreed that British Columbia would be 
connected to the other provinces within ten years. For British Columbia, the trans-
national railway across Canada was the “…most important clause of the Terms of 
Union.”10 Although the federal government knew of the railway’s importance, it 
wanted to build along the most sensible and negotiable route to the pacific coast. 
From the federal government’s perspective, this demanded prudence and careful 
planning if it was hasty and impulsive on the route and construction, it could result in 
a far greater expenditure of public funds than originally intended.  
The Prime Minister realized that construction of the trans-national railway 
within ten years was far too ambitious. Alexander Mackenzie abandoned John A. 
Macdonald’s promise of constructing a trans-national railway because “Such a 
railway was not only ahead of demand…[but also] the project was beyond Canada’s 
financial capability, damaged since 1873 by the worst economic recession of the 
century.”11 It was clear that part of the original Terms of Union, principally Clause 
11, could not be kept by the federal government. Mackenzie wanted a relaxation of 
the original terms with British Columbia.  
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Alexander Mackenzie sent James D. Edgar, a federal government 
representative to British Columbia and instructed him “…to negotiate a relaxation of 
the Terms of Union by offering conditions which were only slightly more favourable 
than…(the original)…in 1870.”12 Mr. Edgar arrived in British Columbia and the 
negotiations continued for three months.13 As time was elapsing Mr. Edgar submitted 
a memorandum to the British Columbia government stating that Canada would agree 
to continue working vigorously on the surveys and construction of the trans-national 
railway, and commence immediately and prosecute vigorously a railway from 
Esquimalt to Nanaimo on Vancouver Island.14 The Government of British Columbia 
did not appreciate the position that the federal government placed upon it. There 
were already local jealousies between Vancouver Island and the mainland, and with 
this new deal the mainland would have to continue to wait a few more years for the 
trans-national railway while Vancouver Island would receive an island railway 
immediately.15 The premier of British Columbia, George Walkem, demanded Mr. 
Edgar’s credentials which allowed and authorized him to make such a proposal, and 
a heated argument ensued which resulted in Mr. Edgar leaving the province on 19 
May 1874.16 British Columbia was angry and irritated at the federal government 
because they both originally and formally agreed to a trans-national railway within 
ten years, and the federal government did not up hold its agreement.  
British Columbians, I would argue, were not acting greedily in their anger nor 
in their disappointment about the much delayed trans-national railway. For British 
Columbians, the trans-national railway symbolized the physical bond between them 
and the rest of Canada, it physically symbolized Confederation itself.17 They knew 
the value of railways, which were vital for pioneering of new settlements within the 
new province to grow and prosper.18 With so many delays in the construction and 
disagreements growing between the province and the federal government, the British 
government got involved in the dispute.  
                                                
12 See Ormsby, British Columbia: A History, 264-265. 




17 See Ormsby, British Columbia: A History, 260. 
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The Carnarvon Terms 
One impetus for the Senate’s blockage of the Esquimalt and Nanaimo 
Railway Bill was Britain’s involvement within the intra-national dispute between the 
province of British Columbia and the federal governme t of Canada.20 After a 
number of meetings with British Columbia and the federal government, the new 
British secretary of state for the colonies (colonial secretary), Lord Carnarvon, acted 
as an arbitrator between the two and laid out new terms to settle the disagreement 
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within the same context is ‘intergovernmental’.  
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between the province and the federal government.21 The primary elements of the 
Carnarvon Terms, laid out in November 1874, included the construction of a railway 
from Esquimalt to Nanaimo, to be commenced and finished as soon as possible, 
additionally the surveys of the trans-national railw y were to be “…pushed on with 
the utmost vigour…” and the trans-national railway was to be completed by 31 
December 1890.22 The main difference between the proposal made by Edgar, as 
federal negotiator, and that contained in the Carnarvon Terms was the latter 
stipulated a fixed date of completion of the trans-national railway while the former 
did not.  
The Carnarvon Terms were agreed upon with both the provincial and federal 
governments. British Columbia’s views of the Carnarvon Terms were similar to 
those of Mr. Edgar. This served to heighten the regional tension between Vancouver 
Island and the mainland. However, there was no real alternative but to agree to the 
Carnarvon Terms. If British Columbia did not agree, it would still be in the situation 
that it had been in before the disagreement between the federal government and the 
province had escalated. Moreover, it would still be waiting for the trans-national 
railway surveys to be finished. This would most like y lead to an even longer wait for 
the completion of the railway. I would argue that by agreeing to terms arbitrated by 
an external third party the provincial government was acting in a way that was more 
neutral towards both Vancouver Island and the mainland. This may have seemed 
preferable compared to agreeing to terms generated by a representative of the federal 
government. Prime Minster Mackenzie reluctantly agreed with the Carnarvon Terms 
which included a completion date for the trans-national railway and an additional 
local railway on Vancouver Island as a good will gesture.23 However, even though 
the provincial and federal governments agreed to the Carnarvon Terms, the term 
regarding the Esquimalt to Nanaimo railway had to be approved by Parliament 
because it was not one of the original Terms of Union, and the federal government 
needed parliamentary approval to commence the construction and the work of the 
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22 Ibid. 
23 See D.G. Creighton, Canada’s First Century, 1867-1967 (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1970), 
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railway.24 By contrast, the other Carnarvon Terms did not requi  specific Canadian 
parliamentary approval and Royal Assent.  
 
The Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill in the House of Commons 
As the federal government was required to proceed with utmost vigour, the 
Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill was drafted during the early months of 1875. 
Speed was essential as the federal government had no intention of breaching and 
violating its agreement to uphold its obligation abided by the Carnarvon Terms.25 
The railway bill formally known as An Act to provide for the construction of a 
Railway from Esquimalt to Nanaimo, British Columbia (1875) was introduced into a 
strong Liberal led House of Commons on 19 March 1875 by Alexander Mackenzie.26 
If this railway bill passed it would have created a tr ck approximately one hundred 
and five kilometres in length at the public cost ranging between two to four million 
dollars.27 The Commons debate on the railway bill was rather lively with 
Conservative members and even some prominent Liberal members criticizing and 
attacking it. Edward Blake was the most prominent member of the Liberal Party who 
was against the bill from the introduction, for he vi wed it as a local railway, and not 
one that was nationally significant. Mr. Blake said, “The construction of sixty-five 
miles of railway was a local work which would invole an expenditure of two or two 
and a half millions of dollars….It was a local work which, it might be assumed, was 
important to the locality…but a local work.”28 This local railway was a public works 
project in which the federal government should not be involved for it was a 
provincial matter. In defence, Alexander Mackenzie reminded the House of 
Commons that “…the construction of the railway was absolutely necessary to the 
welfare of the Confederation and particularly to British Columbia….”29 It was a 
                                                
24 See Daily Free Press, “Ottawa,” 1 April 1875. (Winnipeg, Manitoba).  
25 See Margaret A. Ormsby, “Prime Minister Mackenzie, The Liberal Party, and the Bargain with 
British Columbia.” The Canadian Historical Review 26, 2 (1945): 163. 
26 Dominion of Canada, Journals of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada, 2nd Session, 
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necessary action needed for the health of the newly formed Confederation which was 
less than ten years old.  
The Opposition in the House of Commons then attacked th  specifics of the 
railway bill. The main issue at hand for the Conservative opposition was the financial 
cost of the railway. The geographical surveys on Vancouver Island were not 
complete, estimates were not thorough; Parliament and the Government were not 
fully appraised of the cost of the railway. There wre a number of estimates but no 
firm final expected cost was known when the bill was introduced.  How could this 
bill be passed or receive parliamentary approval when, as Charles Tupper argued, “It 
comes before (Parliament) involving an unknown sum to be given to unknown 
parties.”30 As a result of the unknown sums of money that would be granted, the 
Conservatives wanted the railway contracts to be sumitted to Parliament thus being 
aware of how much the Government was spending and to whom the contracts were 
awarded.  
Alexander Mackenzie did not intend to submit these railway contracts to 
Parliament. As Mackenzie noted, “The Government (does) not propose to submit 
these contracts for the approval of Parliament….”31 If his Government submitted the 
contracts to Parliament, “…they would have to put off c nstruction of the [rail]road 
for another year, and they had agreed with the Province of British Columbia to 
commence the construction immediately.”32 A fellow Liberal member, Aemilius 
Irving opposed Mackenzie’s process of the lack of parliamentary approval for the 
awarding of contracts. Irving said, “The point was that the country had been led to 
expect that such contracts would be submitted to Parliament….All large 
contracts…should be submitted to Parliament.”33 He continued, “…the law did not 
require it, but it was understood to be a part of the present Government when they 
criticized the late Government for not following it in connection with the Pacific 
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Railway.”34 Still Mackenzie refused to include any stipulation that the contracts 
under this railway bill would be submitted to Parliment. 
As Alexander Mackenzie had a substantial loyal Liberal majority in the 
House of Commons, as a result of the Canadian Federal Election of 1874, the 
Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill did not encounter great resistance as it was 
passed through with ease. The third reading in the House of Commons was on 29 
March 1875, the vote was ninety-one in favour to sixty-four opposed.35 The 
Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill passed its first hurdle in the House of 
Commons. However, it did not receive the same support in the Senate the following 
week.  
 
The Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill in the Senate 
After passing its third reading in the House of Commons, the Esquimalt and 
Nanaimo Railway Bill was sent to the Senate where it was introduced by Senator 
Richard Scott (Liberal – Ontario) on 3 April 1875.36 Senator Scott stated that this bill 
was a result of “…the failure to carry out the Terms of Union with British 
Columbia….”37 The Government acknowledged it could not keep its agreement 
regarding the completion of the trans-national railw y across Canada within the time 
frame originally agreed upon. In keeping with the Carnarvon Terms it therefore 
stipulated that it would continue working diligently on the trans-national railway and, 
as compensation, build an additional railway on Vancouver Island.  
From the moment the bill was introduced in the Senate a number of concerns 
were voiced about building this railway on Vancouver Island. These included the 
appearance of British influence upon the bill with the involvement and arbitration of 
Lord Carnarvon, the incompleteness of the geographic l land surveys, the difficult 
terrain, the significant proposed costs and, finally, the fact that this was a local 
railway not a national railway.  
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Diagram 3.1 – Political Party Allocation in the Senate in 187538 
 
 
The Senate in 1875, with seventy-six senators, twenty-six were Liberal senators (red), while there were fifty Conservative 
senators (blue).   
 
The Senate’s concern about British influence on the development of this bill 
was reflected in comments such as those by Senator William Miller (Conservative - 
Nova Scotia) who stated that, “The line of railway proposed by the bill…had been 
recommended by the Imperial Government.”39 Additionally, Senator Scott 
acknowledged that this bill was “…through the interference of the Imperial 
Government…to create a state of good feeling in British Columbia.”40 Within the 
Senate there was a level of discomfort with the high level of British involvement in 
the dictation of the legislative agenda of Canada with respect to an intra-national 
                                                
38 Parliament of Canada. “Senators.” 
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39 Dominion of Canada, Debates of the Senate of the Dominion of Canada (6 April 1875), p. 747  
(Mr. Miller, Senator). 
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issue contained within Canada’s borders. Not one seator praised Lord Carnarvon 
and his involvement in undertaking the position of arbitrator between the federal 
government and British Columbia. Canada was still relatively young, but not an 
infant, perhaps the Senate was trying to assert some greater independence from 
Britain immediately after Confederation? 
The second aspect was the non-completion of the geographical/topographical 
land surveys on Vancouver Island between Esquimalt and Nanaimo.  The issue at 
hand was that construction of the railway would not commence until the completion 
of the surveys. No money would be paid out until the surveys were complete, so no 
contracts would be finalized. With the completion of the surveys, the Government 
and Parliament would have a greater understanding of the final cost of negotiating 
the terrain for the railway through the mountains ad hills between the two towns. It 
was rather perplexing to a number of senators as to the timing of this bill; Senator 
Robert Dickey (Conservative - Nova Scotia) stated, “In view of the incompleteness 
of the surveys, the commencement of the railway could possibly be left over till next 
year, and, if so, why should not the contracts be submitted to Parliament next 
Session?”41 He continued that the “…construction could not be commenced till after 
the line was thoroughly surveyed and located.”42 Why was this bill being rushed 
through Parliament when there were so many unknowns still waiting to be answered?  
 The Government pushed the bill through as it promised it would move as fast 
as it could with respect to both railways after the int rvention from Lord Carnarvon. 
Senator Scott stated, “In consequence of [the] Governm nt having undertaken to lose 
no time in the construction of this work, it was impossible to complete the surveys 
and have the contracts prepared at the meeting of Parliament.”43 However, this was 
not viewed favourably with the majority of senators during the debate. Senator 
Robert Read (Conservative – Ontario) summarized what other senators had 
additionally mentioned. “Let the Government make an exhaustive survey of the 
country…then select the proper place…and go to work with no uncertain sound to 
                                                
41 Dominion of Canada, Debates of the Senate of the Dominion of Canada (6 April 1875), p. 742  
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42 Ibid. 
43 Dominion of Canada, Debates of the Senate of the Dominion of Canada (6 April 1875), p. 738  
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construct a railway…and they shall have my hearty support.”44 In short, the Senate 
was challenging the speed with which the bill was being considered in Parliament, 
particularly when there remained so many unknowns with the fiscal details of the 
bill.  
The third aspect of the bill which the Senate did not view favourably 
concerned the terrain on which the railway would be laid down. The archival 
evidence available suggested that the land conditios were indeed poor as the 
proposed route included steep slopes of rocky hillside which would necessitate heavy 
and deep rock excavations.  In addition, heavy bridging would be involved because 
of the number of deep valleys which ranged from seventy-five feet deep to over two-
hundred feet in depth.45 Engineer-in-Chief, Sandford Fleming, noted that the “…the 
work on the line…is far from light…[it] is hilly and rough…deep ravines have to be 
crossed…much of this…line is tortuous.”46 The senators knew that such terrain 
would require more than the usual amount of public funds to build this railway, and 
there was the very real possibility of cost overspending. Senator Read spoke about 
how treacherous the land conditions were between Esquimalt and Nanaimo, and he 
was greatly perplexed as to why a railway was even thought about being laid down 
between these towns. Senator Read noted that the conditions were “…enough to 
preclude its construction….”47 He even posed the question, “…what is this [rail]road 
for…?48 Senator Read concluded his remarks concerning the terrain and the 
construction of the railway by stating, “The whole scheme is an absurdity, and 
should not be carried out.”49 The comments from Senator Read are clearly politically 
partisan statements, for he knew that if the bill fa led to succeed the Liberals were to 
be blamed for the failure, and the failure of the bill might be an inducement to 
support the Conservatives in the next federal election. Although I would agree that 
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the construction of the railway would be difficult to achieve and carry out, it is a 
partisan excuse to claim that this railway would be too difficult to achieve for many 
other public works projects in Canada were also very challenging and difficult. If the 
Canadian government was involved in construction of a railway that crossed the 
Rocky Mountains surely it could build this one hundred and five kilometre railway 
over complicated territory. Regardless of the partis n behaviour, the senators did 
demonstrate a sober second thought with their concern over the terrible terrain, 
which usually equates to more money for the successful completion of the project. 
 The fourth and final aspect of the bill which the Senate did not view 
favourably concerned the financial cost associated with the construction of the 
railway to Canada. The surveys were incomplete and,s a result, there was no true 
concrete assessment of the actual cost of the railway, only estimates, and these 
estimations were high.  One estimate by Senator James Aikins (Conservative – 
Ontario) suggested that the railway would cost two and a half million dollars, which 
“…was a large price to pay….”50 Another estimate was by Senator Read and he 
suggested that it would cost Canada almost four million dollars.51 Senator Read said, 
“The last census report says there are 5,959 souls…for these we are to build a 
railway, costing about $4,000,000, an expenditure of over $640 per head.”52 
Furthermore, he stated, “While I feel we must do everything reasonable to satisfy 
British Columbia, we must not make ourselves ridiculous.”53 Although Senator 
Read’s comments might seem brash, his comments clearly reveal how he, among 
others, demonstrated the characteristics of a chamber of sober second thought that 
contemplated the specifics of proposed legislation such as the financial costs that 
would be imposed on Canada if approved. However, I would argue some of the 
arguments in the debate which could be interpreted as a sober second thought might 
actually be partisan in nature. Very few Conservative senators actually promoted the 
bill, the majority of them failed to mention that British Columbia joined Canada on 
high spirits and some Terms of Union, which now the province was growing bitter 
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and the federal government was doing very little to alleviate the situation. It is not 
really national thinking when they do not want to improve the health and relationship 
of the region nor federation at large. 
From the viewpoint of the people of British Columbia, they had waited long 
enough for the railway to be constructed from the railway networks in central Canada 
to the pacific coast. With the introduction of the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway 
Bill, the federal government believed the pressure and tension in the federal-
provincial relationship would ease, but it appeared that some people were now 
against this railway bill and British Columbia itself. One of the senators from British 
Columbia finally rose in the Senate and commanded th  attention of the chamber. 
Senator Robert Carrall (Conservative – British Columbia) stated, “The blame of 
these expensive works had been thrown on British Columbia, which had been treated 
as too troublesome and expensive a legacy – as if she alone needed this railway, and 
not Canada also.”54 This railway was not a small local line on a far island in Western 
Canada, it was a railway for which all of Canada would benefit, British Columbia 
would benefit from the economic advantages of a railway in place, and in addition it 
would generate more settlement within the province. It would also benefit the 
federation as it would demonstrate that the federal government could complete major 
public works projects throughout the federation which would raise the provinces’ 
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                     Hoist: 24                                                       Pass: 21 
The Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill vote, there were 45 senators present for the vote. 19 Conservatives and 5 Liberals 
voted in favour of the Hoist, while 15 Liberal senators and 6 Conservative senators voted against the hoist. 
 
The Hoist Amendment 
Before the vote could be cast for the second reading in the Senate, Senator 
James Aikins (Conservative – Ontario) moved for a special motion within the Senate 
chamber. Senator Aikins moved a motion for the inclusion of an amendment to the 
bill giving it a six month hoist.56 According to parliamentary procedure a hoist 
amendment “…requests that a bill not ‘now’ be read a second time, but instead that 
second reading be postponed for three or six months.”57 With respect to the 
Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill, Senator Aikins preferred to wait until more 
information was available to the Senate to review before making a decision on the 
construction of the railway. Other members of the Senate agreed with Senator 
Aikins. Senator Read stated, “In view of the circumstances I do think its time to 
pause before we are ruined in almost useless work. I therefore have great pleasure in 
supporting the amendment for the…hoist.”58 The vote for the hoist amendment had 
                                                
55 Dominion of Canada, Journals of the Senate of the Dominion of Canada (1875), p. 283. 
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precedence over the second reading of the bill and thus was taken first. The vote to 
hoist the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill for six months was approved on 6 
April 1875 by a vote of twenty-four yeas, and twenty-one nays.59 Although the bill 
was not rejected it was nonetheless blocked from passage.  
 
What Killed the Bill? 
The vote to hoist the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill took place on 6 
April 1875, within seventy-two hours of that vote the Governor General, Lord 
Dufferin, acted on the advice of Prime Minister Mackenzie and the Canadian 
Parliament was prorogued on 8 April 1875.60 It remains unclear if the two events are 
directly connected, but regardless it occurred. By having the Canadian Parliament 
prorogued, the principal effect of ending the session was to end all parliamentary 
business, bills that were in Parliament that had not received Royal Assent ceased to 
exist, the fate of the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill was among them. The 
only way the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill could have proceeded was in a 
new session and the Government would then have had to reintroduce it as a new 
bill.61  
Who should be blamed for killing the bill – the Senate or the Prime Minister? 
There is evidence that shows that the Prime Minister publicly announced that he 
intended to prorogue Parliament before the vote took place in the Senate.62 Usually 
there are normal breaks in the parliamentary calendr and a Spring break was in 
order around this time. Perhaps the Conservative senators who were in majority saw 
a political opportunity in hoisting the bill knowing that Mackenzie intended to 
prorogue Parliament sooner than later for a Spring break. The Senate knew that 
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prorogation would eliminate the bill from Parliament a d rather than vote against the 
bill and reject it, the Senate would save face and ‘temporarily’ withhold passing it. A 
few days would pass and the bill would be gone because of the Prime Minister, thus 
making him the individual that would finally kill the bill. However there is no 
concrete evidence that the Senate purposely went about and did this. The available 
evidence shows the Senate hoisted the bill, the Prime Minster prorogued Parliament 
and the bill ceased to exist.   
 
Evaluation of Public Reaction 
The Senate legislated over this railway bill thoroughly because it examined 
and scrutinized the core aspects and finer details and found that it was unwarranted 
of passage. Initial reactions to the blockage were mixed, some found the actions 
admirable while others were upset and even unsure of wh  to blame. While strongest 
reaction came from British Columbia, it is interesting to note that while the 
Government of British Columbia and the people of Vancouver Island were 
disappointed with the Senate’s decision to hoist the bill, people living on mainland 
British Columbia were pleased. Attitudes voiced in the provincial press included: 
“The British Columbia Government and the people of the island cried out that it was 
treachery.”63 The people of British Columbia certainly have a “…grievance….”64 
British Columbia wants “…the terms, the whole terms and nothing but the 
terms….”65 However the island railway and the Carnarvon Terms to the Mainlanders 
were “…neither acceptable nor just.”66 There were mixed views of the public from 
British Columbia after the initial blockage of the bill in the Senate and termination 
after prorogation.  The reaction in British Columbia was understandable because of 
the preceding delays of the trans-national railway across Canada legislation not being 
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The Economic Cost 
In other parts of the country the Senate was praised for blocking the bill. To 
get a grasp of the public view in Canada, the Herald in Montreal was quoted as 
saying, “We…congratulate the Senate upon getting rid of the Esquimalt Railway 
Bill.” 67 The Globe in Toronto stated, “…Canada is now relieved from the necessity 
of building [the railway].”68 The most surprising admission came from the Daily 
Colonist, a regional newspaper based in Victoria, which quoted the Mail in which it 
thanked that Senate. “The Senate has well deserved, and will unquestionably receive 
the thanks of the community for the stand which it as taken….”69 If there is one 
concluding message of the Senate’s actions of blocking the Esquimalt and Nanaimo 
Railway Bill it would be that, “…the Senate displayed its concern for saving public 
funds by rejecting a bill for the construction of the Esquimalt and Nanaimo 
Railway.”70  This evidence of newspaper commentary in central and Western Canada 
show a consensus that the potential costs of the railway caused the Senate to examine 
the bill with a sober second thought to consider ‘was this worth it’? The majority of 
the senators answered no, it was too high and uncertain of expenditure and the Senate 
followed the intentions of the Fathers of Confederation because it scrutinized the bill 
and found that it was an unwarranted cost.  
The Constitution reflects how the upper chamber is present in the Parliament 
“…to assure the public that proper precautions are being taken to guard against 
improvident use of the taxpayers’ money.”71 Based on the Senate debate on the 
railway, as MacKay has argued, it is not surprising that the Senate blocked this bill 
“…on the ground that it was a quite unwarranted public expenditure.”72 The Senate 
did not block nor reject this railway bill solely on the fact that it would have cost the 
federal government a great sum of money. Canada found itself in 1875 in the midst 
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of an economic depression.73 The Senate reviewed the Esquimalt and Nanaimo 
Railway Bill as a piece of legislation that requested a vague and unspecific sum of 
money in the millions of dollars to be spent not prescribed by the Canadian 
government on a railway which was a local provincial project. In my opinion, the 
Senate would have failed the intentions of the Fathers of Confederation if it had 
passed the bill. Furthermore, during a speech in Victoria in 1876, the governor 
general of Canada, Lord Dufferin confirmed that the Senate’s actions were the right 
course. He noted “The fact is that Canada at large…has unmistakably shown its 
approval of the vote in the Senate….that the Nanaimo and Esquimalt Railway cannot 
stand upon its own merits, and that its construction as a Government enterprise 
would be at all events at present a useless expenditure of public money.”74 The 
Senate saved millions of dollars of the public purse from being spent on the 
questionable island railway and it performed in accordance with the intentions of the 
Fathers of Confederation where they wanted a chamber that would slow down the 
pace of the legislation, examine and scrutinize it with a fresh perspective, and if that 
chamber was not completely satisfied in the details of a particular bill, it was to 
exercise its constitutional powers and block the legis ation from passage through 
Parliament. 
 
The Protection of Rights under the Constitution 
One of the foremost intentions and objectives of the Senate is the protection 
of the constitutional rights. The Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill encompassed 
an interesting situation because the Senate protected the constitutional provincial 
rights of British Columbia but in turn acted against the economic interests of the 
province. Within the British North America Act, Sections 91 and 92 divide federal 
and provincial areas of jurisdiction within the Canadian federation. During the 
Senate debate many had commented that this railway ine was a local railway. 
Senator Robert Dickey (Conservative – Nova Scotia) said, “This railway was already 
a local line.”75 Senator James Aikins (Conservative – Ontario) said, “This local work 
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would cost another two and a half millions [sic] which was a large price to pay for a 
relaxation of the terms of Union.”76 Furthermore one of the senators from British 
Columbia, Senator Carrall (Conservative) additionally noted that the Esquimalt and 
Nanaimo Railway was a local line too.77 The Daily British Colonist stated, “A 
(railroad) connecting Nanaimo with Esquimalt is essentially a local work….”78 
Finally, the Morning Chronicle also echoed similar declarations mentioned in the 
Senate and other media sources stating, “This in reality is a local railway, and should 
not in justice be made a Dominion charge.”79 The federal government should not 
involve itself with local railways because Section 92 lists what the province is in 
control of and within it includes that the province is in exclusive control over local 
railways.  
The Senate was created to act as a protector of rights within a chamber of 
sober second thought; the Senate protected the rights of the province when the 
federal government tried to pass legislation that ws not within the domain of the 
federal government as it would have infringed on the provincial rights of British 
Columbia. Section 92 of the British North America Act lists the subjects of exclusive 
provincial legislation. Specifically Section 92(10)(1) states that the province has 
exclusive control on “Local works…other than…railways…connecting the Province 
with any other…or extending beyond the limits of the Province.”80 If the railway 
were to cross into the United States or cross into the North-West Territories, then the 
federal government would have the legal right of involvement.  Section 92(16) of the 
British North America Act additionally states that the provinces have exclusive 
legislative control on, “Generally all matters of a merely local or private nature in the 
Province.”81 There might be some confusion as to why the bill passed through the 
House of Commons. I would argue first, the Liberals had a majority in the House of 
Commons and it was a significant bill from the Government influenced by London, it 
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would be doubtful that the Liberals would embarrass their own leader and 
Government because of a possible constructional infringement. Second, it was 
introduced and passed through because British Columbia allowed for this unique 
infringement on their provincial rights for the construction of a free local railway on 
Vancouver Island as they had agreed to the Carnarvo Terms.  The Senate upheld the 
British North America Act when it blocked the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill 
from passing in the Senate and acted in the proper constitutional manner that the 
Fathers of Confederation intended, and by doing so the Senate acted as an institution 
that protected the constitutional rights of that province.   
 
Regional Representation 
The Senate was created to scrutinize legislation first and foremost, but 
secondly it was created to advocate and articulate C nada’s regional concerns and 
express those on proposed legislation that came before the upper chamber. Of the 
three blocked bills considered in this thesis, the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill 
was the most regionally based in which it directly related to a very specific part of 
Canada. Senators from British Columbia were placed ntre stage to see if they 
articulated British Columbia’s concerns and view points on the bill. This was a major 
challenge for British Columbia, as Western Canada was still being developed. An 
unfortunate challenge for this region of Canada wasth t it was not designated an 
official region within the Senate. Alberta and Saskatchewan did not yet exist as 
provinces, it was just Manitoba and British Columbia. There was no regional 
equality yet for Western Canada in the Senate, as it would be designated a Senate 
‘region’ in 1915.82 While the region of Ontario, Quebec, and the Maritimes had 
twenty-four senators each respectively, British Columbia only had three senators in 
1875 that could speak on behalf of the province.83 Focus was on these three senators 
to speak for the province.  
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The first British Columbia senator who spoke was Robert Carrall. He felt that 
the members of parliament and other senators were being absurd because they had 
approved other so called ‘local’ railways in other parts of the country prior to the 
Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway, yet they did not want to support this particular 
railway.84 Senator Carrall (Conservative - British Columbia) also felt that the people 
of British Columbia wanted to have confidence in the federal government and 
without this railway the relationship could possibly e damaged.85 He said, “…for 
the peace, good order, and welfare of this whole country…it [was his] duty to help 
the Government in carrying out the (bill).”86 There was no denying from Senator 
Carrall that the railway was a local line, similar to other railway lines that were 
approved by Parliament, but for the welfare of the new federation, the Senate should 
approve it and get this railway constructed. 
The second British Columbia senator who spoke was William Macdonald. 
Senator Macdonald (Conservative - British Columbia) did not speak at length but he 
did state that British Columbia consented to the new t rms arbitrated by Lord 
Carnarvon and that British Columbia felt bound by the new terms and the federal 
government should be also.87 He felt that some parliamentarians believed that British 
Columbia was being ridiculous in these new terms, however Senator Macdonald 
said, “British Columbia was not unreasonable in this matter.”88 The Senate should 
approve of this railway on Vancouver Island and let th  work begin.  Unfortunately 
the third senator from British Columbia did not speak during the debate.89 When it 
was time to vote, actions speak significantly louder than words – all three senators 
from British Columbia voted against the hoist delay amendment.90 They wanted 
action; they wanted construction to begin immediately – without delay.  
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Focus was not on the senators from British Columbia entirely as all senators 
in the Canadian Senate are to advocate and articulate their home regions’ concerns. 
As mentioned above, Senator James Aikins (Conservative – Ontario), Senator Robert 
Dickey (Conservative – Nova Scotia), Senator Robert R ad (Conservative – Ontario) 
were most vocal against the construction of the railway. They each mentioned the 
high financial cost of the local railway and they voted for the hoist amendment.91 
British Columbia in 1875 was sparsely populated, and these senators knew who 
would be paying for the construction of the railway. The senators acted in the 
interests of their regions, as Ormsby noted,“…to ease the burden on the taxpayers of 
Ontario [and eastern Canada].”92 The people of Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia and 
New Brunswick had the larger population base and would be financing the railway 
on Vancouver Island with their taxes.  The Governmet did not know exactly how 
much the railway was going to cost, how could the senators from primarily Ontario 
and Quebec immediately approve of a bill that their citizens would largely be 
financing, when they did not know and could not inform their citizens about how 
much, as tax payers, they would have to pay.  
 
Senate Independence  
One of the original intentions of the Senate having appointed members was 
that it legislated with greater independence than tt of the House of Commons. The 
appointed Senate was created to legislate on measures benefiting Canada and not 
necessarily to be swayed by strong gusts of public op nion of what was the most 
popular thing to do. Did the Senate demonstrate that i  legislated as an independent 
chamber of sober second thought with the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill? 
The primary cause of a loss of independence would be if political parties dictated the 
vote outcome and, secondly, if the political leaders outside the Senate tried to 
influence the vote.  Clearly some political partisan hip was involved with the vote; 
however that was not the full story. 
If specifically the Conservatives were against thisrailway bill, more of them 
would have remained in the Senate during the debate and would have voted. When I 
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examined the attendance records for the evening when the debate occurred and the 
vote took place, I found that there were fifty-eight senators present at the beginning 
of business that afternoon.93 However the last item on that day’s agenda was the 
Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill. By the time thevote took place only forty-five 
senators were present and voted.94 Of the thirteen absent senators, twelve were 
Conservative.95 If the Conservative-controlled Senate was truly against the bill for 
exclusively partisan reasons there would have been a greater presence of 
Conservatives in attendance for the debate and vote. Secondly, an examination of the 
list of senators who voted for and against the hoist amendment showed that two 
senators voted in favour of the hoist amendment were Liberal senators recently 
appointed on the recommendation of Alexander Mackenzie.96 This demonstrated a 
heightened level of independence because it is often assumed that a senator who has 
recently been appointed to the Senate would typically be loyal to the individual who 
appointed them into the upper chamber. Not fearing that any real consequences 
would develop because the senators were appointed for life, a number of Liberal 
senators showed their independence and separation from their political leaders by 
voting in favour of the hoist amendment because they considered that even though it 
was not the most popular action, it was the correct thing to do for Canada.  
The final indication that the Senate acted with some independence was that it 
blocked the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill, which was arbitrated by a 
government outside of Canada. The senators mentioned numerous times that this bill 
was the result of Lord Carnarvon’s involvement within a dispute between the federal 
government and the province of British Columbia. Perhaps, as argued in the Daily 
British Colonist, Lord Carnarvon and the British Government tried to “…whip 
perfidious Canada and dishonest Mackenzie into doing justice to [British] 
Columbia?”97  Canada remained highly loyal and had great respect for Britain, both 
before and after Confederation, and many senators originated from Britain, however 
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they were now Canadians and recognized that they were legislating over an intra-
national disagreement and they did not appreciate Bri ish interference impacting on 
the issue. Since Confederation, which occurred less than ten years before, Canada 
has shown, as D.G. Creighton has argued, “…a somewhat touchy concern in its 
independent status…to insist upon its independence from external control….”98 How 
could a young nation grow stronger if its colonial counterparts stepped in and got 
involved when there was a dispute within its borders? Queen Victoria created the 
Dominion of Canada in 1867 and it was given the power to legislate and govern 
within its borders. For a nation to mature it needs to ort out these issues by itself. 
Not only was the blockage of the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill the first 
major legislative confrontation between the House of C mmons and the Senate, but 
it was also one of the first instances of the Canadian Parliament ultimately dictating 
its own course of action saying no to the British government.  
 
Conclusion 
With the creation of the new federation in 1867, came a new national 
parliament consisting of an upper and lower chamber. The upper chamber – the 
Senate – was to discharge an important role within Parliament, and it was 
constitutionally granted with the power to block legislation from the House of 
Commons and act as an independent chamber of sober second thought on all 
proposed legislation. It was only a matter of time before the first major confrontation 
between the House of Commons and the Senate occurred after Confederation and it 
was in 1875 when the Senate blocked an important piece of legislation that had been 
passed by the lower chamber. The failure to abide to specific union terms agreed 
upon with British Columbia, led to the clash and blockage of a specific piece of 
government legislation that called for the construction of an additional railway 
between two small towns of Esquimalt and Nanaimo.  
The Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill was blocked by the Canadian 
Senate. Canada was a nation that was growing but itwas young and not as wealthy as 
others, thus it had to exercise fiscal prudence to projects deemed unnecessary. There 
shall always be disagreement and debate on the public projects that a Parliament 
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should support. The Senate deemed the construction of the railway between 
Esquimalt and Nanaimo to be superfluous and did not approve. The Senate took a 
strong stand for fiscal prudence during the developing and expanding years following 
Canadian Confederation against excessive spending when it blocked this bill. In part 
the Senate help frame and advance the country, and it took a progressive path for 
greater independence by pushing British intervention into Canadian affairs back. If 
the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill passed, it would have set a dangerous 
precedent. The passage would have demonstrated that if a province falls into a 
disagreement with the federal government, provinces could seek refuge with the 
British government in trying to assist its cause within an intra-national issue. The 
Senate also took a strong stand in holding up the British North American Act and 
protected the rights of the provinces. However, there was some evidence of political 
partisan block voting, but it was not nearly as intense as that found within the 
analysis of the Naval Aid Bill and to a large extent with the Old Age Pension Bill. 
Although the Senate was largely Conservative there was still a strong showing of 
Liberal senators during the debate, and Conservatives with Liberals together in a 




















































The Canadian parliamentary session in the late autumn of 1912 and the spring 
of 1913, was unlike any parliamentary session that had occurred in the past. Records 
were broken, rare parliamentary procedures were used, fr edom of speech issues 
arose, the public was divided, and all of this surro nded one proposed piece of 
legislation in Parliament. In late 1912, Prime Minister Robert Borden introduced the 
Naval Aid Bill which sought a thirty-five million dollar contribution towards the 
construction of three Dreadnought battleships for the British Royal Navy. Unlike the 
Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill and the Old Age P nsion Bill, the Naval Aid 
Bill proved to be nationally and internationally sign ficant, particularly as it 
generated a critical debate during the emergence and development of Canadian 
international policy in an era of British decolonization.  
The debate on the proposed legislation in the House f Commons was led by 
two political titans of their time: Robert Borden (as Conservative Prime Minister) 
sparring against Wilfrid Laurier (as Liberal leader of the Official Opposition). It was 
a dynamic debate that focused not only on the proposal that the federal government 
spend thirty-five million dollars on battleships but also on key questions of Canadian 
national development and independence. Countless issues arose within this divisive 
debate, including the prudent use of Canadian tax dollars, the protection of Canadian 
rights under the British North America Act, and broader questions of British 
influence on Canadian affairs. The Naval Aid Bill only passed through the 
Conservative-controlled House of Commons with the adoption of the closure of 
debate rules. After extensive debate, it was then blocked in the Liberal-controlled 
Senate. Senators considered that opinions were too divided for Parliament to pass the 
bill and that the issue should be brought to the general public for consideration  
Of all the Senate’s actions within the Canadian Parliament during the first 
sixty years of its existence, none was more prominent than the Senate’s rejection of 
Prime Minister Borden’s Naval Aid Bill.  In this chapter I argue that, although the 
Senate failed to follow the intentions of the Fathers of Confederation for Canada’s 
upper chamber, as its independence was greatly influenced, its decision to block the 
legislation was the correct course of action. In short, the Senate’s actions on the 
Naval Aid Bill were a failed success. 
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Summer of 1912 
Britain had been pushing the dominions since the lat  1890s for financial 
contributions in one form or another from the Empire’s dominions for the Royal 
Navy.1 It was not surprising that when Prime Minister Borden travelled to Britain in 
the summer of 1912 to discuss defence and naval issues – additional contributions 
were brought up. The primary motive for financial assistance into the Royal Navy 
surrounded the naval arms race between Britain and Germany. As the Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation noted, Britain would not allow German supremacy 
“…with her naval tradition and prestige, and her utter reliance on sea power as a 
means of defence, (Britain) could not tolerate any rival.”2 After numerous meetings 
throughout the summer in London with the British Admiralty, Borden was convinced 
that British supremacy was in question and Britain f ced a grave emergency in the 
struggle for the naval supremacy against Germany.3 Prime Minister Borden left 
London for Canada for the start of a new parliamentary session in Ottawa with the 
inclusion of a thirty-five million dollar emergency contribution to Britain as the 
centre piece of the 1912 Speech from the Throne.  
 
The Naval Aid Bill in the House of Commons 
The second session of Canada’s Twelfth Parliament opened on 21 November 
1912 with the Governor General reading the Speech from the Throne, which 
surrounded the central component of naval contribution to the British Government.4 
Within his speech included, “During the past summer four members of my 
Government conferred in London with His Majesty’s Government on the question of 
naval defence. Important discussions took place and co itions have been disclosed 
which, in the opinion of my advisors, render it imperative that the effective Naval 
forces of the Empire should be strengthened without delay. My advisors are 
convinced that it is the duty of Canada at this junct re to afford reasonable and 
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necessary aid for that purpose.”5 Prime Minister Borden rose in the House of 
Commons on 5 December 1912, which in turn marked th start of one the most 
record breaking, prolonged and aggressive debates that ever took place in the 
Canadian Parliament, as he introduced the Naval Aid Bill formally known as An Act 
to Authorize Measures for Increasing the Effective Naval Forces of the Empire 
(1912).6 Borden said: “…the day (had) come when either the existence of this 
Empire will be imperilled or the young and mighty dominions must join with the 
motherland to make secure the common safety and the common heritage of all.”7 
Prime Minister Borden continued, “…we ask the peopl of Canada through their 
Parliament to grant…to His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland and of the 
overseas dominions, in order to increase the effective naval forces of the Empire, to 
safeguard our shores and our seaborne commerce, and to make secure the common 
heritage of all who owe allegiance to the King.”8 The cost on Canada’s part to 
increase the effective naval forces of the Empire was thirty five million dollars; this 
would be put towards the construction of three Dreadnought battleships. Concerning 
these three Dreadnoughts, Borden said, “These ships will constitute an aid brought 
by the Canadian people to His Majesty the King as atoken of their determination to 
maintain the integrity of the Empire and to assist in repelling any danger which may 
threaten its security.”9 Borden finished his speech with, “Bringing the best assistance 
that we may in the urgency of the moment, we come…to defend on sea as well as on 
land our flag, our honour and our heritage.”10 There were very strong notions present 
of a dire international situation and Prime Minister Borden argued that Canada 
should perform its duty of assisting the maintenance and the defence of the Empire at 
large.   
After the Prime Minister’s speech, the Naval Aid Bill received its first 
reading in the House of Commons. The naval aid debate h d started, and as the 
C.B.C. had stated, it marked the beginning of “…one of the longest, most 
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implacable, and more famous debates since Confederation.”11 No one expected the 
debate to become so divisive and last as long as it did in the House of Commons, it 
was unprecedented and it did not reach the Canadian Senate until May of 1913, 
something that the Senate took into account.  
 
The Conservative Party Policy 
The Conservative policy was laid out through Prime Minister Borden’s 
opening address and in subsequent days and weeks by fellow Conservative members.  
The Conservative policy was based on contribution to the British Empire, to ensure 
its cohesive defence. Prime Minister Borden believed that Britain needed assistance 
in its maintenance of naval supremacy against the Germans and that by contributing 
thirty-five million dollars, Canadians would demonstrate to “…the mother country a 
pledge of loyalty….”12 As Borden argued, this pledge of loyalty reflected how for 
“…forty-five years as a Confederation we have enjoyed the protection of the British 
Navy without the cost of a dollar….”13 In short, as Britain had protected Canada 
through its early years as a dominion, Borden considered it was a critical time for 
Canada to return this favour. It was time for action on Canada’s part to assist the 
mother country in need. Britain was in need because Britain was “…not a great 
military power, and it has based its security in the past as in the present almost 
entirely on the strength of the navy. A crushing defeat upon the high seas would 
render the British islands or any of the dominions subject to invasion by any great 
military power.”14  If the Royal Navy was at risk of destruction, Canada could be at 
risk of invasion. If the Royal Navy failed to maintain its supremacy, a potentially 
dire situation could erupt for both Canada and Great Britain, and Prime Minister 
Borden felt that the thirty-five million dollar contribution would assist in the 
maintenance of that supremacy. 
The Conservatives felt that a contribution towards the creation of three 
additional battleships for the Royal Navy was better for the Empire as a whole for the 
Royal Navy was already established. By having one navy, there would be one plan 
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which would result in a more cohesive defence strategy. Speaking in the House of 
Commons, Conservative W.F. Cockshutt said, “…I believe in the final analysis that 
it will be found that one fleet to defend the Empire s more economical and more 
effective than several units scattered throughout the world, and that it is far more 
likely to meet the enemy successfully than any units that would be thousands of 
miles away when the battle was fought….”15  
The Conservative policy rested on Imperial unity and common defence 
within the Empire. Prime Minster Borden said: “What are you to do? Are you to 
have one Empire, one foreign policy, one combined naval force, to resist every peril 
or are you to have five foreign policies and five scattered navies to go down against 
the attack which may come upon them at any time? (…) The continents are 
separated, but the sea is one…when I say that the security of this Empire cannot be 
maintained and preserved without a combination of the naval forces of the Empire 
under one control, at least in time of war.”16 The Conservatives did not see the 
benefit of enlarging the Royal Canadian Navy, the Conservative policy was of 
contribution towards the maintenance of British naval supremacy and that was in 
accordance with the wishes of the British government and the Admiralty in London.  
 
The Liberal Party Policy 
Wilfrid Laurier, the Liberal leader of the opposition in the House of 
Commons, was strenuously opposed to Prime Minister Borden’s naval contribution 
to Britain. Every aspect of the Naval Aid Bill was opposed by the Liberals as their 
contrasting naval policy was based on Canadian self defence.  The Liberals did not 
wish to see thirty-five million dollars given to Britain for Canada gained nothing in 
the contribution. Wilfrid Laurier wanted the promotion of further development of the 
Royal Canadian Navy, Laurier said, “The policy of the Liberal Party is the same as it 
ever was, a Canadian navy built, equipped, maintained and manned in Canada.”17 As 
Hopkins has argued, the Liberals accepted the responsibility of shared Empire 
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defence but considered that it should be executed through a Canadian naval force.18  
In their opinion, Canada could not and should not permanently expect Britain to 
safeguard Canadian Pacific or Atlantic waters. The Royal Canadian Navy was young 
and still in its preliminary stages, however an injection of thirty-five million dollars, 
the Liberals sought, would have been a significant boost in its further development 
and maturity.   
The Liberals argued that if Canada was to spend thirty-five million dollars on 
defence infrastructure, it should be directly invested in Canada for the protection of 
Canadians. Mr. Laurier said, “...Canada, with a population of over seven million 
people, with six thousand miles of seashore on the A lantic and six thousand on the 
Pacific, and with harbours and cities on both coasts, cannot remain without a naval 
defence of some kind.”19 The underscoring idea of the Liberals surrounded self-
reliance and self-defence. Since 1867 expansion was occurring rapidly within the 
nation. At some point Canadians would be at its owndevices to defend itself, and the 
Liberals felt it was the suitable time to have a major cash injection into the Royal 
Canadian Navy as the Royal Navy was pulling out of Canadian shores. For decades 
Britain argued that Canada needed to be more self-reliant, particularly in national 
defence. The Liberals saw this opportunity to take  large step forward towards 
obtaining self-reliant Canadian national defence. The Liberals and Laurier also knew 
their support came from Quebec and French speaking Ca adians. The French-
Canadian view point was much more pacifist than that of English-Canadians, and 
French-Canadians were attached to Canada alone. French-Canadians did not feel 
strongly about Canada’s involvement in European confli ts when there was no 
aggressive attack taken directly towards Canada. Promotion of the Royal Canadian 
Navy within Canada was a safe political move for the Liberals.   
Robert Borden and Wilfrid Laurier were two of the most powerful political 
titans of their time. Both political leaders passionately argued in favour of their 
fundamentally opposing naval policies.  These two factors developed into the perfect 
formula for the historical political debate. The policy of the Conservative 
Government was that of concentration and centralization within the British Empire, 
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while the Liberal policy was that of self-reliance, self-defence and co-operation 
within the Empire. No less than a month after the Naval Aid Bill was introduced, 
debate picked up pace with the Liberals passionately opposing Borden’s contribution 
plan. No one knew how long the debate in the House of Commons would last, but 
the Montreal Gazette commented that the debate on the Naval Aid Bill would be, 
“…one of the most spectacular parliamentary fights in Canadian history.”20  
The cornerstones of the Naval Aid Bill were the areas where the Liberals 
found fault. First the Liberals felt that providing a huge sum of money to the British 
government for naval defence would be a retrogressiv  tep in Canadian-British 
relations. The Liberal argument was that, “It reverses the policy of the past seventy 
years and is a retrograde step in the constitutional rel tions existing between the 
Motherland and Canada.”21 Second, “The Conservative policy…(was) one of 
inactivity in holding the country back from a permanent [naval] policy….”22 The 
Royal Canadian Navy was established in 1910 and neeed financial resources. The 
Liberals wished to see the money injected into the further development of the Royal 
Canadian Navy, they did not want thirty-five million dollars given away with nothing 
to show for it nor have any lasting result within Canada. Liberal member of 
parliament, Georges Boivin said, “…instead of giving this money to a nation 
rich…more than able to take care of herself, it [should] be spent at home, and that the 
greatest possible portion of it may find its way into the pockets of our mechanics, our 
labourers, our foundrymen, our builders; then later into the pockets of our sailors; our 
officers, and all these to our traders and farmers.”23 Third, if Canada was simply to 
provide Britain with thirty-five million dollars, it could appear that Canada was “…a 
nation of substitutors, willing to allow others to take our places in the firing line in 
the defence of the Empire.”24 Fourth, the Canadian Parliament would not be in 
control of the three Dreadnoughts that would be built, nor would they be placed in 
the Atlantic Ocean to defend Canada. If built, the ree Dreadnoughts would be 
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stationed near Gibraltar.25 The Liberals argued the Naval Aid Bill was a retrogressive 
move for Canada; it did nothing to help the Royal Cnadian Navy; Canada would 




Both the Liberals and the Conservatives were adamant th t their own policy 
was the superior policy. To reflect more Liberal ideas, the Liberals argued for 
amendments to the Naval Aid Bill, but lacked the numbers in the House of Commons 
to pass amendments. Since the Liberals could not succe sfully amend the bill, the 
next available option was to obstruct the passage of the Naval Aid Bill. If the 
Liberals obstructed long enough, the Liberals thougt the Conservatives might either 
allow amendments or discard the bill altogether.  
History was made during this debate, specifically after the second reading of 
the Naval Aid Bill on 28 February 1913.26  At this point, the Liberals obstructed to 
levels which set new Canadian parliamentary records.27 The easiest and most 
effective method of obstruction is the classic filibuster. If there was something to be 
said, the Liberals said it; on the other hand the Conservatives said, “…as little as 
possible and hoped the Liberals would succumb to physical exhaustion in order to 
proceed.”28 Every single part and clause of the Naval Aid Bill, as Borden stated, was 
“…discussed and the debate [was] characterized by irrelevancy and by constant and 
tiresome repetition….”29 Throughout February and March, there were “…whole seas 
of speech – eloquent and abusive, discursive and cocentrated, keen, incisive and 
logical, angry and unreasonable, patriotic and the reverse.”30 The Conservatives 
would not deviate from their policy, and no amendments would be accepted - the 
Liberals wanted amendments to the Naval Aid Billand continued to speak.  
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  The ability to filibuster and obstruct was rather easy. As noted in the 
Gazette, “…obstructive talk called for little or no mental effort, it (was) easy to 
maintain.”31 The Liberals felt this could be a pivotal moment i both the relations 
with the British Government and the further development of the Royal Canadian 
Navy – it was worth the fight and they were steadfast. The debates on the naval bill 
lasted throughout countless nights, some nights the debate would continue until 
6:00am the next morning.32 There were members of the Liberal caucus that spoke, 
unbroken, for up to four and a half hours, which set n w Canadian parliamentary 
records.33 As of 20 March 1913, there was 232 hours of debate on the Naval Aid Bill, 
where ninety per cent of the members speaking were Lib rals.34 There were over 
four thousand columns of written text in Hansard.35 One Ottawa news correspondent 
for the Manitoba Free Press described the House of Commons on 7 March 1913, by 
writing, “Members on both sides of the House are beginning to show signs of the 
continued strain, with unshaven chins and haggard, tired faces. The chamber at all 
times badly ventilated is beginning to smell musty and stale and is littered with 
papers and grimy with dust….There is no opportunity for the use of the broom and 
there is no time given for fresh air to replace the big supply of devitalized 
atmosphere which at all times pervades the chamber. Everything has a ‘morning 
after’ appearance.”36 Very little effort was made by the Conservatives; all effort was 
by the Liberals. The Liberals fought so hard because they were restlessly dissatisfied 
with every aspect of the Naval Aid Bill, they were adamant that it was flawed 
legislation.  
The Liberals were unpleased with the involvement of the British Government 
and the Admiralty within current Canadian affairs. The Naval Aid Bill was clearly 
introduced into the Canadian Parliament after, “…Admiralty intervention in 
Canadian affairs.”37 The Naval Aid Bill was the result of the “…interfeence by the 
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British Government….”38 The Liberals were being rather nationalistic and strived for 
greater independence and greater independent decision making. However, Borden 
disagreed with this as he wrote in his notes, “There is no interference with autonomy 
in Parliament making a special vote of money for this or any other similar 
purpose.”39 The Liberals felt that if Canada came to the conclusion that Britain 
needed assistance, Canada would come to that conclusion by weighing the facts 
itself. The Liberals additionally questioned the “emergency” Britain faced. Wilfred 
Laurier stated that if Britain was really in danger then Prime Minister Borden would 
have asked for three times the amount of money mentioned in the Naval Aid Bill.40 
The bill called only for three ships, the “emergency” to Laurier and the Liberals 
failed to exist. 
 
Plebiscite 
As the debate within the House of Commons continued, members of 
parliament began to demand that such a considerable issu  be brought to the people 
of Canada to decide its fate. Wilfrid Laurier demanded a plebiscite, “…we challenge 
the verdict of the Canadian people.”41 Liberal member Mr. Guilbault echoed Laurier 
when he argued, “…the only way of ascertaining what t e people of Canada desire to 
do in regard to the matter of defence is by the taking of a plebiscite.”42 However the 
Prime Minster utterly disagreed because to Borden, the Canadian people would have 
an opportunity to express their opinions as a general lection was approaching. 
Borden said, “I pointed out some weeks ago that even if this measure passed, these 
ships could not be put in commission until after a general election had been held in 
this country….”43 The public could vote the Conservatives out of office and replace 
them with the Liberals if they did indeed disagree, so the Prime Minister decided no 
plebiscite would be held on the naval issue. If the Government were to hold one, the 
challenge with a plebiscite is that it is imperative that they win it; it would be a 
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tremendous political loss if they lost their own plebiscite and a huge political gain for 
the opposition. Based on media reports throughout Canada there was rather balanced 
support for both Conservative and Liberal naval policies and a degree of uncertainty 
was present for who had more support.  
After four months of continued debate on the Naval Aid Bill , there was no 
end in sight. The debate was turning into a political farce within the Canadian 
Parliament. According to Liberal member Mr. Thomson, the debate had reached 
“…an epidemic of dumbness….”44 Things were being said which were redundant, 
irrelevant and unproductive and by March the debate was getting out of control. 
Hopkins stated, “Speeches began to get angry, tempers w re short and replies or 
counter replies sharp and swift. Many emphatic remaks were made.”45 On 9 March 
1913 a remarkable incident occurred while Liberal member Fred Pardee was 
speaking. Two Conservative members rose, lit and threw firecrackers at the Liberal 
caucus, across the floor of the House of Commons.  The action sent the Sergeant-At-
Arms chasing the two out of the Chamber.46 A heated stalemate then developed 
between the two political parties in the House of Cmmons.  
 
Closure 
The only way Borden could move beyond the stalemate that had arisen in the 
House of Commons and advance the Naval Aid Bill was to introduce closure. As 
Robert Marleau and Camille Montpetit has described, “Closure is a procedural 
device used to bring debate on a question to a conclusion….”47 The deployment of 
closure had never occurred in Canadian parliamentary history before.48 With the 
introduction of closure, the Liberal ability to filibuster would cease. Extreme 
conditions demanded extreme actions and on 9 April 1913, closure had been 
successfully passed with the Conservative majority.49 The Liberals were not 
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impressed. “The House was instantly in a wild tumult, shouts of “shame” rang from 
the Opposition benches, while Sir Wilfrid Laurier, himself, for one of the rare 
moments in his public life, showed anger and used th  same word.”50 According to 
the Liberal party’s view, closure was an encroachment on Canadian democracy and 
free speech. Wilfrid Laurier rose in the House of Commons and said, “…[the 
Government has taken] from me the privilege which was mine by constitutional 
right…[and] (imposed) a gag upon me, and to prevent me from expressing the views 
of the Opposition with regard to this very important question.”51 Half of Parliament 
and a growing portion of the Canadian public showed disapproval for the Prime 
Minister’s actions, but the Conservatives came fighting back.  
In reply to Wilfrid Laurier’s comment, Prime Minister Borden said, “If there 
has been any gagging, it has been the gagging of the majority in this House….”52 In 
another statement, Borden said, “No one is more ready than I to acknowledge that 
liberty of speech and freedom of debate must be preserv d, but I venture respectfully 
to suggest that these privileges must be observed and maintained under such 
conditions that they shall not be allowed to degenerate into license and 
obstruction.”53 The Conservatives were correct - the Liberals were obstructing 
parliamentary progress on the Naval Aid Bill. For months the Liberals had time to 
say what they wanted - if it was not already said then it could not have been that 
important. In a private letter to the Governor General, Prime Minister Borden gave 
some insight into why closure was needed. Borden wrote, “An Opposition in 
legislatures where no closure prevails can prevent the governmental machine from 
working. In such cases it is the duty of any Governme t to provide such improved 
machinery as will enable the business of the country to be carried on without undue 
or obstructive interruption.”54 The Government needed to proceed, Britain needed 
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those ships and closure was applied for the first tme in Canadian parliamentary 
history when the second reading of the Naval Aid Bill was brought to a conclusion.  
 
Public Discussion on the Third Reading of the Naval Aid Bill 
After months of debates and countless members of parliament speaking in 
favour and against the Naval Aid Bill, it was time to vote on the third reading as 
closure concluded the precedent-setting House of Comm ns debate. On 15 May 
1913, with a vote of one-hundred-and-one in favour to sixty-eight opposed, the 
Naval Aid Bill received its third reading.55 However, a much larger public debate on 
this substantial piece of legislation continued outside the House of Commons. In the 
media, newspapers were “…sharply divided on party lines.”56 Some pro-
Conservative newspapers like the Montreal Gazette stated that Prime Minister 
Borden’s plan promised the “…greatest return in efficiency….”57 The Halifax 
Herald was rather critical of the Liberal policy of Canadian ships when it was 
quoted, “…beyond dispute, Canadian ships kept around Canadian harbours and 
shores would be useless for defence purposes….”58 Conservative newspapers 
concurred that there was indeed an emergency in Europe, ships needed to be 
constructed for the Royal Navy and the Naval Aid Bill must be approved.  The 
Liberal press was equally passionate in favour of Laurier’s policy on the expansion 
of the Royal Canadian Navy and against any emergency a d contribution. The 
Halifax Chronicle stated that Borden’s plan was “…poor and humiliating, 
substituting for a thoroughly Canadian policy….”59 The Manitoba Free Press stated 
that there was no emergency and “…the Borden scheme (was) a proposition to meet 
our obligations of Empire defence by writing a chequ . It is an easy, lazy and 
unmanly way of meeting an obligation of manhood.”60 There was a complete lack of 
consensus within the media and throughout Canada where neither policy had greater 
support than the other.  This was a challenge for the Senate which had to take into 
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account not just the debate in the House of Commons but also the broad public 
debate that was equally divisive.  
Very few public debates of the same magnitude as tht surrounding the Naval 
Aid Bill , had occurred in Canada since Confederation in 1867. The debate was truly 
historic in scale. It is important not to forget tha  the Canadian Senate was a witness 
to this historic national debate, it was engaged in trying to understand the uncertain 
and divided public opinion of Canadians. The Senate either had to pass the Naval 
Aid Bill or block it. A monumental decision had to be made and the decision the 
Senate took proved to be historic. 
 
The Naval Aid Bill in the Senate 
The time came for the Senate, which was intended and established to be the 
institution within Parliament that calmly and dispasionately evaluated proposed 
legislation, to take action on the Naval Aid Bill. Canadians focused on the upper 
chamber when the Naval Aid Bill was brought to and read for the first time in the 
Senate on 20 May 1913.61 The debate on the Naval Aid Bill began when the leader of 
the government in the Senate, James Lougheed (Conservativ  – Alberta), introduced 
the bill with an eloquent and lengthy oration. Senator Lougheed expressed dire need 
for the thirty-five million dollar contribution as the Empire faced an emergency, and 
a contribution to assist the Royal Navy in the present crisis was needed urgently.62 
As the Royal Navy was the principal means of defence for the Empire, Senator 
Lougheed expressed great alarm for Britain and its colonies as he did not want to 
witness an “…armageddon of the sea.…”63 As Britain had the infrastructure in place 
for immediate ship construction, Senator Lougheed echo d Prime Minister Borden’s 
call that the construction of the Dreadnoughts would be in Britain and not Canada.64 
As Senator Lougheed’s introductory address continued, h  did not provide the Senate 
with much new substance into the great Naval Aid debat , a consequence of the 
endless exchange that took place in the House of Commons.  
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Diagram 4.1 – Political Party Allocation in the Senate in 191365 
 
 
The Senate in 1912-1913, with --- senators, thirty-one were Conservative senators (blue), while there w r  fifty-six Liberal 
senators (red). 
 
Debate Over Emergency  
The Conservatives argued that an emergency existed and Canada needed to 
provide assistance immediately, without dissidence. As the debate persisted in the 
House of Commons for such an extended period, the ‘em rgency’ argument used by 
the Conservatives in the lower chamber was essentially deflated by the Liberals and 
frustration was expressed by Senator Lougheed becaus  the Liberals in both 
chambers of Parliament demanded unreasonable proof of the dire emergency that 
Britain faced. Senator Lougheed stated that the Librals were being reckless as to the 
proof they required, Lougheed said, “This question of emergency is one with which 
it is somewhat difficult to deal, owing to the opponents of such a grant practically 
taking the position that this emergency should be demonstrated with mathematical 
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exactitude.”66 He continued, “To satisfy them that there is an emergency they would 
require rival fleets to be in the line of battle, they would want to hear the booming of 
the guns, the tearing noise of shot and shell, the swish of the torpedo, the crash of 
colliding ships and the agonized cry of the wounded. Nothing less than this would 
satisfy the carping critics of an emergency.”67 The Conservatives had no sense of the 
point at which the Liberals might accept the perspectiv  that Britain faced an actual 
emergency. Senator Mackenzie Bowell (Conservative – Ontario) provided assistance 
to Senator Lougheed in the emergency argument. Senator Bowell said: “The question 
of emergency has been talked about to such an extent that it is almost nauseating and 
to my mind the playing upon words has been beneath the dignity of those who have 
the slightest knowledge of the English language. The fact that England found it 
necessary to withdraw her forces from Canada and other portions of the Empire, and 
concentrate the whole power in the North Sea proves to the mind of everyone that 
there was an extraordinary emergency and they were concentrated where they might 
be required.”68 Britain had retracted most of its naval force to the North Sea. 
Germany had rapidly increased its naval development; the Conservatives could not 
understand what other evidence the Liberals needed in order to convince them that 
Canadian assistance was required.  
In their full right, being the opposition in Parliament, the Liberals were not 
convinced that Britain required assistance but rather wanted assistance. From the 
Liberals’ perspective, the Conservatives were overreacting to the situation. Senator 
George Ross, leader of the opposition in the Senate st d, “Britain unaided, alone, 
can cope with her enemies or with any combination of them.”69 The Government still 
had not proved to Liberal satisfaction that a real, tangible emergency existed where 
Canada needed to provide assistance to Britain. Senator Napoléon Belcourt (Liberal 
– Ontario) stated much to Conservative agitation, “Had the Government shown the 
existence, or even the probability, nay, the possibility of such a danger, no one would 
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object to giving aid to Great Britain, to the fullest extent….”70 If Britain was in dire 
straits, the Liberals would not hesitate with providing assistance. However, as the 
emergency arguments progressed throughout the months in t e House of Commons 
and days in the Senate, the Liberals felt that perhaps the Conservatives inflated the 
emergency claim out of proportion and when the Liberals questioned them on it there 
was simply no strength in the Conservative’s emergency argument. 
 
Canadian National Development 
Many Conservative senators were adamant about strengthening the Royal 
Navy not further developing the Royal Canadian Navy. Senator Rufus Pope 
(Conservative – Quebec) said, “If a battle is ever fought in the North Sea or any other 
sea, we must have a fleet owned by Great Britain that will be so strong that after the 
smoke of battle clears away, there will be but one flag flying, and that will be the 
Union Jack of old England.”71 The Conservatives did not want to have two navies, 
one Canadian and one British, but rather one united aval force controlled by Britain 
where Canada made contributions. It was not the timin Canada’s history to start 
constructing a naval force.  Senator Joseph Bolduc (Conservative – Quebec) stated, 
“I believe that the building of that navy is premature today. It may be when Canada 
has a larger population, and our revenues have incrased considerably that we will be 
in a position to build a navy of our own.”72 Senator John Daniel (Conservative – 
New Brunswick) echoed Senator Bolduc statement when  said, “We have to 
remember that the time is still far distant when we, of our own resources and our own 
population, can so arrange defensive matters that we can defend our coasts against all 
comers by the enlistment of our own men, or by the creation of our own naval 
force.”73 The Conservatives focused on what the Empire had and could do, rather 
than what Canada ought to develop and create.  The Conservative argument was 
rather interesting, in that they argued on what they b lieved would be best for 
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Canada which was to provide a financial contribution t  the British Royal Navy as 
the Royal Canadian Navy was still immature. The senators were in the Senate to 
evaluate and legislate on what was best for Canada. The Conservative senators had a 
strong point in building up, the already established Royal Navy which would protect 
Canada, but their remained a fine balance for what ould be best for Canada because 
the Liberal senators also had a strong point in building up the Royal Canadian Navy 
into something stronger and better. 
 The Liberals were flabbergasted by the remarks the Conservatives were 
making, to say that Canada was in a position that it could help Britain, but it could 
not help itself. Many Liberal senators stressed the ne d for national development and 
greater self-reliance. The Liberals argued national development was critical to all 
young nations, Canada included, and the thirty-five million dollar contribution to 
Britain would do nothing in the further development of the Canadian nation. Senator 
William Roche (Liberal – Nova Scotia) said, “Ships can be built in Canada too. We 
have to make a beginning. We will have to obtain more skilled labour and have 
better designers and by doing so we will have the advantage of building commercial 
ships. We can first build ordinary cruisers, and then fast cruisers, and then battleships 
and we can do it as well as any other country in the world.”74 Senator Joseph Legris 
(Liberal – Quebec) stressed the point of focusing i on Canadian interests not 
imperial ones when he said, “In the sacred name of loyalty, Canada is asked to 
commit a crime of such magnitude as to lose sight of her own interests and at the 
same time endanger the peace for the future. No man or cabinet in these days should 
be permitted to bargain away the people’s right of deciding their own policy, and this 
Senate will do well if it takes care that principle of responsibility, won in the past at 
great cost, shall not be subverted by such legislation as this.”75 Senator Legris argued 
the policy of providing thirty-five million dollars for the construction of three 
Dreadnought battleships for the Royal Navy was a policy which did not originate 
from Canada but rather from Britain and it would be a retrogressive act on Canadian 
national development if approved. Senator George Ross (Liberal – Ontario) rose to 
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the floor and reminded the Senate that Canada had made great strides in its national 
development since 1867 and by no means was Canada feeble or weak: 
“There is nothing to stop the chariot wheels of thesovereign people. This 
Senate will not stop them so far as I am concerned. (…) If the twentieth 
century is to see the full fruition of the labour of those who laid the 
foundation of our Dominion and planned the superstructure which should be 
the glory of the nations, every measure which affects its dignity or which 
represents its purpose should be proportioned to the ideals of its founders. I 
have great respect for the Fathers of Confederation; we do not think enough 
about them. The day of small things is past and gone. We are no longer 
infants in the night crying for the light. We are no longer walking timorously 
the path of destiny; our pulse beats stronger and our step is firmer, for the 
strength of young manhood is our lions.”76 
For the Liberals, Canada had developed into a proud nation of individuals from sea 
to sea and the Canadian Parliament should focus on that pride and strengthen the 
Canadian institutions throughout the country, including the Royal Canadian Navy. 
The proposed legislation, according to Senator Joseph Legris (Liberal – Quebec), 
“…(did) not in any way help to put our country in a position to defend herself.”77 
Could Canada defend itself against an attack without the assistance of Britain during 
this time? No, Canada only created its Navy in 1910 and it needed further 
development in naval infrastructure and training its naval officers. Canada needed to 
focus on its own development and maturity, Britain could manage, and there comes a 
point in every nation’s development were its people have to take responsibility for 
itself, and not rely on foreign assistance. The Liberal senators argued for Canadian 
self-security rather than dependent-security. Senator William Edwards (Liberal – 
Ontario) said, “On many occasions statesmen of Great Britain expressed the opinion 
that the time might soon come when Canada would be exp cted to paddle her own 
canoe.”78  
 
Canada’s Autonomy from Britain 
 One of the principle aspects that surrounded the Naval Aid Bill which many 
senators had issue with was the impression of British nterference within an arena of 
Canadian internal policy as this would be unconstitutional according to the British 
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North America Act in Section 91(7). The Liberal Leader of the Oppositi n led off the 
arguments against the infringement on Canadian rights when he said, “I ask my 
honourable friend [Senator James Lougheed] is he going t  take the responsibility of 
surrendering part of the authority conferred upon the Parliament of Canada by the 
British North America Act? We are giving over part of that authority when we agree 
to make conditions with His Majesty’s government as to how this money shall be 
paid, used and applied. (…) What we have we hold. What we have we cannot part 
with. It is ours to use, not to dispose of.”79 Senator Ross was referring to Section 
91(7) of the British North America Act stated the Canadian Parliament has full, 
exclusive authority and administration on all matters extending to the militia, 
military and naval service and defence.80 The constitutionality of the Naval Aid Bill 
might be challenged if the Canadian Parliament assented to the bill. Senator Ross 
continued, “I say we have two constitutional anomalies or defects in the Navy Bill. 
One, that Canada, beyond her right to do so is surrendering part of her power, and 
the other, that the British government is getting power which she has no right to.”81 
Henceforth, the Naval Aid Bill was, “…an interference with our constitutional rights 
under the British North America Act.”82 Senator Napoléon Belcourt (Liberal – 
Ontario) was very blunt, brash and forthright as he said, “I believe this measure, if 
passed, would be unconstitutional, unnecessary, useless, without authority or 
mandate, most likely to cause friction – fraught wih danger to the imperial tie, a 
positive menace to empire unity, inconsistent with the aspirations and ambitions of 
Canada.”83  
 
The Question of a Popular Mandate 
There was a larger issue with the Naval Aid Bill, the issue of justification. 
Many senators argued that no justification existed where the Senate could approve 
the bill. Senator Napoléon Belcourt (Liberal – Ontario) mentioned the fact that the 
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Borden Government never received a mandate nor approval from the people of 
Canada to provide such a precedent-setting contribution to the British Government at 
the last federal election.  Senator Belcourt said, “The only question before the people 
in the elections of 1911 was the establishment of aCanadian naval service. There 
was no discussion, no talk, no hint even, of a contribution. (…) The present 
contribution is, in consequence, not only unauthorized under the constitution; it is 
against the wishes of the people who have never pronounced themselves on the 
question of a contribution…it is not now justified or supported by public opinion.”84 
This was where the debate in the Senate accelerated for the Liberal opposition, in 
that the governing Conservatives never received any mandate from the Canadian 
people to proceed with the thirty-five million dollar contribution.  
The Liberal opposition in the Senate opposed the multi- illion dollar 
contribution, and they knew they had the clear majority in the Senate where they 
could effortlessly block the proposed contribution. However, it has been said, the 
Senate never went against the will of the people. The Senate lacked clarity on where 
the majority of Canadians stood on the issue, since the proposal for naval aid was 
never an issue during the last federal election. The Senate was intended to slow the 
passage of legislation and provide a second thought on it, if the Senate had doubt in 
the proposed bill; the senators were to use their constitutional power to block the 
passage. The Liberal senators’ final argument was to-fold. First Liberal senators 
argued the naval aid debate was epic in scope. The length of debate that took place in 
the House of Commons broke parliamentary records.  The copious newspaper 
articles that were written throughout the nation reflected how one profound issue had 
captivated the entire country into focusing people’s attention on future relations with 
Britain. Moreover, Liberal senators had lack clarity on where the majority of 
Canadians stood on the issue. As a result, many Liberal senators, like George Ross, 
favoured a plebiscite. “…I have this concern, that I do sincerely hope that any 
legislation we may approve of in this House is in harmony with public opinion 
whether that public opinion is represented in the other House by a Liberal or 
Conservative government. (…) The moment a bill comes b fore us in regard to 
which public opinion is uncertain, or in regard to which there has been no expression 
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of it, then I think we are justified in trying to find what that public opinion is.”85 
Senator Henry Cloran (Liberal – Quebec) was more direct as he said:  
“We are asking the country to pass upon an issue which as never been 
submitted to the people, to pass upon a principle which underlies the very 
foundation of our national life, and upon which the p ople of Canada have 
had no opportunity in the past to express themselve. (…) We have had this 
(debate) for the last five months, and for what – all in the main part for self 
glorification, self-adulation and self-sufficiency. Canada was going to save 
the empire by handing over to the treasury of Great Britain $35,000,000 of 
the money of the wage-earners of this country, an absurd proposition! Why, 
honourable gentlemen, if you only knew the sentimens of the people, if you 
would only keep in touch with the will and the needs of the people, you would 
know that throughout Canada today this bill is an object of derision and 
contempt.”86 
The Liberals stressed the importance of this monumetal issue as it ought to be 
brought to the Canadian public for their decision. Senator Joseph Legris (Liberal – 
Quebec) urged for a national plebiscite, “Now I wish to repeat that the question is so 
grave that it cannot be imposed on the people without submitting it to the electors by 
means of a referendum rather than a general election, for in a general election no 
question can be judged independently from several other issues.”87 Senator George 
Ross concurred with his Liberal colleague as he said, “…let the people of Canada say 
whether they believe in a permanent navy or in a contribution. If they want this 
contribution they shall have it, so far as I am concer ed, should I have a seat in the 
Senate.”88 The Senate would not go against the expressed will of the people of 
Canada, so bring the issue to them in the form of a national plebiscite, and the Senate 
shall proceed in a manner that is in accordance to the expressed majority of 
Canadians.  
 
Blockage of the Naval Aid Bill 
Time concluded on the debate of the Naval Aid Bill in the Senate and an 
important conclusion was reached. Since the Liberals were in majority, there was a 
strong sense that rejection was eminent. Senator Gege Ross (Liberal – Ontario) 
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articulated Canada nation concerns when he said, “To reject it means nothing to the 
Empire, but to reject it means a great deal to Canad . Sentiment, construction of a 
navy at home, employment of our skilled workmen, the inspiration of doing 
something for ourselves instead of hiring somebody else to do it.”89 The 
Conservatives fearing inevitable rejection cautioned the Liberal majority with a 
reminder as to when the Senate should reject proposed legislation. Senator William 
Ross (Conservative – Nova Scotia) said, “We are a court of review, and the question 
for us here is not whether this bill is the best possible bill, but whether the bill is so 
bad that it would be a public menace, that it would be irrevocable and so disastrous 
for the public interest that we should stop it at all hazards.”90 How could the 
Canadian upper chamber know if this bill was a public menace when there was such 
a division in public opinion and the lower chamber had to introduce parliamentary 
procedural rules to advance the bill?91 Senator Hewitt Bostock (Liberal – British 
Columbia) said, “This bill has been discussed in the House of Commons for a great 
length of time; there has been a great difference of opinion over the matter, and the 
government, instead of consulting the people on a question of this kind, where there 
was very divided opinion as to what was the best thing to do, went so far as to 
introduce rules into the House that would enable them to put this legislation through 
the House without reference to the people….”92 Other Liberal senators felt the only 
action that ought be taken was blockage as the public was ignored. Senator Joseph 
Legris (Liberal – Quebec) said, “Now, since the government has completely 
ignored…the feeling of the people, I think it only right that this Senate should 
accomplish the best act of its existence by repudiating, under such circumstances, the 
bill now before us.”93  
The Conservatives were shocked with the Liberal claims that the people were 
ignored and argued that it would be preposterous if the Senate rejected the Naval Aid 
Bill  on these grounds because the Senate is the appointed body while the House of 
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Commons is the chamber that houses the elected representatives of the people of 
Canada. Senator George Gordon (Conservative – Ontario) s id, “The Senate is taking 
upon itself a responsibility which is not warranted in any shape or form. They are 
turning down the House of Commons who are the proper representatives of the 
people, and thwarting the will of the people of Canada, and I thoroughly believe that 
if tomorrow, or the day after, the Senate reject this bill the people of the Dominion of 
Canada had any chance of abolishing the Senate they would do so.”94 This is rather 
remarkable as the Liberals counted back at that claim and reminded the Senate why 
the Canadian Senate was established in 1867 and what its function was. Senator 
William Edwards (Liberal – Ontario) stood in the Senate and said: “As I understand 
the situation, it is the function of this House to consider the various propositions that 
come before us, and it is the function of this House, in the interests of the people of 
this country, to correct where corrections are necessary, and to change when they 
find changes should be made in any of the bills which come before us. Certain 
honourable gentlemen seem to think that the functio of the Senate is simply to say 
yes to everything and anything which the other chamber proposes. If such is true, 
then this House should be dispensed with.”95 The Senate was never intended to be a 
rubber stamp of approval for the House of Commons just because the House of 
Commons was the elected chamber. From time to time he Senate will block 
particular pieces of legislation approved in the House of Commons when the senators 
judged that to be the warranted response and there would be no use of the upper 
chamber if it did not perform that function set out for it by the Fathers of 
Confederation. In evaluating the Naval Aid Bill, the Liberals then proposed an 
amendment which read, “That this House is not justified in giving its assent to this 
bill until it is submitted to the judgement of the country.”96 The approval of this 
amendment inevitably blocked the passage of the bill in the Senate.   
 
The Vote Outcome 
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The Senate’s vote on the proposed amendment was remarkable. On 29 May 
1913, the Senate voted fifty-one in favour of the amendment and twenty-seven 
opposed.97 The Canadian Senate voted and blocked the passage of th  Naval Aid 
Bill. There was clear and irrefutable political partisanship in the vote as virtually 
every Liberal senator voted for the amendment and virtually every Conservative 
senator voted against the amendment. The debate on the Naval Aid Bill did not last 
long in the Senate as there was not much new material available to mention which 
had not been considered in the debate in the House f Commons. 
 
Diagram 4.2 – The Senate vote regarding the Naval Aid Bill98 
 
 
                       Pass: 51                                                      Block: 27 
The Naval Aid Bill vote, there were 78 senators present for the vote. 50 Liberal senators (red) and 1 Conservative senator (blue) 
voted in favour of the amendment, while 26 Conservative senators and 1 Liberal senator voted against the amendment. 
 
Partisan Voting 
It is clear that the Liberal senators voted in a pronounced partisan form, so 
much so that it is incontrovertible. The clear partis n action by the Liberal majority 
immediately drew public speculation and conclusion that those senators did not 
legislate as members of Canada’s upper chamber which was intended to be a 
thoroughly independent chamber, that legislates over proposed legislation free from 
outside influence. It would have been a remarkable coincidence for such a large 
group of senators belonging to the same political party to have the same vote 
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outcome on such a heavily contentious issue that captivated the nation. It was no 
coincidence at all but rather the political manoeuvring of Wilfrid Laurier and his 
imposition of party discipline upon the Liberal senators. Rumours began by 22 May 
1913 that Laurier was personally influencing the Senat , although he denied this in 
the House of Commons.99 Although Laurier may have officially denied it on the 
floor of the House of Commons – outside the Commons is different territory and 
when confronted with the charge of trying to influenc  the independent upper 
chamber, “…he virtually pleaded guilty.”100  
Wilfrid Laurier gave an ultimatum to his fellow Liberal members of the 
Senate to either block the Naval Aid Bill or face his resignation as leader of the 
Liberal Party of Canada. The Montreal Gazette reported, “…Laurier had flatly told 
the Liberal leaders in the Senate that if they did not kill the Naval Bill he would at 
once resign the Liberal leadership in the House of C mmons.”101 This was surely a 
blow to the Liberal senators as this was “the Wilfrid Laurier,” the grand statesman, 
one of the first great prime ministers of Canada who led the Liberals through many 
successful elections to political office. For if heresigned, who would lead against 
Robert Borden and the Conservatives? The choice was cle r for the Liberal senators 
– they had to block the bill.  
The greater independence of the upper chamber had been roken. Prime 
Minister Borden said, “Many of the Liberal Senators voted against their conscience 
and their judgement and at the dictation of Sir Wilfrid Laurier who gave them the 
choice between the defeat of the bill and his resignat on.”102 The threat of Laurier’s 
resignation was too high of a cost for the Liberal majority in the Senate to vote 
according to their own individual assessment on, and the potential passage of, the 
Naval Aid Bill. An individual’s decision making will always be influenced by 
outside factors if the consequences of their decision are high enough. Although some 
Liberal senators may have personally concluded that passage was warranted on the 
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Naval Aid Bill, the threat of Laurier’s resignation was enough to influence virtually 
every Liberal senator ultimately to block the bill.  
 
A Failed Independent Sober Second Thought 
The intention for the Senate to be a thoroughly independent chamber of sober 
second thought was not fulfilled with the blocked Naval Aid Bill. The Senate was not 
entirely free of party constraints and the senators demonstrated a lack of 
independence with the clear demonstration of partisan voting. Perhaps the Naval Aid 
Bill polarized the two political parties to such a degree that nothing less could be 
expected. A middle ground could not have been achieved. The Liberals were the 
recipients of the greatest blame. The Montreal G zette, a Conservative newspaper 
remarked rather bluntly and emphatically, “The line of action followed by the 
majority was not a courageous one nor a wise one, not o e calculated to raise the 
Senate in the estimation of the people. (…) In voting for the (amendment) the 
majority shirked its duty, made itself the tool of the Liberal party managers in the 
House of Commons, and played the smallest kind of politics.”103 However, for every 
charge that the Liberals received concerning partisanship – the Conservatives were 
equally guilty. If the Conservative senators were any less partisan there would have 
been a greater distribution of Conservative votes during the amendment, but there 
was not. The Conservatives blamed the Liberals for outside interference, but to have 
the Conservatives vote as they did, the Liberals could cry hypocrisy. This leads to the 
larger problem of Senate independence from outside influences.  
Senate independence was a major concern for the Fath rs of Confederation. 
The Fathers of Confederation had intended that senators would have a measure of 
independence from outside interference, interference such as threats by their local 
constituents to remove them from political office at the next election if they voted 
certain ways. The senators are appointed and thus did not fear or have to be 
concerned with losing their seats. The Fathers of Confederation were successful in 
achieving this, but this is independence from the people.  However, as Robert 
Dawson has argued, “An examination of the history of the Senate, however, shows 
that while it was the aim of the founders of the Dominion to secure the personal 
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independence of its members, that aim has never been s cured.”104 Wilfrid Laurier 
and Robert Borden were two dynamic leaders who commanded great respect among 
their peers, so much so as to influence and shaped the formal lawmaking decisions in 
the Senate. Dawson has argued, the Canadian Senate, “…is independent of the 
people certainly, and that does not appear to be much in its favour; but, as for 
independence in the higher sense of impartiality or freedom from party prejudices 
and predilections, it can lay no claim to the slightest infusion of it.”105 The life 
appointment of each senator was intended to achieve greater independence, but just 
because the ability to be independent is there – it does not mean they will be. The 
intention for the Senate to be an independent upper chamber which evaluated 
proposed legislation was not fulfilled while proceeding over the Naval Aid Bill.  
 
Fiscal Responsibility and National Development 
The Borden Government in a hasty manoeuvre introduce  the Naval Aid Bill 
under the pretence of a dire emergency which would have contributed millions of 
dollars to the Royal Navy while ignoring Canadian development and national 
defence advancement. The Senate recognized this and the bill was blocked from 
passage. National development is vital to all new and developing nations and at some 
point that nation must stand up for itself. Before this can occur, the government must 
institute a series of programs to increase the country’s development and its autonomy 
from other states. A contentious issue develops when two political parties have very 
contrasting and opposing views on national development and autonomy, as witnessed 
with the Naval Aid Bill. For, as D.G. Creighton noted, the Conservatives, “…(they) 
saw Canadian defence within the context of imperial defence; and for (them) the 
Canadian navy was essentially a fleet unit within te world-wide organization of the 
imperial navy.”106 By contrast, he explained how the Liberals felt that “…Canadian 
national autonomy and Canadian national dignity requir d a Canadian naval 
service.”107 The Liberals wanted Canada’s own individual navy allied with Britain, 
not a Canadian fleet within the Royal Navy.  Additionally, by providing a large fiscal 
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contribution to the Royal Navy, Canada would have established a precedent of 
reoccurring contributions which would have been a gr ve retrogressive move and 
contrary to Canadian national development. In a private letter from Senator George 
Ross to Senator James Lougheed, Ross wrote that the passage of the Naval Aid Bill 
would invite “…Canadians to lean upon the Imperial Government for defence 
instead of providing for their own defence. As Marc Milner noted, this is not the way 
to make a strong nation and is contrary to all the processes of development which 
have characterized Canada since Confederation.”108 Secondly, a developing nation 
should allocate greater fiscal resources to new and emerging industries within their 
nation and Canada was no exception. Canada could not build the Dreadnoughts as 
Canadian shipbuilding had not advanced and developed to an extent where it could. 
This came to the forefront of Canadian politics and the Conservatives decided to 
funnel the money into the British Royal Navy as it “…was the most cost-effective 
way to go.”109 I would argue that this was a band-aid solution as it was the easiest 
thing to do, but not the right thing to do. A fiscal ontribution to the British Royal 
Navy was nonetheless a lower cost option, yet it had a lower reward, compared to a 
fiscal underpinning for the development of the Royal C nadian Navy which would 
have a higher cost but, potentially yield a greater reward. If the money was allocated 
to the Royal Canadian Navy and related industries, Canada would have witnessed 
greater national development, economic development, industrial development and 
regional development, all of which were important elements towards achieving 
greater national autonomy for Canada.  The Senate followed one of the intentions of 
the Fathers of Confederation by blocking a fiscally imprudent use of Canadian 
taxpayer’s money.  
 
Opinion of the People Too Divided 
The Senate was intended to legislate and pass bills which resulted in the 
greatest advancement of the Canadian nation; this was not always the most popular 
thing to do. A small minority of individuals were indeed displeased with the Senate’s 
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action on the Naval Aid Bill, calling the senators a group of “…fossilized old 
gentlemen.”110 A clear majority of one opinion or the other in the Canadian public 
concerning the Naval Aid Bill did not exist; people’s opinions were too hopelessly 
divided for the Senate to approve the bill.111 With good reason the Senate did not 
pass the Naval Aid Bill because, as MacKay has argued, the Senate, “…has never 
defeated the real will of the people or obstructed it when that will was clearly 
expressed.”112 If the opinions of the people were clear, then the Senate would not 
have approved the amendment requesting the bill be brought to the people for a 
public decision in a form of a referendum or plebiscite. George Ross has stated what 
is clear is that, “On no occasion has the Senate been overruled by the electors, 
although it has often overruled the opinion of the House of Commons.”113  More 
specifically, the Senate was not so much of a check upon the House of Commons but 
rather a check upon the Cabinet, “…and there can be o doubt that its influence in 
this respect is salutary.”114 However a reason why it was so was because the 
opposing party was in majority in the Senate and if the Conservatives were also in 
the majority, the bill might have passed. The Naval Aid Bill  did not pass and the 
Senate was a successful check upon the Cabinet, partially due to the powers it was 
granted by the British North America Act, as it was a productive check upon the 
proposed legislation in Canada’s bicameral parliament. More so, as the Morning 
Chronicle mentioned, the Borden Government had no mandate for the naval aid 
contribution and was only successful in passing the bill through the House of 
Commons, “…by a resort of brute force, and after a parliamentary deadlock….”115 
As the Government forced the bill through Parliament with the nation’s opinion 
lacking clarity and focus, the Senate demanded it be brought to the forefront of the 
Canadian people for they are the ultimate deciders, whatever their decision may end 
up being. 
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Failed Success 
The Senate’s legislative actions over the Naval Aid Bill can be considered a 
failed success. It was a failure in that the final decision was heavily influenced by the 
two leaders in the House of Commons thus lacking independence; however it was 
nonetheless a success in blocking a bill which would have been a retrogressive step 
in Canadian national development. As the Morning Chronicle argued, “The Senate 
(had) done its plain duty. It (had) rendered a servic  which would more than justify 
its continued existence….”116 More so, “…the Senate was established to pass upon
and provide a check to hasty legislation by the Comm ns – such legislation as the 
Borden Naval Bill.”117  For the Senate to fulfill all the original intentions perhaps 
might be too large of an expectation for it to follow. Nations develop and situations 
change that could not be anticipated from the Fathers of Confederation, one where 
the leader of the opposition in the House of Commons threatens to resign if the 
Senate did not do as requested, but a nation can grow, further develop and mature 
from those unique situations into possible reform to prevent such future action. In the 
case of the Naval Aid Bill, “…the Senate was justified in suspending the bill until the 
people had more clearly expressed their will. Moreover, history would seem to be on 
the side of the Senate rather than on that of the Government. The whole trend of 
political development in Canada for the preceding three-quarters of the century had 
been towards autonomy, and, in the Empire, towards decentralization.”118 One of the 
direct national benefits of the Senate’s rejection of the Naval Aid Bill was that it was 
one in a series of critical events that helped acquire greater Canadian independence 
from Britain. A number of years after the Senate’s blockage, Robert Borden gave a 
lecture on Canadian constitutional development at the University of Toronto. Borden 
said between 1911 and 1914, “Canada’s right to a voice in foreign policy involving 
her interests as a great Dominion of the Empire, began to be recognized. Her 
complete control over her policy in respect of military and naval defence was 
acknowledged. By these sure steps, Canada was steadily mounting to the stately 
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portal of nationhood.”119 The Senate’s blockage was viewed harshly by some 
individuals but as time progressed, greater hindsight and clarity were established to 
conclude that the Senate’s actions were beneficial. Perhaps the clear adherence to the 
intentions of the Fathers of Confederation was not vital, particularly when the Senate 
clearly lost its critical independence, but if the ultimate outcome is advantageous to 
the nation, I would argue, diversion then could be tol rated.  
 
Conclusion 
The debate surrounding the Naval Aid Bill endured months of speeches in the 
House of Commons with countless pages of arguments both for and against the 
legislation. The Conservatives argued that Britain faced an emergency situation 
which Canada, second only to Britain in the Empire, should contribute thirty-five 
million dollars for the construction of three Dreadnought battleships for the British 
Royal Navy. Britain had helped Canada in the past, for it was then time to return the 
favour. The money would not be allocated towards the Royal Canadian Navy, as 
Prime Minister Borden felt that one navy was stronger together than two. The 
Liberals argued that the emergency Britain faced was only a perceived emergency, if 
Britain was in grave danger, it would have requested a great deal more from Canada 
in assistance. Secondly, the Liberals argued that if this bill was passed it would be a 
retrogressive step in Canadian development. Ever since Confederation occurred in 
1867, Canada was on a path of national development and obtaining greater self-
reliance. The debate surrounding the Naval Aid Bill was a dynamic debate, it was not 
just about a thirty-five million dollar contribution, it was a debate about Canadian 
national development.  
The Naval Aid Bill was a rather controversial piece of Canadian legislation 
from the moment it was introduced. There were months of filibustering by the 
opposition which cried foul when they felt their right to free speech was taken away 
as the bill was forced through the House of Commons with the adoption of closure.  
The Senate ultimately blocked the Naval Aid Bill from passage, as it felt that it was 
fiscally imprudent for thirty-five million dollars to leave Canada, for the money 
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should stay within Canada for national development. Additionally, the Senate 
deemed there was neither justification for it nor enough public support to pass it. The 
Senate’s final decision was to demand the Naval Aid Bill be brought to the Canadian 
public, as there should be a general vote on it because the public’s opinion was too 
divided on the issue that the Senate lacked clarity on how they stood toward such a 
divisive and controversial piece of legislation.  
The Canadian Senate’s parliamentary performance with respect to the Naval 
Aid Bill is concluded as a failed success, in accordance to the intentions of the 
Fathers of Confederation and the framers of the Constitution. It was a failed success 
for two main reasons. First the Fathers of Confederation strived for an upper 
chamber that would evaluate and legislate with a height ned level of independence. 
However, the Senate failed in this as there was such obvious political partisanship 
from both political parties, and particularly from Wilfrid Laurier who threatened 
resignation if the Liberal majority did not concurrently vote one specific way. The 
Senate’s independence was unfortunately breached by a unique situation where the 
consequence of the Senate’s action or inaction was dictated by the potential 
resignation of an individual completely outside and i ependent of the upper 
chamber. The Fathers of Confederation failed to foresee such political party 
manoeuvrings as a potential threat to the independence of the Canadian upper 
chamber.   
However, as the same time the Senate’s parliamentary performance was a 
success because it demonstrated great concern for fiscal responsibility as it blocked 
the immediate departure of thirty-five million dollars from Canada, as this was not a 
prudent use of Canadian taxpayers’ dollars. Additionally, the Senate’s performance 
was a success as it blocked the Naval Aid Billwhich had potentially precedent 
setting retrogressive policies towards Canadian natio l development, Canadian 
economic development, Canadian industrial development, Canadian regional 
development and Canadian national defence, all fundamental elements towards 








































In 1926 the Canadian Senate blocked the Old Age Pension Bill which was an 
important piece of social welfare legislation introduced into the Canadian Parliament. 
Even though the Senate blocked its passage, its introduction was a significant 
moment in Canadian welfare policy as the legislative proposal signalled a change in 
thinking about social welfare in Canada. The Senate found the principle of the 
legislation admirable in granting pensions to the elderly in Canada. However, the 
Senate blocked the Old Age Pension Bill as it was legislation that entered into the 
sphere of provincial rights and obligations, such as the welfare of the population, 
which conflicted with Section 92 of the British North America Act. If passed it could 
have created a potentially conflict-generating preced nt between the federal 
government and the provinces. The Senate also believed the legislation had passed 
through the House of Commons in haste where careful consideration was required 
but not given. Unlike the previous blocked bill, the Old Age Pension Bill focused on 
a Canadian domestic issue that encompassed the social welfare of the nation and 
brought out the dynamics of jurisdictional invasions which has been a feature of 
political and legal debate in Canada since Confederation. 
 
History of the Old Age Pension Bill 
The political landscape in Ottawa in the mid-1920s was unlike anything in 
previous Canadian political history. The 1925 federal lection saw the Liberal party 
return to their minority government status in the House of Commons with the 
Conservatives in opposition. However, the Liberals obtained 39.8 percent of the vote 
and 99 seats in the 245 seat House of Commons, while the Conservatives received 
116 seats with 46.5 percent of the popular vote.1 The Liberals were propped up into 
governing Canada, much to the displeasure of the Conservatives because of the 
remaining parties seated in the House of Commons, being the Progressives and 
Labour, provided Mackenzie King and the Liberals support.2 Progressive support 
was easily obtained but support was critically needed from the two Labour members 
in particular as the two members provided Mackenzie K ng’s government the 
                                                
1 See Kenneth Bryden, Old Age Pensions and Policy-Making in Canada. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1974), 68. 
2 Ibid. 
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majority in the House of Commons.3 “King’s sole motive was to cling to power.”4 
The Labour members wanted some social welfare legislation introduced, pensions 
for the old aged in particular.5 The Prime Minister agreed that his government would 
draft and introduce a measure providing old age pensions for Canadians.   
By 1926 the political landscape had altered in the Senate from consisting of a 
majority of Liberal senators to a majority of Conservative senators. With the 
introduction of the Old Age Pension Bill, the senators took great interest as the bill 
required an equal partnership with the provinces. The Senate, in part, was established 
to articulate and express Canada’s regional and provincial concerns in the upper 
chamber in Parliament and this bill provided the perfect opportunity to assess the 
Senate’s ability to do so. From the outset of Parliamentary debate, senators were 
concerned that the bill had not been mentioned in the election campaign, or in the 
Speech from the Throne. Moreover, as the bill could only be implemented in 
partnership with the provinces, senators were concerned that the Government was 
seeking to pass the bill without having consulted with provincial governments. Of 
key concern to the Senate was ultra vires or the infringement of rights by the federal 
government into an area of provincial jurisdiction.  
 Providing pensions for the old aged was not a new topic in the Canadian 
Parliament, it had been discussed in some form in previous years. As Kenneth 
Bryden noted, in the 1920s old age pensions were “…unquestionably the social 
security issue…[as] poverty among the aged was acute, widespread and 
chronic…(and) old age pensions, as least those of the non-contributory variety were 
thought to be relatively simply to institute.”6 The emergence of a Canadian welfare 
state was trying to gain a foothold within the nation. Indeed, the Globe argued that as 
more and more people aged without any means of self-support, a general acceptance 
had developed in “…principle that an obligation rests omewhere to care for those 
approaching advanced years without adequate funds….”7 A special committee of the 
House of Commons was appointed in 1924 to inquire about a system of old age 
                                                
3 The Canadian Labour Party was a political party that had marginal success primarily in Western 
Canada between 1917 to 1929. The party focused on social and labour issues.  
4 Bryden, Old Age Pensions and Policy-Making in Canada, 69.  
5 Robert A. MacKay, The Unreformed Senate of Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967), 
104-105. 
6 Bryden, Old Age Pensions and Policy-Making in Canada, 75-76.  
7 Globe, “Old-Age Pensions Elsewhere,” 2 February 1926. (Toronto, Ontario). 
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pensions in Canada.8 This committee made a number of recommendations including 
that if an individual be of seventy years of age, they ought to receive twenty dollars 
per month, and that the scheme be based on the federal government providing fifty 
percent of the cost while the provinces providing the other half.9 These 
recommendations formed the foundation of the 1926 Old Age Pension Bill. The 
dilemma lay in the details as to whose responsibility and obligation it was of the care 
for old-age individuals.  
The Old Age Pension Bill was a fairly simple piece of legislation introduced 
into Parliament. Based on the recommendations of the special committee two years 
earlier, the bill entitled eligible Canadians to a pension of twenty dollars per month. 
The bill also listed certain requirements for eligib lity, such as an individual had to be 
seventy years of age and certain residency restrictions applied. There were 
approximately 98,840 people in Canada who were eligible.10 In 1926, this equated to 
about one percent of the Canadian population.11 An individual would receive twenty 
dollars per month with the federal government paying half and the provinces paying 
the other.12 This equated to a cost of $11,860,000 for each government per annum.13 
The federal government saw it as an ingenious plan that allowed for federal 
government initiative while trying to respect provincial responsibility because the 
federal government would offer financial assistance to each province with the 
implantation of a provincially-administered plan.14  
There were two significant problems with this bill. First, as the Globe argued, 
“There (was) little evidence of favourable response from the provinces to the federal 
suggestion of the provincial partnership and administration.”15 Second, as the 
Gazette noted, “The Government was not sure that it had the authority to do this.”16 
                                                
8 See Canada. Department of Labour. Old Age Pension Systems Existing in Various Countries. 
(Ottawa: F.A. Acland, 1926), 3. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Globe, “100,000 are Eligible for Old-Age Pension, is Ottawa Estimate,” 27 March 1926. 
11 Globe, “Old Age Pensions,” 9 April 1926. 
12 Library and Archives Canada, William Lyon Mackenzie King Fonds, R10383-10-9-E, Reel C-2720, 
"Old Age Pensions in Canada," Letter from Mr. Peter K enan to Prime Minister William Lyon 
Mackenzie King, Specific Date Unknown, Written in 1926, page 1.  
13 Ibid. 
14 See Bryden, Old Age Pensions and Policy-Making in Canada, 77.  
15 Globe, “Old Age Pensions,” 9 April 1926. 
16 Gazette, “Old Age Pension Scheme Debate is Started in House,” 16 April 1926. (Montreal, 
Quebec).  
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Each provincial government also had to arrive at an agreement with the federal 
government before any pensions were handed out to their respected provincial 
citizens. So, for example, if Alberta did not agree, then the people of Alberta would 
not receive old age pensions, but if Ontario agreed – those people would receive old 
age pensions. 
 
The Old Age Pension Bill in the House of Commons 
The debate on the Old Age Pension Bill started in the House of Commons 
when the acting minister of labour, Mr. James Horace King moved that the House 
enter committee-of-the-whole on 26 March 1926 in order to consider the bill.17 The 
debate started with the political parties in the House of Commons generally 
accepting the introduction and theory of pensions for aged citizens of Canada. The 
minister of labour, Mr. J. H. King, by saying, “I believe under this bill there will be 
great benefit to those people who find themselves, in their old age, without sufficient 
means for their maintenance.”18 Conservative member of parliament, Mr. Ladner 
said, “I think this question is one of the most important before the people of Canada. 
It is far above partisan politics. It…will bring more real happiness to the maximum 
number of people in this country than any other enactments which have been before 
the House for a great many years, and for that reason I want to keep it out of party 
politics as much as possible.”19 Other Conservatives members were also in general 
acceptance of old age pensions. Mr.  Manion said, “I repeat that I favour the 
principle involved, and I believe that…we should look after our old people. We 
should not allow our aged to be down and out and to be dependent upon charity.”20 
Canada had never had a national old age pension plan and the old mostly relied on 
religious organizations, charities and their indiviual families to support them. Some 
individuals, if fortunate enough, had private company pensions but those were few 
and far between.  
                                                
17 Dominion of Canada, Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada, 1st Session, 
15th Parliament, 1926, (26 March 1926), p. 1937. 
18 Dominion of Canada, Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada (26 March 
1926), p. 1939 (Mr. King, A/Minister of Labour). 
19 Dominion of Canada, Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada (26 March 
1926), p. 1954 (Mr. Ladner, Member of Parliament). 
20 Dominion of Canada, Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada (15 April 
1926), p. 2488 (Mr. Manion, Member of Parliament). 
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Virtually every member who spoke during the month long debate agreed that 
some form of social welfare ought to be provided by the state to elder citizens of 
Canada. Liberal member, Mr. Heenan said, “I think it is the business of the 
Dominion government to look after the old worn-out industrial workers and pioneers 
of this country, and if they can do something to assist the provinces in this matter it 
will be a proper policy to pursue.”21 Conservative member, Mr. Sutherland said, 
“Everybody cannot get good jobs. No matter how much effort they put forth there 
(are) always a certain number of people that cannot get good jobs…and we have got 
to look out for them.”22 Mr. Ladner additionally said, “The question we have to face 
is, has civilization advanced to the point where th state should take in its hands the 
distribution of the maintenance and support of our aged people, or must we leave that 
duty to the kindness and charity of benevolent people?”23 Furthermore he said, “…I 
would prefer to have old age pensions than to have the Hudson Bay railway and 
many other public expenditures which have been made during the last few years.”24 
Liberal member Mr. Euler stated, “I have always felt that when men and 
women…reach old age…the nation as a whole owes themsomething, not merely as 
a matter of charity but as a matter of right.”25 Finally Conservative member Mr. 
Barber commented, “There is probably one point on which we all agree, and that is 
that something is necessary in the way of old age pension legislation.”26 The 
Conservatives focused their criticism to the way the Liberal minority government 
brought the bill into Parliament.   
The Old Age Pension Bill was introduced into the Canadian Parliament rather 
abruptly and the Conservative opposition cried foul. During the election campaign, 
months prior, there was no reference to an old age pension plan or any mention of 
one in the Liberal party’s election manifesto.27 Conservative member, Mr. Cahan 
                                                
21 Dominion of Canada, Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada (26 March 
1926), p. 1948 (Mr. Heenan, Member of Parliament). 
22 Dominion of Canada, Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada (26 March 
1926), p. 1963-1964 (Mr. Sutherland, Member of Parliament). 
23 Dominion of Canada, Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada (26 March 
1926), p. 1953 (Mr. Ladner, Member of Parliament). 
24 Ibid., p. 1954. 
25 Dominion of Canada, Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada (26 March 
1926), p. 1964 (Mr. Euler, Member of Parliament). 
26 Dominion of Canada, Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada (16 April 
1926), p. 2537 (Mr. Barber, Member of Parliament). 
27 Bryden, Old Age Pensions and Policy-Making in Canada, 68. 
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said, “It is utterly absurd, it seems to me, to present a scheme such as this, whereby 
the federal treasury will be bound…to the expenditure of $12,000,000 of annual 
appropriations, without having secured first the approval and the co-operation of the 
various provinces which will be expected to contribute the other twelve or thirteen 
million dollars.”28 He additionally said, “My objection to this scheme as a scheme is 
that it is not well matured; it has not been carefully considered….”29 The 
Conservatives remained cautious of what they said about the proposed legislation. 
Mr. Stevens remarked, “I want to be acquitted now of obstructing or opposing the 
principle of old age pensions, but I cannot allow this to pass without most 
emphatically protesting against proceeding in this way…the hopelessness of the 
legislation as at present draughted in the absence of an agreement with the 
provinces….”30 There was no agreement obtained from the key administrators of the 
plan – the provinces. 
The problem the Liberals faced with a minority government was that they 
were starved for support in the House of Commons. They tried to obtain the majority 
of plus one, and when the Labour members asked for old age pension legislation in 
return for confidence support, the Prime Minister agreed and along came that 
support. However, with that agreement arose the hasty introduction of legislation 
which involved direct co-operation of the provinces for success. As time restraints 
were present, neither consent nor approvals were obtained from the nine provinces. 
The Liberals believed that the bill concerning the introduction of old age pensions 
should be approved and any disagreement would have been rectified with the 
provinces at a later date. Liberal member Mr. Lapierre said, “Old age pensions are 
today accepted by almost all civilized nations; theonly objection we have heard 
against the scheme, so far, has been the refusal of some of the provinces to co-
operate with the government in putting such a measur  into execution.”31 The 
Liberals felt provincial protest and conflict could and would be rectified after the 
bill’s passage. Conservative member Mr. Bury criticized the path that the federal 
                                                
28 Dominion of Canada, Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada (15 April 
1926), p. 2472 (Mr. Cahan, Member of Parliament). 
29 Ibid., p. 2471. 
30 Dominion of Canada, Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada (16 April 
1926), p. 2526 (Mr. Stevens, Member of Parliament). 
31 Dominion of Canada, Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada (26 March 
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government took as he said, “We will not discuss it with you; we will draft and pass 
our act and submit it to you, and if you do not like it, we will alter it to suit the 
convenience of one or another or all of you.”32 This is the type of legislation that 
alarms the Senate in that the proposed legislation was introduced too hastily and 
possibly ill-considered.  
Two Conservative members, in particular, harshly criticized the way the 
Government was preceding. Mr. Stevens said, “Why do ou not go to the provinces 
beforehand and get an agreement with them before you do anything? Why do you 
not bring in a bill which will reflect the opinion of the provinces?”33 He continued 
further, “By attempting to pass a measure of this kind before a conference of the 
provinces is held and an agreement on the part of th se provinces secured, the 
government are [sic] passing a piece of legislation hat will be a joke on the statute 
books of Canada.”34 Finally, “…if you get nine people around a table to confer on a 
given question with the federal authorities declaring that they have taken the lead in 
the matter, then you would have some hope of getting u animity.”35 Mr. Manion 
echoed his fellow caucus member, “That seems to me an xtraordinary way of doing 
business with any person – to make your agreement first and then ask the other 
parties to accept it. Why not make your arrangements with the provinces first?”36 He 
finished, “The time to discuss the matter with the provinces is not after you pass your 
act, but before, so that you can bring in an act which is the consensus of opinion of 
the different provinces, in co-operation with the Dominion.”37 The Conservatives 
thought strongly that the federal government must di cuss the proposed legislation 
with provincial governments first as it was ill-advised to push legislation through 
Parliament without securing their agreement. This wa even more critically important 
when the proposed legislation potentially infringed on provincial rights under the 
British North America Act. What started as an agreement with two Labour members 
of parliament for majority support in the House of Commons began a significant 
                                                
32 Dominion of Canada, Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada (15 April 
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33 Dominion of Canada, Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada (15 April 
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35 Ibid. 
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debate in the Canadian Parliament with respect to federal incursion into provincial 
rights. 
 
Authority of Parliament verses Provincial Rights  
The constitutional authority of Parliament legally to enact the Old Age 
Pension Bill was debated. In 1867, the British North America Act segmented and 
established a division of powers and responsibilities between the federal government 
and provincial governments, which is outlined in Sections 91 and 92.38 The federal 
government’s area of responsibility encompassed larger concerns such as national 
development and security while personal welfare typically was a local matter and 
made minimal significance in nation building.39 Additionally, “…it might be said 
that the province, assuming responsibility for life’s preparation through general and 
technical education, and assuming responsibility for the health of the people, is also 
responsible for old age.”40 The passage of old age legislation in Parliament might 
have infringed on the exclusivity the provincial legislatures possessed in the sphere 
of social legislation. Conservative member Mr. Bury said, “Surely it stands to reason 
that the federal government cannot force legislation on the provinces. (…) It is 
impossible for the federal government to enforce…old age pensions because it has 
no authority over property rights of individuals….”41 Although Sections 91 and 92 
have some clarity concerning the division of powers in the Canadian federation, like 
in national defence, currency and education, conversely, it was situations like this 
where ambiguity existed between the federal and provincial governments where 
one’s jurisdiction lacked clarity.  
Confusion developed furthermore when political leaders within the provinces 
stated that old age pensions had nothing to do with the provinces and if approved by 
Parliament, then it would be the federal government financing the entirety. The 
attorney general of British Columbia stated, “…the opinion is confirmed that the 
matter of old age pensions is a subject for the consideration of the federal and not the 
                                                
38 Please refer to the British North America Act – Section 92 in Appendix E. 
39 Bryden, Old Age Pensions and Policy-Making in Canada, 76.  
40 Globe, “Old-Age Pensions Elsewhere,” 2 February 1926. 
41 Dominion of Canada, Debates of the House of Commons of the Dominion of Canada (15 April 
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provincial parliament.”42 If the federal government proceed with their bill, the 
provinces should not be expected, at least the province of British Columbia, to be 
part of the scheme. All the individuals above, both federal and provincial, were those 
of politicians which perhaps were influenced by partis n views in favour of their own 
political party, or in favour of their province. There was one opinion that had 
considerable weight behind it. The federal deputy minister of justice, Mr. W. Stewart 
Edwards provided his expert opinion of the authority of Parliament and that of 
provincial rights:43 
“…with regard to the authority of Parliament to legislate on the subject of 
old age pensions, I may say that this subject does n t fall specifically within 
any of the enumerated subjects given to the Dominion under Section 91 of the 
British North America Act, but does in my judgement fall within the subject of 
“Property and Civil Rights in the Province” committed to the province under 
Section 92. I am of opinion, therefore that the subject matter of pensions has 
been entrusted to the provincial legislature rather than to Parliament. I do 
not mean to suggest that Parliament has not the power to legislate upon the 
subject so as to assist the province or to establish an independent voluntary 
scheme, provided that in either case the legislation d es not trench upon the 
subject matter of property and civil rights in the province, as for example by 
obligating any province or person to contribute to the scheme.”44 
The federal government tried to pass legislation which was extraordinarily close to or 
within the sphere of provincial rights. At some point, if approved, the legislation 
would heavily involve the provinces’ participation a d cooperation and no Canadian 
court had ruled on the matter and the provinces had a strong argument for launching 
a constitutional challenge to the federal government.    
 
Passage through the House of Commons 
The Liberal party introduced this bill in part to secure the support of the 
Labour members which resulted in the Liberals having majority support. 
Constructive consultation with the provinces was not p ssible as the bill was a 
                                                
42 Library and Archives Canada, Department of Justice Fonds, R188-43-X-E, Volume 2416, File 9-
930/1925 Part 1. "Old Age Pension Act – Authority of Parliament to legislate on the subject of old age 
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hurried piece of legislation. One cannot blame the Liberals for trying, and the 
Conservatives were very cautious in their speeches as not to appear to be against old 
age pensions. Mackenzie King’s minority government was still in its infancy and 
only had a razor thin majority of confidence, an election could have occurred at any 
time and the Conservative would not want to be the party openly against old age 
pensions in a national election. With that, as Bryden noted, “No one was prepared to 
vote against the bill, and it passed all stages without division.”45 The Old Age 
Pension Bill received its third reading in the House of Commons on 28 May 1926.46 
The House of Commons passed the Old Age Pension Bill without division, but the 
Senate blocked it as it determined the bill had serious problems.  
 
The Old Age Pension Bill in the Senate 
The political landscape in the Senate had changed since the Naval Aid Bill 
from a Liberal to a Conservative majority, reflecting appointments made during the 
lengthy premiership of Robert Borden. Unlike the House of Commons, which faced 
a Liberal minority government with minimal support, the Conservatives were in solid 
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Diagram 5.1 – Political Party Allocation in the Senate in 192647 
 
 
The Senate in 1926, with ninety-three senators, forty- ne were Liberal senators (red), while there were fifty-one Conservative 
senators (blue), plus 1 independent senator (grey).   
 
The Fathers of Confederation had envisaged the Senate not only as a chamber 
of sober second thought on legislation but also one which would take full account of 
the interests of the provinces and regions of Canad.  The Old Age Pension Bill 
provided a good institutional test on the upper chamber as the bill developed and 
passed through the lower chamber with rather speed ev n though the bill appeared to 
intrude into an area of provincial jurisdiction.  The Old Age Pension Bill was 
introduced into the Senate at the beginning of the debate by the leader of the 
government in the Senate, Senator Dandurand (Liberal – Quebec), “Honourable 
gentlemen, this bill aims at providing old age pensio  for people who have reached 
the age of seventy. It is not a new idea. Although no effort has hitherto been made to 
legislate in this matter, the question has often been debated in the Canadian 
Parliament. It is not new in the rest of the world.”48 He continued, “There is not a 
                                                
47 Parliament of Canada. “Senators.” 
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48 Dominion of Canada, Debates of the Senate of the Dominion of Canada, 1st Session, 15th 
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citizen of Canada who does not know, and see under his own eyes, people who are in 
want yet are being insufficiently provided for.”49 Furthermore, he highlighted how, 
“The aged poor in our country have been supported partly by private effort and partly 
by public institutions established by the municipalities and the provinces.”50 This bill 
was designed so that federal and provincial governmnts would provide equally to 
those in need. After Senator Dandurand finished his opening remarks, the Old Age 
Pension Bill received first reading on 1 June 1926.51 After the pleasantries of the 
introduction were over, the Conservative majority ardently attacked the bill.   
 
No Demand 
Numerous senators from the forefront were opposed to the bill as there was 
simply no demand originating for it from the provinces. Senator Black (Conservative 
- New Brunswick) said, “May I point out to honourable gentlemen opposite, and to 
the members on this side of the House as well, that legislation of this kind has not 
been asked for by any province of Canada. (…) I cannot find in the record a single 
request from any province in Canada for legislation f this kind.”52 Senator 
McCormick (Conservative - Nova Scotia) echoed similar feelings, “I intend to vote 
against this measure because it is not called for; there is no part of the country 
demanding it; there is no province asking for it; and therefore the purpose for which 
it is brought in is unworthy of support, at least in this House.”53 Senator Robertson 
(Conservative - Ontario) said, “…no province in Canada has made such a request. 
Naturally not, because the provinces have recognized up to the present time that the 
obligation has been theirs to look after the old peopl  within their own boundaries.”54 
The Leader of the Government in the Senate replied back that demand from the 
provinces may not exist, but there were people in Ca ada at the age of seventy or 
older who needed such assistance. Senator Dandurand said, “All these efforts have 
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51 Dominion of Canada, Journals of the Senate of the Dominion of Canada, 1st Session, 15th 
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52 Dominion of Canada, Debates of the Senate of the Dominion of Canada (8 June 1926), p.163  
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53 Dominion of Canada, Debates of the Senate of the Dominion of Canada (8 June 1926), p.167  
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not solved satisfactorily the needs of a vast number of men who, upon reaching the 
age of seventy, look in vain for support.”55 According to the federal government, the 
bill was a proactive measure for social welfare assistance for the old aged, but the 
majority of the senators felt that there was simply no demand from the provinces for 
it.  
 
Coming in Too Hastily 
The second issue that senators had problems with was the speed with which 
the bill came about in Parliament from virtually no mention to it prior to its 
introduction by the Minister of Labour in the House of Commons.  Some senators 
took issue with this haste and the lack of due diligence required with such a bill. 
Senator Foster (Conservative – Ontario) said, “…I am opposed to this bill as it is 
introduced, because it is not based upon the best and most thorough investigation that 
could possible be given the matter.”56 He continued, “…why has the present 
Government displayed such hectic haste in bringing this legislation before 
Parliament in order to fasten upon this country an initial expense of $25,000,000 
which, once started, will grow until it runs into hundreds of millions of dollars?”57 
The Senate was intended to act as a sober second thugh  to such bills when they are 
introduced and passed through the House of Commons with such speed without the 
proper examination warranted to them, especially a bill which appeared to be 
invasive in the provincial field. Senator Tanner (Conservative - Nova Scotia) in part 
asked, “…why (is there) so much haste to bring in and pass a bill which invades the 
legislative territory of the provinces…?”58 Not only was there a belief of a perceived 
infringement into the provincial field of legislation, the federal government had 
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Lack of Provincial Consultation  
One of the most contentious issues for the Senate surrounding the Old Age 
Pension Bill was that the provinces were not fully consulted on the proposed 
legislation. The Senate felt that was important as this was legislation which required 
equal partnership. Senator Reid (Conservative - Ontario) said, “...(the federal 
government) did not give the provinces an opportunity to be consulted, although the 
whole question is one of provincial right.”59  Senator Reid continued, “Yet, without 
consulting anybody, the Government draft(ed) a bill and presented it to 
Parliament.”60 Senator Lewis (Liberal - Ontario) echoed a similar argument, “…the 
provinces ought to have been consulted more fully than they have been, and their 
consent should have been obtained before this legislation was proposed.”61 Senator 
Ross (Conservative - Nova Scotia) concluded, “Unless you arrive at an agreement 
with the provinces, you are simply legislating in the air.”62 Most senators agreed that 
this bill entered Parliament with far too much haste and without the proper 
consultations and consent required with this piece of l gislation. Senator Dandurand 
argued differently, in that the federal government did not need to consult with the 
provinces nor require their consent because, if passed, the Old Age Pension Bill 
could then be examined by each province knowing it as an actual law and not an 
abstract idea. Senator Dandurand said if the bill passed, “…the provinces will thus 
know what the Dominion is ready to do, what it is offering, to what it has bound 
itself by its offer – which will not be simply a tentative offer, but a reality.”63 The 
federal government wanted the bill passed, then it could begin provincial 
consultations with a legal document, a concrete offr which if needed could be 
amended to suit. The majority of the Senate did not approve of this way of handling 
federal - provincial legislation nor relations. There was a larger issue the Senate had 
with the Old Age Pension Bill, away from the fact that the provinces were not fully 
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consulted nor was consent given, which was the infringement into of provincial 
rights and responsibilities.  
 
Infringement into Provincial Jurisdiction 
The Senate’s primary focus on the Old Age Pension Bill was the perceived 
infringement of provincial rights which was out of the realm of the federal 
Parliament.  Senator McMeans (Conservative - Manitoba) said, “I am one of those 
who sincerely believe that this is purely a question f r the provinces, and that each 
province should have its own measure of old age pensions.”64 Senator McCormick 
(Conservative - Nova Scotia) warned the Senate, “Honourable gentlemen, this 
measure is not one of the subjects with which this Parliament has power to deal. It is 
a matter that should be provided for by the provincial legislatures of the country.”65 
Senator Tanner (Conservative - Nova Scotia) did not understand why the federal 
government was entering the provincial legislative ar na. The Senator said, “I think 
the field of the provincial legislation should be left to the provincial legislature, and 
that the Federal Parliament should content itself with dealing with matters that come 
within the purview of this Parliament.”66 Senator Calder (Conservative - 
Saskatchewan) was more direct to the Senate, he said, “Personally, I am strongly 
opposed and always will be strongly opposed, to anye croachment by the 
Parliament of Canada upon the provincial field of legislation.”67 The Senate was 
intended to protect such encroachment of legislation and act as a last line of defence 
which had the power to block this type of legislation before it became law. Senator 
Calder continued, “…this House should take the greatest precaution to avoid 
encroaching on the provincial field of legislation. There is nothing that will give rise 
to greater trouble in this country, as it has done in the past, than interference on the 
part of the federal government in provincial affairs.”68 Finally, the leader of the 
opposition in the Senate, Senator Ross (Conservative - Nova Scotia) said, 
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“…according to the Department of Justice, the subject-matter over which we are 
legislating had been assigned under our federal constitution to the provinces. I think 
it is a good general rule to lay down and follow as closely as possible, that the 
Parliament of Canada, or any house legislating under a similar constitution, should 
confine itself to those subjects which have been assigned to it, and the provinces to 
the subjects that have been assigned to them.”69 Senator Belcourt (Liberal – Ontario) 
felt clarification was needed on the Senate floor twards the unwarranted 
encroachment on the provinces. Senator Belcourt said, “Nothing is forced on any 
province, but the province is invited, purely and simply, to come in with the 
Dominion Government and together make a scheme….”70 Nothing in the Old Age 
Pension Bill would force the provinces to participate, if it got passed, the federal 
government would welcome any and all provinces to participate with them to assist 
the old aged population in Canada. However, that was not the issue to the majority in 
the Senate, the issue was that the federal government has no business in the creation 
of legislation on subjects that fell within the purview of the provinces.  
 
Blockage of the Old Age Pension Bill 
The debate moved further past the direct topic of old age pensions and 
proceeded to a much larger debate on Parliament and politics behind the bill. Senator 
Hughes (Liberal - Prince Edward Island) stood in the Senate and said, “The Senate, 
as I understand it, is specially charged with the protection of minorities and with the 
responsibility of seeing that the Constitution is fairly carried out as between the 
federal power and the provincial authorities. Therefore anything that even indirectly 
entrenches upon the political field should, and will no doubt, receive the careful 
consideration of this House.”71 The Old Age Pension Bill was a bill created by the
federal government that encroached upon the political and constitutional field of the 
Canadian provinces as it was a bill concerning civil and social issues, not national 
development. Such a bill, according to Senator Hughes ought to receive careful 
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consideration or, in other words, a sober second thoug t. This was further 
commented by Senator Calder (Conservative – Saskatchewan), “This Confederation 
has existed from 1867 down to the present time, and the whole problem of looking 
after the civil population, in every respect, has been taken care of by the 
provinces.”72 A bill that clearly broke into the confines of provincial legislation 
caused concern for the senators as they represent each province in Parliament, and 
they clearly knew that the provinces had not been fully consulted or granted consent 
to the bill.  
Finally, Senator McCormick (Conservative - Nova Scotia) said what 
everyone knew in the Senate yet never said, “I do not think there is any doubt in the 
minds of those who have been following the affairs of this country for some years 
that this measure was proposed simply in order to secure the support of two men who 
call themselves Labour men in the other House.”73 Moments before the vote took 
place Senator Foster (Conservative - Ontario) had some final cautionary remarks to 
his fellow senators, “…political tendency is shown i  democratic countries 
everywhere, and so long as that is not curbed, and in proportion as it grows and the 
strife and duplication continue, you will have confusion and you will be marching 
every day closer and closer to the failure of democratic institutions. I think that safety 
is to be found only in each parliamentary power confini g itself as closely as 
possible to the limits of its own constitutional territory and respecting the 
constitutional territory and limits of the provincial or state powers which are under 
it.” 74 The Old Age Pension Bill appeared to cross the lin into provincial jurisdiction, 
without the consent of the provinces as it was introduced into Parliament in a rather 
hasty manoeuvre in order to secure the support of certain members of parliament.  
After the passage of the bill in the House of Commons, the Old Age Pension Bill was 
blocked by the majority of senators on the evening of 8 June 1926; the Senate 
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rejected the passage of the Old Age Pension Bill in a vote of forty-five to twenty-
one.75 
 
Diagram 5.2 – The Senate vote regarding the Old Age Pension Bill76 
 
 
Pass: 21    Block: 45 
The Old Age Pension Bill vote, there were 66 senators present for the vote. 20 Liberal senators (red) and 1 Conservative senator 
(blue) voted to pass the bill, while 40 Conservative senators, 4 Liberal senators and 1 independent sena or(grey) voted against it.  
 
 
The Senate vote on the Old Age Pension Bill again demonstrated the perpetual issue 
of political party block voting. The Senate voted in a politically partisan manner 
which is not in line with the intentions of the Senate that its creators originally 
intended and the question of Senate independence becomes questioned. The Fathers 
of Confederation created a Senate with no public ele tions in order to allow each 
senator to evaluate and legislate on what they considered to be right for Canada and 
not necessarily for what was considered to be the most popular approach. Having 
their seats for life granted senators the opportunity to vote in this way without fear of 
losing their seats in an upcoming election if the vote proved unpopular.  
 If one examines the “Pass” vote above, its shows out of twenty-one votes, 
twenty Liberal senators voted in favour of it. It would be an unconvincing argument 
to state that it was a coincidence. In the “Block” vote above, it shows out of forty-
five votes, forty Conservative senators voted against t. Again it would be an 
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unconvincing argument to state that it was a coincidence because two questions can 
be asked towards the Liberal and Conservative senators. To the Liberal senators, one 
might have asked, “You voted in favour of the Old Age Pension Bill, because you 
support the idea of pensions, but do you not feel that his bill was developed too 
hastily and rather ill-conceived and as a senator who sits in the Senate as a 
representative of their respective province, why would you approve legislation 
directly effecting the provinces without full consultation and consent of their 
governments?”  To the Conservative senators, one might have asked, “You voted 
against the Old Age Pension Bill, primarily because of the lack of consultation and 
consent from the provinces and the possible infringement within their constitutional 
rights, but why would you reject legislation which would have provided old age 
pensions to those in need throughout Canada. Surely th  Dominion government and 
the provinces could have worked something out after Royal Assent?” One possible 
answer to both these questions is found in the House f Commons.  
The Canadian House of Commons in 1926, had a Liberal minority 
government with razor thin support. The Liberal senators perhaps thought that it was 
only a matter of time before the Liberal government f ll on a vote of confidence, so 
the Liberal senators might have chosen to pass this publicly popular bill in the hope 
that the Liberals would look better in the public sphere rather than legislating on the 
true merits of the bill as being a bill that was ill-considered and flawed. The 
Conservative senators might have been bitter and angry at the political dealings in 
the House of Commons allowing the Liberals to form the government when the 
Conservatives had the greater number of seats in the lower chamber.  Perhaps the 
Conservative senators were feeding into the politica  situation in the House of 
Commons, showing how the Senate is not pure and separat d from the House of 
Commons in Parliament as the Fathers of Confederation had intended.  
The main criticism that can be charged against the Senate was that of 
partisanship and block voting. Although no direct evid nce was found of political 
influence or interference from prominent members of Parliament towards the Senate, 
as with the case of the Naval Aid Bill, there are always questions of that possibility 
as this prominent bill was created through an agreement within the House of 
Commons for very critical support that the minority Liberal Government needed to 
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maintain confidence in the lower chamber. Some argue that the Senate should not be 
blamed for the blockage but rather Prime Minister Mackenzie King. As the Gazette 
argued, the Prime Minister had “…the opportunity of being very gracious to 
clamorous minorities and winning their gratitude by introducing the legislation they 
desire, secure in the knowledge that the Senate will throw it out in any case.”77 The 
newspaper also asserted that this, in turn, “…is a form of political dishonesty, and the 
Senate is the goat of it. The Government by means of it is permitted to make its plays 
to the gallery, while the Senate becomes increasingly unpopular.”78 Perhaps the 
Liberal Government went along with the Labour members in order to get their 
support, rather than saying no and face defeat in a confidence motion. They passed 
the Old Age Pension Bill and due to perfuse deficien i s the Senate was almost 
forced to block it. Just as the Old Age Pension Bill was passed in the House of 
Commons with a majority, the Senate blocked it with another majority and that is 
what a democratic parliament does, they act in the will of the majority. 
Aside from the partisan voting in the Senate, the senators fulfilled the 
intentions of the Fathers of Confederation. The Senate’s primary intention and 
function was to legislate. The majority of the Senat  voted and blocked the passage 
of the Old Age Pension Bill originating from the House of Commons as it felt there 
were fundamental flaws with it that could not have been rectified even with Senate 
amendments. The Globe noted that, following the blockage, “Criticism of the Senate 
(had) been revived in a vigorous manner in various parts of Canada as a result of the 
rejection of the Old-Age Pensions Bill.”79 The blockage angered some but that was 
to be expected as with every bill there are supporters and opponents. At their annual 
convention, the Montreal Trades and Labour Council publicly denounced the actions 
of the Senate. As the Gazette noted, the Council concluded that the senators were, 
“…hard-hearted, unjust and injudicious in killing the Old Age Pensions Bill, passed 
by the Lower House.”80 Similarly, in Toronto, the Globe commented that, “Rejection 
of the old-age pensions bill by the Senate (threw) this important piece of social 
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legislation back into the waiting line, where it (had) been stationed for several 
years.”81  
The Prime Minister was exceptionally angered by Liberal senators who had 
voted against the bill and Liberal senators who were entirely absent from the Senate 
during the vote.82 However, perhaps the four Liberals who voted against the bill 
demonstrated a heightened level of independence by voting against their party. 
Additionally of those four, we can conject that Senator Aylesworth and Senator 
Hughes (both of whom had been appointed on the advice of Prime Minister 
Mackenzie King) were not yet “institutionalized” by the Senate and legislated 
independently.  Senator Robertson, the only Conservative senator acted against his 
party as he considered that the bill warranted passage.  
Out of the three blocked bills in the Senate, examined in this thesis, the Old 
Age Pension Bill directly concerned provincial rights. The Senate was created as a 
chamber which consisted of its members representing each of the provinces, and later 
territories, throughout Canada. In an article authored by Arthur Meighan, former 
prime minister of Canada and leader of the opposition during the Old Age Pension 
Bill, he wrote, “…the Senate has the particular duty of standing guard over the 
Constitution as it applies to all sections of Canada, of making certain that provincial 
rights are maintained inviolate, that the relationship which the British North America 
Act established between provinces, on the one hand, and the federal state, on the 
other hand, is respected, whatever may be for the tim  being the arbitrary action of a 
bare majority.”83 The Senate protected the Canadian provinces with the hasty, ill-
consulted, and possibly constitutionally-infringing Old Age Pension Bill as there was 
a provincial rights issue with this bill and the Fathers of Confederation intended that 
the Senate would represent and protect provincial rights from any possible 
infringement.   
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Conclusion 
In 1926 the Senate blocked the Old Age Pension Bill which was an important 
piece of social welfare legislation that would have provided financial assistance to 
individuals over the age of seventy in Canada. Virtually every senator supported old 
age pensions for Canadians, but not the Old Age Pension Bill that was introduced to 
Parliament in 1926. The senators supported the idea of welfare for Canadians and 
financial support but the ultimate rejection surrounded two issues. First it was not in 
the Liberal election manifesto or propaganda and after the election it was not in the 
Speech from the Throne. The bill was introduced in haste as the result of an 
agreement for support in the House of Commons.  As the lower chamber passed the 
House of Commons without opposition, the Senate acting as the workshop of 
Parliament broke away from the generalities of the bill in supporting old age 
pensions and focused on the possibility of an infringement of provincial rights 
entrusted to the provinces in the federation under Section 92 of the British North 
America Act. The Senate was not concerned about the issue of supporting people, 
they all agreed with that idea, it was the infringement into provincial rights and the 
complete lack of consultation of the key stake holders. There was a very real 
possibility of infringement into the constitutional area of entrenched provincial rights 
and the federal government never consulted nor obtained an agreement with any 
province.  
The Fathers of Confederation and the framers of the Constitution established 
the Senate to legislate as the upper chamber in the Canadian Parliament and to 
articulate and express Canada’s regional and provincial concerns towards legislation 
that proceeded through Parliament. The Old Age Pension Bill was a valuable test for 
the Senate as it involved both primary roles of the Senate.  Legislatively the Senate 
found the bill entered Parliament too quickly without the due diligence required for 
such an important piece of legislation potentially involving nearly a dozen 
governments. Representatively, the Senate acted as their respective provincial 
representatives in the upper chamber and determined that the Old Age Pension Bill 
constituted an infringement into the provincial sphere of legislation. The Senate 
might have found the intrusion acceptable if the provinces they represented were 
properly consulted by the federal government and if they granted their consent to 
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move forward with it. However the former and latter were not achieved and the 
Senate blocked passage of the Old Age Pension Bill as t might have set a dangerous 




























































































Discussion about Senate reform is “…one of the enduri g features of 
Canadian political life.”1 Nonetheless, the Senate has undergone minimal reform 
since Canada’s creation in 1867 and the last substantial reform was in 1965 when 
mandatory retirement, at the age seventy-five, was introduced. Despite countless 
attempts at reform, the Canadian Senates remains “…one of the last unreformed 
chambers in Westminster-based parliamentary democracies.”2 Notwithstanding 
limited reform in Canada, it appears likely that the current Conservative Government 
under Prime Minister Harper will pass some measure of r form through Parliament, 
given that the Conservatives have majorities in both the House of Commons and 
Senate. Earlier in 2011, Bill C-7, An Act respecting the selection of senators and 
amending the Constitution Act, 1867 in respect of Senate term limits, was introduced. 
The discussion on Canadian Senate reform has been reignited again and is alive and 
well, but there remains many questions because if the Senate is constantly being 
singled out for reform, there must be something problematic with its performance.  
However, was there ever a period during the Senate’s history that it performed as it 
was intended? 
My review of the literature on the Canadian Senate revealed that very little 
attention had been paid to the performance of the Senate during the first sixty years 
of its history. An examination of the Senate during its early years was of interest as 
Confederation itself was a significant process of cnstitutional reform. The 
immediate period following thereafter provided a period of time when little had 
changed within the Senate as not enough time had lapsed in Canadian political 
history for the Senate to have evolved away from its original design.  
My focus on the development of the Senate in its first sixty years provided 
opportunities to examine the introduction of governme t legislation from 
Conservative and Liberal governments, headed by three different prime ministers. 
This time frame also allowed for the analysis of a blocked government bill 
originating from a minority government. As senators were appointed for life, the 
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sixty year time frame also allowed the political party control of the Senate to be 
alternated between both major political parties that have held the government, which 
enabled me to consider how the changing membership of the Senate affected the 
legislative debate.  
This thesis analyzed the original intentions for the Canadian Senate, 
developed by the Fathers of Confederation, and it showed how the architects of the 
Senate regarded it as a chamber for sober second thught. The thesis then considered 
the extend to which the senators followed the founders’ intentions when legislating 
over three government bills that were blocked in the Senate during the first sixty 
years of its existence. It is easy for one to state that the modern Senate needs reform, 
as the current Senate is an easy target which has had little formal reform to it, but this 
thesis analyzed the Senate in a period immediately fol owing its creation and 
examined if it performed as intended.  
 
Intentions 
The intentions of the Fathers of Confederation for the Senate were critical in 
the analysis of the Senate’s performance during the first sixty years. These 
individuals created the Senate and established criteria for its evaluation. The primary 
function intended for the Senate was to legislate and the secondary function was of 
representation. According to John A. Macdonald, to legislate was to “…calmly 
(consider) the legislation initiated by the popular branch, and (prevent) any hasty or 
ill-considered legislation which may come from that body.”3 The Senate was 
designed to act as a bulwark, with justified reasoning, against the House of 
Commons, blocking legislation which its members concluded was not in the best 
interest of Canada. Joseph Édouard Cauchon stated the Canadian Senate ought “…to 
moderate the precipitancy of any government which might be disposed to move too 
fast and go too far…a legislative body able to protect the people against itself and 
against the encroachments of power.”4 Secondly, in federations like Canada, upper 
                                                
3 Provincial Parliament of Canada. Parliamentary Debates on the subject of the Confederation of the 
British North American Provinces, 3rd Session, 8th Parliament, (6 February 1865), p. 36 (Mr. 
Macdonald, Member of Provincial Parliament). 
4 Provincial Parliament of Canada. Parliamentary Debates on the subject of the Confederation of the 
British North American Provinces (2 March 1865), p. 572 (Joseph Édouard Cauchon, Member of 
Provincial Parliament). 
 141 
chambers usually perform a second role of representatio  of regions, provinces, 
states, and territories within the national legislature. The Canadian Senate was 
intended to represent, articulate and express the larg r regional concerns of Canada. 
This is why senators represent larger regions and not individual constituencies, with 
the exception of Quebec.  The final intention for the Senate was that of protector of 
rights from legislative infringement. In the view of James G. Curry, the Senate was 
“…to guard (Canadian) interests, protecting them against hasty and ill-considered 
legislation, and preventing improper and extravagant appropriations of the public 
funds.”5 The intentions of the Fathers of Confederation for the Senate were to 
legislate, represent and protect.  
 
A Sober Second Thought  
The blockage of government bills is the most signifcant action that could be 
performed by the Senate and three were explicitly se ected to create a well-rounded 
sample, as together they encompassed provincial, national and international 
dimensions of legislation, all of which included a regional element. This thesis 
demonstrated that through an analysis of the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill, 
the Naval Aid Bill, and the Old Age Pension Bill, senators provided a well informed, 
critical sober second thought. Nonetheless, there wr  constant problems surrounding 
the issue of partisan block voting that had concerned the Fathers of Confederation, 
and this affected the independence of the Senate and the legislative outcomes in each 
case. 
 
The Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill 
In 1875 the Senate found after careful consideration bl ckage was necessary 
in order to prevent the passage of the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill. It was 
blocked on the grounds that the Government and Parliament lacked critical 
information on the railway and because it was a locl railway which lacked national 
significance. This bill provided an excellent opportunity to examine the performance 
of the Senate as Confederation and the Senate were less than ten years old and many 
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of the Fathers of Confederation were still in Parliament. Their intentions for the 
Senate were therefore still present in the minds of the parliamentarians.  
The bill was hastily introduced into Parliament, and the Senate did not 
appreciate the fact that the geographical surveys on Vancouver Island were 
incomplete. The Senate disliked the vague estimates of the proposed railway, 
particularly as these were high and the Government was not going to present a final 
cost of the railway to Parliament.  The Senate did not want to be extravagant and 
unjustifiable in appropriations of public funds. The Senate performed in accordance 
with the intentions of the Fathers of Confederation where they wanted a chamber that 
would slow down the pace of legislation, examine and scrutinize it with a fresh 
perspective.   
The Senate was also intended to represent, articulate and express regional 
concerns and act as a protector of rights. Of the thr e blocked bills within this study, 
the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill was the most regionally based in which it 
directly related to a very specific part of Canada. This local railway was a public 
works project in which the federal government should not have become involved for 
it was a provincial matter. The senators from British Columbia argued this railway 
should be approved because it would benefit the fedration as it would demonstrate 
that the federal government could complete major public works projects throughout 
the federation which would raise the provinces’ confidence of the relatively new 
federal government. Unfortunately, British Columbia’s representation in the Senate 
was a challenge, as the Senate’s western region was ot officially designated a region 
within the Senate. As a result senators from the West of Canada were greatly 
outnumbered by senators from Ontario, Quebec and the Maritimes.  
The Senate’s decision to block the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill is 
possibly one of the first acts by the federal parliament that contributed to the broader 
development of western alienation in Canada. The Senate is a democratic chamber, 
where the majority rules and a number of senators from Ontario expressed their 
desire to protect the taxpayers as the people from Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia and 
New Brunswick, would be financing the local railway on Vancouver Island. 
Regardless, the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill would have impeded upon the 
constitutionally guaranteed provincial rights of British Columbia. The bill did not 
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represent good policy and the Senate argued that the federal government should not 
get involved with local railways, because Section 92 of the British North America 
Act explicitly states that the provinces have the exclusive control over local railways.  
The Senate also disfavoured direct British involvement with the intra-national 
dispute between the federal government and British Columbia. It appeared to the 
Senate that the British government was trying to dictate the legislative agenda of 
Canada with respect to a dispute within Canadian borders. Canada was still relatively 
young, but I would argue that, even at this stage, th  Senate was trying to assert 
greater independence from Britain. In the end, the Senate voted to block the passage 
of the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill because th  proposed legislation  relied 
on a vague sum of money (that could amount to millions of dollars) being prescribed 
by a foreign government for the construction of a loca  railway. The Senate viewed 
the legislation as an unconstitutional infringement o  the rights of the province.   
 
The Naval Aid Bill 
In 1913 the Senate found that after careful consideration blockage was 
necessary to prevent the passage of the Naval Aid Bill , on the grounds that it would 
have set a bad precedent for future national development and Canadian international 
autonomy. This bill provided an excellent opportuniy to examine the performance of 
the Senate with a nationally and internationally signif cant piece of legislation. Prime 
Minister Robert Borden introduced the Naval Aid Bill as he felt the best thing to do 
was assist Britain with a significant contribution. I  his view, there was a strong 
sense of urgency, and Imperial unity would protect everyone. However, in the House 
of Commons, Wilfrid Laurier, as leader of the Liberal opposition, argued for the 
further development and promotion of the Royal Canadian Navy, on the grounds that 
the federal government should be directly investing in Canada for the protection of 
Canadians. Both the Liberals and the Conservatives w re adamant that their own 
policy was the superior policy and the debate in the House of Commons turned into a 
farce with Liberal obstruction. After some two-hundre  and thirty hours of debate, 
the Conservatives introduced closure which essentially brought the debate to a 
conclusion. Opinions in the House of Commons were solidified and Canadians 
differed in opinion greatly.  
 144 
The Senate reacted differently from the House of Comm ns, and it blocked 
the Naval Aid Bill from passage. There were two major elements in the legislation 
with which the Senate took issue. First, once again there was the appearance of 
British interference within an arena of Canadian inter al policy which the Senate 
considered unconstitutional in light of the federal government’s responsibility for 
“Militia, Military and Naval Service, and Defence,” as specified in Section 91(7) the 
British North America Act.6 The Senate acted as a protector of rights and there w e 
many arguments that concluded the bill infringed on rights guaranteed to Canada 
under the British North America Act.  The second major element with which the 
Senate had issue was the lack of focus on Canadian national development in the 
proposed legislation. By providing a large financial ontribution to the Royal Navy, 
Canada would have established a precedent of recurring contributions which the 
Liberals considered to be retrogressive and contrary o Canadian development.  They 
argued that Canada was still a developing nation and if the money was allocated to 
the Royal Canadian Navy and related industries, Canad  would have witnessed 
greater national development, economic development, industrial development and 
regional development, all of which were important elements towards achieving 
greater national autonomy for Canada.  
The Senate, in part, followed the intentions of the Fathers of Confederation 
by blocking a fiscally imprudent use of Canadian taxpayer’s money. The Senate 
considered the bill’s passage would have hindered th  advancement of Canadian 
national defence. In the Senate’s view it was time for Canada ‘to paddle her own 
canoe’ and not lose sight of Canadian national interes s of self-security rather than 
dependent security. However, as the Naval Aid Bill created great controversy, and 
generated strongly opposing arguments, the Senate lost clarity on where the majority 
of Canadians stood on this principal issue. As a result, many senators favoured a 
plebiscite and the Senate blocked the passage of the Naval Aid Bill by stating, “That 
this House is not justified in giving its assent to this bill until it is submitted to the 
judgement of the country.”7 
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The Old Age Pension Bill 
In 1926 the Senate found that after careful consideration blockage was 
necessary in order to prevent the passage of the Old Age Pension Bill, on the grounds 
that its introduction into Parliament was hasty, potentially unconstitutional, and 
carried out with no evidence of demand for such legis ation from either the provinces 
or the public. To obtain a razor thin majority in the House of Commons, Mackenzie 
King and his Liberal minority government, required the support of the Progressive 
members and Labour members. Progressive support was easily obtainable but to 
survive, King was required to introduce an old age pensions bill to obtain the support 
of the Labour members. The bill would have provided ol  age pensions of twenty 
dollars per month to individuals seventy years or older. Virtually every member of 
the House of Commons agreed upon the principle of old age pensions, and the bill 
was easily passed through to the Senate. What started s an agreement with two 
Labour members of parliament for majority support in he House of Commons began 
a significant debate in the Canadian Parliament with respect to federal incursion into 
provincial rights. This bill provided an excellent opportunity to examine the 
performance of the Senate with this socially and natio lly significant piece of 
legislation. 
The Senate was supportive of providing pensions for the old aged, but it did 
not appreciate how the Government went about this in developing the Old Age 
Pension Bill. Out of the three blocked bills examined in this study, the Old Age 
Pension Bill directly concerned provincial rights. The Senate’s chief functions were 
to legislate, represent and protect; with this billal  three functions came into play. 
The Old Age Pension Bill provided a good institutional test on the upper chamber as 
the bill was developed, and passed through the lower chamber with speed – even 
though this proposed legislation appeared to intrude into provincial jurisdiction. The 
Senate legislated and ultimately blocked the Old Age Pension Bill for two well 
founded reasons. The bill was believed to be ultra vires, in that it invaded the rights 
of the provinces. The senators articulated their respective provinces’ concerns in the 
Canadian Parliament concerning the Old Age Pension B ll as it appeared to be ill-
considered, and likely to potentially encroach on the provinces’ constitutional rights, 
as delineated in Section 92 of the British North America Act. Such actions ran 
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contrary to the intentions of Mr. Édouard Cauchon who, as a Father of 
Confederation, had intended the Canadian Senate to prevent “…the precipitancy of 
any government which might be disposed to move too fast and go too far…a 
legislative body able to protect…against the encroachments of power.”8 If passed, 
the legislation could have created a potentially conflict-generating precedent between 
the federal and provincial governments. The Senate perception that the Old Age 
Pension Bill was unconstitutional led to an appropriate decision to block passage of 
this legislation.  
The second reason why the Senate blocked the Old Age Pension Bill was the 
lack of consent from the provinces, of legislation that demanded a great deal of 
participation from their governments as key administrators of the plan. A number of 
senators believed that the federal government was ill- dvised to push legislation 
through Parliament without securing a firm agreement from the provinces. The 
Government felt the best course of action was to pass the Old Age Pension Bill, 
which was essentially a framework for national pensio , then work out the specifics 
and technicalities with each province at a later date. The Senate was intended to act 
as a sober second thought to such bills when they are introduced and passed through 
the House of Commons with such speed, without the proper examination warranted 
to them, especially a bill which appeared to be invasi e in the provincial field. The 
Senate performed admirably as it blocked a bill that had been ill-considered in the 
House of Commons and did not, therefore, represent good public policy of provincial 
infringement. 
 
Lack of Independence 
Although the Senate’s blockage of each bill was justified with solid 
reasoning, in each case the actions of the Senate highlig ted the key issue of partisan 
block voting that had concerned the Fathers of Confederation. Partisan block voting 
affected the independence of the Senate and the legislative outcomes in each case.  
The Senate was intended to act as an independent chamber within the Canadian 
Parliament. The Fathers of Confederation had intended that the Senate should 
                                                
8 Provincial Parliament of Canada. Parliamentary Debates on the subject of the Confederation of the 
British North American Provinces (2 March 1865), p. 572 (Joseph Édouard Cauchon, Member of 
Provincial Parliament). 
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legislate at a distance from strong gusts of public passion, not to be swayed but to 
evaluate proposed legislation for its true merits, and for the overall benefit of 
Canada. George Brown and John A. Macdonald, both hig ly venerable Fathers of 
Confederation, stated that the Senate was to be an independent chamber. George 
Brown said, “The desire was to render the upper house a thoroughly independent 
body – one that would be in the best position to canvass dispassionately the measures 
of (the lower house)….”9 John A. Macdonald said the Senate “…must be an 
independent house, having a free action of its own….” To act on its own was key. 
By creating an appointed chamber where its members would sit for life, the 
Fathers of Confederation tried to establish an independent Senate. By creating an 
appointed-for-life chamber where the members do not face re-election, it was hoped 
that senators could evaluate and legislate independently and beneficially for Canada, 
without fear of losing their seats. However, this intention never resulted in reality. 
Confederation was in 1867 and by 1873, Senate seats had been filled and then 
refilled according to the partisan views of the political party installed in office.10 The 
pattern of partisan appointments in the Senate was evident throughout the early years 
of the Senate. For example, G.B Roberts determined John A. Macdonald made one 
hundred and seventeen party appointments, while Wilfrid Laurier made eighty-three 
party appointments.11 Left alone long enough, partisan appointments often result into 
partisan block voting. Partisan block voting was an issue with the Esquimalt and 
Nanaimo Railway Bill, and more so with the Naval Aid Bill and the Old Age 
Pension Bill. Partisan block voting is the act of individuals voting with their 
respected political parties, not necessarily having a  independent mindset and voting 
on proposed legislation in terms of what they individually considered was best for 
the nation. I would argue that we cannot blame the Fathers of Confederation in what 
the Senate developed into. Although the Fathers of Confederation were worried 
about partisan block voting during the Confederation Conferences, Canadian 
political parties were in their infancy and party discipline in the legislatures was 
                                                
9 Provincial Parliament of Canada. Parliamentary Debates on the subject of the Confederation of the 
British North American Provinces (8 February 1865), p. 90 (George Brown, Member of Pr vincial 
Parliament).  
10 Harold W.V. Temperley, Senates and Upper Chambers (London: Chapman and Hall, 1910), 224.  
11 G.B. Roberts, The Functions of an English Second Chamber (London: George Allen and Unwin, 
1926) 156. 
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rather loose.12 As a result of the fluidity of political partisan behaviour prior to 1867, 
the Fathers of Confederation did not entirely foresee a Senate which would vote in 
large rigid blocks based on political party allegiance in Canada.  
Having a fixed, constitutionally-rigid number of Senate seats was an 
additional issue associated with the intention of having a more independent Senate. If 
the Senate did not have a rigid number of seats and the numbers were rather fluid 
which could be increased, the government of the day could simply appoint new 
partisan senators that would vote favourably towards government measures, hence 
reducing the independence of the upper house. I would argue, is a beneficial 
inclusion in the British North America Act, found in Section 28.13 However, having a 
rigid number is disadvantageous as well. If the Senate is at its maximum capacity, 
then the prime minister could not appoint additional p rtisan senators, in order to 
encourage greater partisan support in the Senate. This can create a hindrance in 
Canada because it also creates Senates with hostile tend ncies towards the lower 
house after there has been a government change in th House of Commons. This was 
exactly the problem Alexander Mackenzie and his Liberal government incurred 
when he became prime minister in 1873. According to Robert Dawson, it only took 
five years after 1867 for a system of party-based nomi ations to the Senate to 
become well established in Canada.14 There was a large Conservative majority in the 
Senate, while there was a Liberal majority in the House of Commons. This was the 
first time in Canadian parliamentary history when opp sing political parties held 
different majorities in the two chambers of Parliament. The Prime Minister tried to 
appoint more members (under Section 26 of the British North America Act) as there 
was majority of Conservative senators and he felt th re was an unfair dominance of 
Conservatives in the Senate. Mackenzie’s request wa rejected and the Senate did 
vote in a partisan manner with respect to the blockage of the Esquimalt and Nanaimo 
Railway Bill, but it was not to the same degree found in later votes, such as the other 
two blocked bills considered in this study. Perhaps the Senate, still in its relative 
                                                
12 See Peter H. Russell, Constitutional Odyssey (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 16.  
13 Please refer to Appendix E for the full except of he Section.  
14 Robert MacGregor Dawson. The Principle of Official Independence (Toronto: S.B. Gundy, 1922), 
243. 
 149 
infancy, exhibited some independence which was intended by the Fathers of 
Confederation as the Senate had not matured and established itself fully by 1875.  
The primary cause of a loss of independence would be if political parties 
dictated the vote outcome and, secondly, if the politica  leaders outside the Senate 
tried to influence the vote within the Senate.  Clearly political partisanship was 
involved with the Naval Aid Bill. As Dawson noted, by the time the Conservatives 
got back into power, the Liberals, under Laurier had “…completed a fifteen-year 
tenure without making one Conservative appointment.”15 Senate independence was a 
major concern and it was intended that senators would legislate independently from 
outside interference, interference such as threats by heir local constituents to remove 
them from political office at the next election if they voted in a particular way. 
However, this is independence from the people.  As Robert Dawson has argued, “An 
examination of the history of the Senate…shows thatwhile it was the aim of the 
founders of the Dominion to secure the personal independence of its members, that 
aim has never been secured.”16  
The intention for the Senate to be a thoroughly independent chamber was not 
fulfilled either with the Naval Aid Bill. As Dawson argued, the Canadian Senate, 
“…is independent of the people certainly, and that does not appear to be much in its 
favour; but, as for independence in the higher sense of impartiality or freedom from 
party prejudices and predilections, it can lay no claim to the slightest infusion of 
it.” 17 The Senate demonstrated a great lack of independence with the clear 
demonstration of partisan voting. Perhaps the Naval Aid Bill polarized the two 
political parties to such a degree that nothing less could be expected. It was debated 
in the House of Commons for months, only passed with the adoption of closure and 
broke parliamentary records. A middle ground could not have been achieved. Wilfrid 
Laurier and Robert Borden were two dynamic leaders who both commanded great 
respect among their respective peers, so much so as to influence and shape the formal 
lawmaking decisions in the Senate. As Marc Milner noted, Wilfrid Laurier “…was 
able to impose party discipline on Liberal senators when the navy aid bill came 
                                                
15 Ibid., 244. 
16 Ibid., 240.  
17 Ibid., 251.  
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forward for a vote on 29 May 1913 and was rejected.” 18 The Liberal senators 
probably thought, if Laurier resigned, who would lead against Borden and the 
Conservatives? The choice was clear for the Liberal senators – they had to block the 
bill. However, for every charge that the Liberals received concerning partisanship – 
the Conservative senators were equally guilty. If the Conservative senators were any 
less partisan there would have been a greater distribution of Conservative votes 
during the final vote outcome.  
By 1926 the Canadian Senate had a power shift and Co servatives were in a 
strong majority in the Senate while there was a Liberal minority-government in the 
House of Commons and this again caused political partisan problems. A number of 
Conservative senators voiced their concern over the Old Age Pension Bill as it 
entered the legislative process in Parliament unexpectedly, having not been 
mentioned in the election campaign or in the Speech from the Throne. The argument 
that the Senate ought to have blocked this bill because it was not mentioned in the 
election campaign or Speech from the Throne is veryweak. There are hundreds of 
government bills introduced that never have been metioned in these forums.  Just 
because a bill is not mentioned in the election campaign or the Speech from the 
Throne, does not mean the government cannot introduce it.  
Although no direct evidence of political interferenc  was found from 
prominent members of parliament towards the Senate, as was with the case of the 
Naval Aid Bill, there are always questions of that possibility with the Old Age 
Pension Bill. The bill was created through an agreem nt within the House of 
Commons that would enable the minority Liberal Government to maintain 
confidence in the lower chamber. The Conservatives might have applied any tactic to 
break that confidence – even in the Senate. By voting against the bill, the Senate 
might have tested the support that the Liberals had obtained from Labour members in 
the House of Commons. The vote outcome in the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway 
Bill, the Naval Aid Bill, and the Old Age Pension Bill, all show that partisan block 
voting was an issue and that senators did not have the free independent action of their 
own, as the Fathers of Confederation had intended.  
 
                                                
18 Marc Milner, Canada’s Navy: The First Century (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 28. 
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Post-Script 
As with everything, life continued after the Senate’s blockages of the three 
government bills. The railway between Esquimalt and Nanaimo was privately 
financed by a coal magnate and completed in 1886.19 Canada never financed the 
three Dreadnought battleships, but did enter the First World War at Britain’s side as a 
strong ally and Canada’s military policy changed at the outbreak to accommodate the 
fact that it was a country at war. The Old Age Pension Bill , which was blocked in 
June of 1926, was reintroduced in the House of Commns in February of 1927.20 
Between that time there was another Canadian general el ction, and Mackenzie King 
made old age pensions a prominent campaign issue. The Liberals were returned to 
office and the Senate subsequently passed the legislation as the Government had a 
clear electoral mandate supporting the measure.21  
 
Conclusion 
Partisan Appointments and the Lack of Independence 
There is a clear problem with partisan appointments to he Senate, resulting in 
a lack of senatorial independence.  The Fathers of Confederation believed that an 
appointed Senate would be more independent, since there would be no public 
elections the senators could evaluate and legislate on what was the correct and 
beneficial thing to do for Canada. However, this hanot always been the case.  Just 
because the senators could be independent, it does not mean they always would be 
independent. The chief antagonist of Senate independence is the partisan 
appointment. As John Turner argued, “Political considerations have succeeded in 
depriving the Senate of any independence. Party appointments to the Senate produce, 
naturally enough, party senators; and their independence, their calm judgement, their 
impartiality tend to vanish when subjected to strain.”22 A Liberal appointment would 
equate to Liberal voting, a Conservative appointment would lead to Conservative 
voting. Prime Minister Arthur Meighen once said, “The Senate is worthless if it 
                                                
19 See S. W. Jackman, Vancouver Island (Harrisburgh: Stackpole Books, 1972), 47. 
20 See Kenneth Bryden, Old Age Pensions and Policy-Making in Canada. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1974), 72.  
21 See Henry S. Albinski, “The Canadian Senate: Politics and the Constitution,” The American 
Political Science Review Vol. 57, No. 2 (June, 1963): 381. 
22 John Turner, “The Senate of Canada – Political Conundrum,” in Canadian Issues: Essays in 
Honour of Henry F. Angus, ed. Robert M. Clark (Toronto: University of Toront  Press, 1961), 72. 
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becomes merely another Commons divided upon party lines and indulging in party 
debates such as are familiar in the lower chamber session after session. If the Senate 
ever permits itself to fulfil that function and tha alone in the scheme of 
Confederation, then the sooner it is abolished the better.”23  
There is a problem with the ‘independence’ concept. There is a lack of 
independence in the Senate, but what is independence, a d from what? Independence 
from outside forces? Independence from the public? Independence from political 
parties?  The public influenced the Senate, primarily during the Naval Aid Bill, they 
are an outside force, but so was Wilfrid Laurier. Who and what is the Senate 
supposed to be independent from.  The concept of the Senate being independent, I 
would argue, is far too vague. Individuals must not forget that the Senate is not pure 
and it is not a completely isolated chamber as it forms an integral part of Parliament. 
The Canadian Parliament is a bicameral legislature and the House of Commons will 
always have some influence over the Senate and vice versa. As Canada developed, so 
did Parliament, and what was once rather loose partisanship in the Senate, developed 
into rather rigid partisanship with predictable voting patterns. A non-partisan Senate 
may not be achievable without some significant reform.  The Senate did not fully 
fulfil all the intentions of the Fathers of Confederation from 1864, but to fulfil all the 
intentions perhaps might be too large of an expectation for it to follow. Nations 
develop and situations change that could not have been anticipated by the Fathers of 
Confederation, such as at the time of the Naval Aid Bill  when the leader of the 
opposition in the House of Commons threatened to resign if the Senate did not do as 
requested.  However, a nation can grow, develop and mature beyond these particular 
situations and reform of Parliament can be designed to prevent such action in the 
future.  
The analysis of the three bills provided in this thesis shows that immediately 
following Confederation, the Senate provided a sober s cond thought during 
Canada’s formative years. The Senate protected Canadians against hasty legislation 
and the creation of bad precedents. The Senate also encouraged financial prudence, 
and blocked legislation that would have infringed into the provincial field. These 
where three rather controversial bills introduced in Parliament that were blocked, but 
                                                
23 Arthur Meighen, “The Canadian Senate,” Queen’s Quarterly Vol. 44, No. 2 (Summer 1937): 159. 
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as Robert MacKay has argued, “The Senate is virtually indispensable as a revising 
chamber for legislation coming up from the Commons. The great bulk of legislation 
is non-controversial and for the purpose of amendment the party balance in the 
Senate makes little difference. It is highly important that legislation passed by 
Parliament should be as nearly perfect as possible in order to avoid administrative 
embarrassment, legal uncertainties and consequent litiga ion.”24 The Senate did well, 
but it cannot claim to be a thoroughly independent chamber because it acted in a 
partisan manner – but it was never unprofessional. Serge Joyal, a highly respected 
and venerable senator has stated, “The Senate is perhaps the last remaining obstacle 
to the total domination of Parliament by the executive government. Its demise would 
signal the atrophy of parliamentary federalism in Canada and the birth of a less 
Canadian system of government.”25 
 
Directions for Future Research 
In looking to the future research if one was to study similar bills, it would be 
interesting to examine the dynamics and relationship further between the Senate and 
House of Commons with legislation that might infringe on the rights of the provinces 
when the two chambers shared the same majority governing party. There would be a 
rather interesting dynamic for the senator as would they represent the province or 
support the party? However, the period of study ought to be after 1915 when Western 
Canada was officially designated as a region in the Senate and had twenty-four 
senators representing the Western provinces so as nt to handicap any one region’s 
representation.  
Critical analysis of the modern unreformed Senate is rather straightforward, 
but perhaps in a future study some scholars ought to create a series of different 
reformed Senate models and theorize how they would perform in Canada. How 
would each model theoretically perform within the first five years, within the first 
decade and so on? What role would the provinces play throughout the years? 
Theoretically, how would Canadians react to different models, through either senator 
                                                
24 Robert A. MacKay, The Unreformed Senate of Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967), 
110.  
25 Serge Joyal, “Conclusion: The Senate as the Embodiment of the Federal Principle,” in Protecting 
Canadian Democracy: The Senate You Never Knew, ed. Serge Joyal (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2003), 307. 
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selection or consistent use of legislative power? This is not an effortless task, but I 
would argue the analysis would be rather interesting to Canadianists, political 
scientists, political theorists and anyone interested in institutional reform.  
 
Reform in the Present Day 
Following the Senate’s creation in 1867 it has been designated as a 
problematic institution in need of reform, subjected to numerous reform proposals 
that have provided a wealth of literature on the Canadian upper chamber. At the 
present time, Prime Minister Harper has been actively discussing and trying to 
reform Canada’s upper chamber in Parliament. In the Sp ech from the Throne that 
followed Harper’s formation of a majority government after the 2011 election, 
Governor General Johnston said, “Reform of the Senate remains a priority for our 
Government. Our Government will reintroduce legislat on to limit term lengths and 
to encourage provinces and territories to hold elections for Senate nominees.”26 In 
scholarly analysis, David Docherty has argued that t ere is success with simplicity in 
that the “…best hope for change to the structure of the Senate lies in smaller, 
incremental moves that do not require amending the Canadian Constitution.”27 This 
is the current method that Prime Minister Harper is trying with Bill C-7, An Act 
respecting the selection of senators and amending the Constitution Act, 1867 in 
respect of Senate term limits.28 There are two key elements of the bill which involve 
the selection of new senators, and term limits. Thebill states that the prime minister 
“…must consider names from the most current list of Senate nominees selected for 
that province or territory.”29 How those names are placed on the list is unclear and 
the prime minister only needs to ‘consider’ the list of names and is not required to 
follow the provided list. An interesting situation would develop if the provinces ran 
an open and perfectly legitimate Senate election and provided the names of the 
‘elected’ on a list for the prime minister of the day to be considered, but the prime 
                                                
26 Canada. Speech from the Throne. H re for all Canadians: Stability, Prosperity, Security. (Ottawa. 3 
June 2011), 15. 
27 Docherty, “The Canadian Senate: Chamber of Sober Reflection or Loony Cousin Best Not Talked 
About,” 28. 
28 Parliament of Canada. “Bill C-7 - An Act respecting the selection of senators and amending the 
Constitution Act, 1867 in respect of Senate term liits.” 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Docid=5101177&file=4 
(Date created unknown, date last accessed on 31 August 2011). 
29 Ibid.  
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minister decided to appoint someone else. The second element of Bill C-7 is senator 
term limits and the bill states that a senator’s term will expire after nine years of 
being summoned.30 Senate reform remains very difficult and only time will tell 
whether Harper will be successful or if his proposal will be added to the other failed 
attempts.   
 Reforming upper chambers is not an exclusively Canadian topic as other 
countries have also proposed reform to their upper chambers. The most notable is the 
discussion occurring in Britain surrounding the House of Lords. In the most recent 
Queen’s Speech, Her Majesty said, “My Government will propose parliamentary and 
political reform to restore trust in democratic inst tutions and rebalance the 
relationship between the citizen and the state. (…) Proposals will be brought forward 
for a reformed second house that is wholly or mainly elected on the basis of 
proportional representation.”31 This is remarkable as the Fathers of Confederation 
used the House of Lords as a model for the Canadian Senate, and it too is now in the 
reform spotlight. It is also rather interesting as both are contemplating the election of 
further members, rather than continued appointment. As one can see there have been 
active discussions surrounding reform to both the Canadian and British upper 
chambers, and certainly strong parallels based on similarities between the two 
chambers make it a valid and beneficial relationship in the international transfer of 
knowledge.  
The calls for reform in the twenty-first century are not surprising as it is 
socially and politically unacceptable to have appointed members in the Canadian 
Senate. Reform and revitalization of the Senate and other democratic institutions will 
be beneficial.  Former speaker of the Senate, Wishart Robertson once argued 
“…there is a real need to consciously and continuously (cultivate) our democratic 
institutions…trying to improve and better them, if they are to survive and if freedom, 
                                                
30 Ibid.  
31 House of Lords, “Queen’s Speech.” 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldhansrd/text/100525-0001.htm#1005255000174 
(Date created unknown, Date last accessed on 31 August 2011). 
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as we know it, is not to perish.”32 Canada is potentially on the verge on reforming its 
upper chamber.   
There are problems with the contemporary Senate and this study also 
concluded that there were problems with the Senate during the first sixty years of 
Confederation. The expectations of the Fathers of Confederation were not entirely 
met after the Senate was created and this is relevant in the modern discussion as it 
provides more weight upon the arguments for Senate reform. However, the 
discussion in this thesis suggests that there must be caution about reform and the 
Senate. What reformers intend may not always come about after the period of reform 
takes place. An important consideration and a word f caution goes out to the 
individuals who wish for parliamentary institutional reform, what you want and what 
you get after a period of reform might be two completely different things. 





















                                                
32 Library and Archives Canada, Wishart Robertson Fonds, R9206 #3, "Constitution of the Senate" 
series, 3-10, 1944, The Canadian Senate – Its Purpose and Function, page 2, Senator Wishart 




Significant dates regarding the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill 
 
 
1 July 1867   Confederation. 
 
 
20 July 1871   British Columbia entered Confederation. 
 
 
7 November 1873  Alexander Mackenzie became Prime Minister. 
 
 
February 1874   James Edgar went to British Columbia. 
 
 
19 May 1874   James Edgar left British Columbia.  
 
 
November 1874  Carnarvon Terms were laid out. 
 
 
19 March 1875 First reading in the House of Commons. 
 
 
29 March 1875 Third reading in the House of Commons. 
 
 
3 April 1875 First reading in the Senate. 
 
 
6 April 1875 The Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway Bill received 
hoist amendment. 
 
8 April 1875 Parliament was prorogued and the Esquimalt and 















Significant dates regarding the Naval Aid Bill 
 
 
Summer 1912   Prime Minister Robert Borden visited Britain. 
 
 
21 November 1912  Speech from the Throne. 
 
 
5 December 1912  First reading in the House of Commns. 
 
 
28 February 1913  Second reading in the House of Comm ns. 
 
 
9 April 1912   Closure applied to the Naval Aid Bill.  
 
 
15 May 1913   Third reading in the House of Commons. 
 
 
20 May 1913 First reading in the Senate. 
 
 



























Significant dates regarding the Old Age Pension Bill 
 
 
29 October 1925  1925 Canadian Federal Election. 
 
 
8 January 1926  Speech from the Throne. 
 
 
26 March 1926  Discussion started in the House of Commons. 
 
 
15 April 1926   First reading in the House of Commons. 
 
 
16 April 1926   Second reading in the House of Commns. 
 
 
28 May 1926   Third reading in the House of Commons. 
 
 
1 June 1926   First reading in the House of Commons. 
 
 
























Excerpts of the 72 Quebec Resolutions1 
 
6. There shall be a General Legislature or Parliament for the Federated Provinces, 
composed of a Legislative Council and a House of Comm ns. 
 
7. For the purpose of forming the Legislative Council, the Federated Provinces shall 
be considered as consisting of three divisions: 1st Upper Canada, 2nd Lower Canada, 
3rd Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island; each division with an 
equal representation in the Legislative Council. 
 
8. Upper Canada shall be represented in the Legislative Council by 24 members, 
Lower Canada by 24 members, and the 3 Maritime Provinces by 24 members, of 
which Nova Scotia shall have 10, New Brunswick 10, and Prince Edward Island 4 
members. 
 
11. The members of the Legislative Council shall be appointed by the Crown under 
the Great Seal of the General Government, and shallhold office during life: if any 
Legislative Councillor shall, for two consecutive ses ions of Parliament, fail to give 
his attendance in the said Council, his seat shall t ereby become vacant. 
 
12. The members of the Legislative Council shall be British subjects by birth or 
naturalization, of the full age of thirty years, shall possess a continuous real property 
qualification of four thousand dollars over and above all incumbrances, and shall be 
and continue worth that sum over and above their debts and liabilities, but in the case 
of Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island, the property may be either real or 
personal. 
 
14. The first selection of the Members of the Legislatve Council shall be made, 
except as regards Prince Edward Island, from the Legislative Councils of the various 
Provinces, so far as a sufficient number be found qualified and willing to serve; such 
Members shall be appointed by the Crown at the recommendation of the General 
Executive Government, upon the nomination of the respective Local Governments, 
and in such nomination due regard shall be had to the claims of the Members of the 
Legislative Council of the Opposition in each Province, so that all political parties 
may as nearly as possible be fairly represented. 
 
 
                                                
1 Canada. Library and Archives Canada. “The Quebec Resolutions, October, 1864” Government of 
Canada. http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/confederation/023001-7104-e.html  




Excerpts of the British North America Act, 18671 
 
21. The Senate shall, subject to the Provisions of this Act, consist of Seventy-two 
Members, who shall be styled Senators. 
 
22. In relation to the Constitution of the Senate, Canada shall be deemed to consist of 
Three Divisions:  
1. Ontario; 
2. Quebec; 
3. The Maritime Provinces, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick; 
which Three Divisions shall (subject to the Provisions of this Act) be equally 
represented in the Senate as follows: 
• Ontario by Twenty-four Senators; 
• Quebec by Twenty-four Senators; 
• and the Maritime Provinces by Twenty-four Senators, Twelve thereof 
representing Nova Scotia, and Twelve thereof represnting New Brunswick. 
In the Case of Quebec each of the Twenty-four Senators representing that Province 
shall be appointed for One of the Twenty-four Electoral Divisions of Lower Canada 
specified in Schedule A. to Chapter One of the Consolidated Statutes of Canada. 
23. The Qualifications of a Senator shall be as follows:  
• (1.) He shall be of the full Age of Thirty Years: 
• (2.) He shall be either a Natural-born Subject of the Queen, or a Subject of 
the Queen naturalized by an Act of the Parliament of Great Britain, or of the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, or of the 
Legislature of One of the Provinces of Upper Canada, Lower Canada, 
Canada, Nova Scotia, or New Brunswick, before the Union, or of the 
Parliament of Canada after the Union: 
• (3.) He shall be legally or equitably seised as of Freehold for his own Use and 
Benefit of Lands or Tenements held in Free and Commn Socage, or seised 
or possessed for his own Use and Benefit of Lands or Tenements held in 
Franc-alleu or in Roture, within the Province for which he is appointed, of the 
Value of Four thousand Dollars, over and above all Rents, Dues, Debts, 
Charges, Mortgages, and Incumbrances due or payable out of or charged on 
or affecting the same: 
• (4.) His Real and Personal Property shall be together worth Four thousand 
Dollars over and above his Debts and Liabilities: 
• (5.) He shall be resident in the Province for which he is appointed: 
                                                
1 Canada. Department of Justice Canada. “British North America Act, 1867” Government of Canada. 
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/const/lawreg-loireg/p1t11.html  
(Date created unknown, date last accessed on 31 August 2011).   
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• (6.) In the Case of Quebec he shall have his Real Property Qualification in the 
Electoral Division for which he is appointed, or shall be resident in that 
Division. 
24. The Governor General shall from Time to Time, in the Queen's Name, by 
Instrument under the Great Seal of Canada, summon qualified Persons to the Senate; 
and, subject to the Provisions of this Act, every Person so summoned shall become 
and be a Member of the Senate and a Senator. 
 
25. Such Persons shall be first summoned to the Senate as the Queen by Warrant 
under Her Majesty's Royal Sign Manual thinks fit to approve, and their Names shall 
be inserted in the Queen's Proclamation of Union. 
 
26. If at any Time on the Recommendation of the Governor General the Queen 
thinks fit to direct that Three or Six Members be added to the Senate, the Governor 
General may by Summons to Three or Six qualified Persons (as the Case may be), 
representing equally the Three Divisions of Canada, d to the Senate accordingly. 
 
27. In case of such Addition being at any Time made, th  Governor General shall not 
summon any Person to the Senate, except on a further like Direction by the Queen on 
the like Recommendation, until each of the Three Divisions of Canada is represented 
by Twenty-four Senators and no more. 
 
28. The Number of Senators shall not at any Time exceed Seventy-eight. 
 
29. A Senator shall, subject to the Provisions of thisAct, hold his Place in the Senate 
for Life. 
 
31. The Place of a Senator shall become vacant in any of the following Cases: 
• (1.) If for Two consecutive Sessions of the Parliament he fails to give his 
Attendance in the Senate: 
• (2.) If he takes an Oath or makes a Declaration or Acknowledgment of 
Allegiance, Obedience, or Adherence to a Foreign Power, or does an Act 
whereby he becomes a Subject or Citizen, or entitled to the Rights or 
Privileges of a Subject or Citizen, of a Foreign Power: 
• (3.) If he is adjudged Bankrupt or Insolvent, or applies for the Benefit of any 
Law relating to Insolvent Debtors, or becomes a public Defaulter: 
• (4.) If he is attainted of Treason or convicted of Felony or of any infamous 
Crime: 
• (5.) If he ceases to be qualified in respect of Prope ty or of Residence; 
provided, that a Senator shall not be deemed to have ceased to be qualified in 
respect of Residence by reason only of his residing at the Seat of the 
Government of Canada while holding an Office under that Government 
requiring his Presence there. 
32. When a Vacancy happens in the Senate by Resignation, Death, or otherwise, the 
Governor General shall by Summons to a fit and qualified Person fill the Vacancy. 
 163 
 
33. If any Question arises respecting the Qualification of a Senator or a Vacancy in 
the Senate the same shall be heard and determined by the Senate. 
 
34. The Governor General may from Time to Time, by Instrument under the Great 
Seal of Canada, appoint a Senator to be Speaker of the Senate, and may remove him 
and appoint another in his Stead. 
 
35. Until the Parliament of Canada otherwise provides, the Presence of at least 
Fifteen Senators, including the Speaker, shall be nec ssary to constitute a Meeting of 
the Senate for the Exercise of its Powers. 
 
36. Questions arising in the Senate shall be decided by a Majority of Voices, and the 
Speaker shall in all Cases have a Vote, and when the Voices are equal the Decision 
shall be deemed to be in the Negative. 
 
53. Bills for appropriating any Part of the Public Revenue, or for imposing any Tax 
or Impost, shall originate in the House of Commons. 
 
91. It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate and House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good 
Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of 
Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces; and 
for greater Certainty, but not so as to restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms 
of this Section, it is hereby declared that (notwithstanding anything in this Act) the 
exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to all Matters 
coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say, --  
1. The Public Debt and Property. 
2. The Regulation of Trade and Commerce. 
3. The raising of Money by any Mode or System of Taxation. 
4. The borrowing of Money on the Public Credit. 
5. Postal Service. 
6. The Census and Statistics. 
7. Militia, Military and Naval Service, and Defence. 
8. The fixing of and providing for the Salaries and Allowances of Civil and 
other Officers of the Government of Canada. 
9. Beacons, Buoys, Lighthouses, and Sable Island. 
10. Navigation and Shipping. 
11. Quarantine and the Establishment and Maintenance of Marine Hospitals. 
12. Sea Coast and Inland Fisheries. 
13. Ferries between a Province and any British or Foreign Country or between 
Two Provinces. 
14. Currency and Coinage. 
15. Banking, Incorporation of Banks, and the Issue of Paper Money. 
16. Savings Banks. 
17. Weights and Measures. 
18. Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes. 
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19. Interest. 
20. Legal Tender. 
21. Bankruptcy and Insolvency. 
22. Patents of Invention and Discovery. 
23. Copyrights. 
24. Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians. 
25. Naturalization and Aliens. 
26. Marriage and Divorce. 
27. The Criminal Law, except the Constitution of Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction, 
but including the Procedure in Criminal Matters. 
28. The Establishment, Maintenance, and Management of Penitentiaries. 
29. Such Classes of Subjects as are expressly excepted in the Enumeration of the 
Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the 
Provinces. 
And any Matter coming within any of the Classes of Subjects enumerated in this 
Section shall not be deemed to come within the Class of Matters of a local or private 
Nature comprised in the Enumeration of the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned 
exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces. 
92. In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to 
Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next h reinafter enumerated, that is to 
say, 
1. The Amendment from Time to Time, notwithstanding anything in this Act, of 
the Constitution of the Province, except as regards the Office of Lieutenant 
Governor. 
2. Direct Taxation within the Province in order to the raising of a Revenue for 
Provincial Purposes. 
3. The borrowing of Money on the sole Credit of the Province. 
4. The Establishment and Tenure of Provincial Offices and the Appointment 
and Payment of Provincial Officers. 
5. The Management and Sale of the Public Lands belonging to the Province and 
of the Timber and Wood thereon. 
6. The Establishment, Maintenance, and Management of Public and 
Reformatory Prisons in and for the Province. 
7. The Establishment, Maintenance, and Management of Hospitals, Asylums, 
Charities, and Eleemosynary Institutions in and for the Province, other than 
Marine Hospitals. 
8. Municipal Institutions in the Province. 
9. Shop, Saloon, Tavern, Auctioneer, and other Licences in order to the raising 
of a Revenue for Provincial, Local, or Municipal Purposes. 
10. Local Works and Undertakings other than such as are of the following 
Classes,--  
1. Lines of Steam or other Ships, Railways, Canals, Telegraphs, and 
other Works and Undertakings connecting the Province with any other 
or others of the Provinces, or extending beyond the Limits of the 
Province: 
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2. Lines of Steam Ships between the Province and any British or Foreign 
Country: 
3. Such Works as, although wholly situate within the Province, are 
before or after their Execution declared by the Parliament of Canada 
to be for the general Advantage of Canada or for the Advantage of 
Two or more of the Provinces. 
11. The Incorporation of Companies with Provincial Objects. 
12. The Solemnization of Marriage in the Province. 
13. Property and Civil Rights in the Province. 
14. The Administration of Justice in the Province, including the Constitution, 
Maintenance, and Organization of Provincial Courts, both of Civil and of 
Criminal Jurisdiction, and including Procedure in Civil Matters in those 
Courts. 
15. The Imposition of Punishment by Fine, Penalty, or Imprisonment for 
enforcing any Law of the Province made in relation  any Matter coming 
within any of the Classes of Subjects enumerated in this Section. 
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